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Abstract 
 
Among other Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia and Myanmar have the highest levels of 
vulnerability (UNISDR, 2010). Based on the indicator of the average annual number of 
casualties per one million residents, both countries have a high level of susceptibility to disaster. 
This study of Indonesia and Myanmar was initially motivated by the intriguing question of what 
makes these countries vulnerable to disaster. Most particularly, this study focused on disaster 
risk governance (DRG). 
For the last three decades, the global policies and meetings on disaster risk reduction (DRR) 
have consistently repeated the commitment to strengthening DRG. The concept of DRG has been 
used as a frame to explain structural arrangements and multifaceted interaction among actors 
working with the objective of reducing risk. 
As the core infrastructure of DRR, DRG requires the strong engagement of multiple actors 
involved in DRR in a country. The international community has converged on the principle of 
‘inclusive DRR’. Referring to the work of Gaillard and Mercer (2012), inclusive DRR denotes 
‘the collaboration of a wide array of stakeholders operating across different scales’ (Gaillard and 
Mercer, 2012: 95). To achieve inclusive DRR, the governance of disaster risk also needs to 
provide space to the multiplicity of actors who have a stake in DRR. Inspired by these works, 
this thesis studies pluricentric mechanisms to reduce disaster risk. 
Despite the international convergence on the idea that DRG has to be inclusive, and should 
bring in public and private actors, crucially, the actual practice of DRG faces challenges. At the 
beginning of this PhD trajectory, there were already signs of growing frustrations that appeared 
to overshadow the spirit of inclusiveness. However, these misgivings were not yet underpinned 
by empirical research. The chief objective of this study was therefore to re-visit the debate based 
on empirical findings. This thesis sought to investigate the dynamics of DRG in the global arena, 
Indonesia and Myanmar by zooming into three dimensions: the institutional setting of the 
governance network (polity), the power relations among network actors (politics) and the 
advocacy politics (policy). The following questions guided the research: 
 
(1) How has inclusive DRR been developed at the global level? 
(2) How does the principle of inclusiveness on DRG work in practice in Indonesia and 
Myanmar? 
a. What are the characteristics of the polity, policy and politics of DRG in Indonesia and 
Myanmar? 
b. To what extent has the actual practice of inclusiveness been affected by the domestic 
political environment? 
 To what extent has decentralisation in Indonesia contributed to DRG? 
 To what extent has political transition in Myanmar influenced the dynamics of DRG? 
(3) How has the idea of an interactive structure for DRR governance networks played out in 
Indonesia and Myanmar? 
 What explains the different perceptions of risk among multiple actors involved in the 
process of interactive governance?  
 What are the actual challenges to the practice of inclusive DRR in DRG? 
(4) What are the lessons learned on interactive governance from the two case studies? 
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This research used qualitative methods for data collection, processing and analysis. The 
research design was further developed by including multiple qualitative methods of data 
collection within the case studies. Field research was conducted for 18 months, and a total of 129 
people in Indonesia and 78 in Myanmar participated in this research through semi-structured 
interviews or focus group discussions. These participants included both government officials and 
non-state actors (representatives of international organisations and NGOs). 
To organise the discussion, the thesis is divided into six chapters. After an introduction, 
chapter 2 traces the dynamics of global DRG to present the construction of inclusive DRR as a 
global framework. This chapter draws on the observation of two multi-stakeholder DRR events: 
the WCDRR in Japan in 2015 and the Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR in Thailand in 
2014. In Chapter 3, the case of decentralised DRG in Indonesia is explored with the objective of 
examining how changes in the political system influence the practice and reality of DRG. 
Chapter 4 turns to Myanmar, analysing the dynamics of DRG in the setting of political change. 
In Chapter 5, the thesis focuses on the role of NGOs in DRR multi-stakeholder advocacy 
mechanisms in Indonesia and Myanmar. This chapter emphasises the process of agenda setting, 
power relations between state and non-state actors, and advocacy channels for the DRR agenda 
in both countries. The thesis ends with a concluding chapter that synthesises the outcomes of the 
four studies and provides answers to the research questions. 
Throughout the research, the main findings of the study are as follows: (1) DRR practice has 
transformed from a top-down, state-centric and largely non-political issue into a more 
pluricentric governance network. It has become a global paradigm characterised by robust 
political commitment, a high level of participation of multiple actors and advocacy at a wide 
range of levels. (2) Political changes in Indonesia and Myanmar have significantly influenced the 
process of strengthening DRG in both countries. This change has stimulated the transformation 
of DRG towards a pluricentric approach and inspired the practice of inclusiveness by using 
multi-stakeholder initiatives in policy advocacy. (3) In practice, inclusive DRR in DRG has 
encountered implementation challenges: an organisational structure that is heavy on bureaucracy, 
poorly integrated work, coordination issues and an organisational ego. The advocacy arena for 
NGOs and other non-state actors is widening, but this space is also shrinking because the 
decision-making process has failed to develop a comprehensive plan for building a partnership 
and the government remains dominant in the agenda-setting process. (4) Differing perceptions 
among actors translate into different agendas on DRR. (5) In Indonesia and Myanmar, advocacy 
through alliances and consortiums is continuously developing: Improvements in capacity, 
resources and strategy to build a robust advocacy profile significantly strengthen credibility and 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the government, the effectiveness of advocacy is determined by 
both the network and the positional power of the network vis-à-vis the government, and the 
process of interactive governance requires actors on both sides (government and non-state actors) 
to play an active role. 
All in all, the thesis finds that the massive endorsement and policy changes towards inclusive 
DRR seem to negatively impact the capacity to reduce disaster in an effective and efficient 
manner. By state and non-state actors alike, DRG is often seen as too complex, too competitive 
and ineffective. 
Four recommendations coming from this study are follows: (1) A specific mechanism for 
coordination to facilitate the process of information and knowledge exchange within the 
government structure should be developed. This mechanism should entail periodic and regular 
reports by DRR-relevant government bodies to help the work across all sectors. In parallel, this 
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mechanism would also impact the dynamics of the governance network by offering more 
coordinated efforts to govern policy steering. Advocacy access, which is often hindered by 
heavily bureaucratic procedures, might also increase through an open coordination mechanism in 
the inter-ministerial arrangement. (2) In terms of resource issues, the current DRR global 
framework specifically highlights the agenda of regulatory and financial means as a way to 
empower local authorities. In attempting to achieve this goal, strong political willingness from 
member states is critical to improve the resource distribution from national to local governments. 
(3) A clear strategic advocacy agenda by non-state actors, as well as strong capacity in terms of 
resources and knowledge, would enable measurable action to empower these actors in 
negotiations with the government in the DRR governance network. (4) Governance network 
members should have a strong political willingness, a concrete strategic plan and robust 
resources. 
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Samenvatting  
 
De politiek van disaster risk governance in Indonesië en Myanmar: 
Een onderzoek naar de dynamiek van het governance-netwerk bij 
risicoreductie na rampen  
 
In vergelijking met andere Zuidoost-Aziatische landen zijn Indonesië en Myanmar het meest 
kwetsbaar voor rampen (UNISDR, 2010), afgaand op het gemiddeld jaarlijks aantal slachtoffers 
per miljoen inwoners. De aanleiding voor dit onderzoek naar de situatie in Indonesië en 
Myanmar was de intrigerende vraag waarom deze landen kwetsbaar zijn voor rampen. De focus 
van dit onderzoek ligt specifiek op governance van het risico bij rampen (disaster risk 
governance, DRG). 
 
De laatste drie decennia is het belang van versterking van DRG wereldwijd steeds benadrukt 
in beleid en conferenties op het gebied van risicoreductie na rampen (disaster risk reduction, 
DRR). Het begrip DRG is gebruikt als kader ter verklaring van structurele maatregelen en de 
veelzijdige interacties tussen actoren die het risico beogen te verkleinen. 
 
DRG vormt de centrale infrastructuur van DRR en vereist een sterke betrokkenheid van 
verschillende actoren die zich binnen een land bezighouden met DRR. De internationale 
gemeenschap huldigt het principe van ‘inclusieve DRR’. Inclusieve DRR betekent ‘de 
samenwerking van een brede groep stakeholders die op verschillende niveaus kunnen opereren’ 
(Gaillard en Mercer, 2012: 95). Om inclusieve DRR te bewerkstelligen moet de governance van 
het risico bij rampen ook ruimte bieden aan de veelheid van actoren die betrokken zijn bij DRR. 
Met dit eerdere werk als inspiratiebron gaat dit proefschrift over pluricentrische mechanismen 
om het risico na rampen te reduceren. 
 
Ondanks de internationale instemming met het idee dat DRG ruimte moet bieden aan alle 
betrokkenen, en publieke en private actoren erbij moet betrekken, lukt dit in de praktijk helaas 
niet altijd. Aan het begin van dit promotieonderzoek waren er al tekenen van groeiende frustratie 
die de sfeer van inclusiviteit overschaduwden. Er was echter nog geen empirisch onderzoek 
gedaan naar deze pessimistische signalen. Het hoofddoel van dit onderzoek was daarom om het 
debat opnieuw te bekijken op basis van empirische gegevens. Dit proefschrift beschrijft de 
dynamiek van DRG in de wereld, Indonesië en Myanmar door te focussen op drie dimensies: de 
institutionele setting van het governance-netwerk (bestuursvorm), de machtsrelaties tussen 
actoren in het netwerk (politiek) en de politiek van belangenbehartiging (beleid). De 
onderzoeksvragen zijn: 
 
(1) Hoe is inclusieve DRR ontwikkeld op mondiaal niveau? 
(2) Hoe werkt het principe van inclusiviteit bij DRG in de praktijk in Indonesië en Myanmar? 
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a. Wat zijn de kenmerken van de bestuursvorm, de politiek en het beleid van DRG in 
Indonesië en Myanmar? 
b. In welke mate is de binnenlandse politieke omgeving van invloed geweest op de 
daadwerkelijke praktijk van inclusiviteit? 
 In welke mate heeft decentralisatie in Indonesië bijgedragen aan DRG? 
 In welke mate heeft de politieke transitie in Myanmar de dynamiek van DRG 
beïnvloed? 
(3) Hoe heeft het idee van een interactieve structuur voor governance-netwerken voor DRR 
uitgepakt in Indonesië en Myanmar? 
 Hoe kunnen de verschillen in de perceptie van risico tussen verschillende actoren 
die betrokken zijn bij het proces van interactieve governance verklaard worden?  
 Wat zijn in de praktijk de werkelijke uitdagingen op het gebied van inclusieve 
DRR in de governance van het risico bij rampen? 
(4) Welke lessen over interactieve governance kunnen worden getrokken uit de twee 
casestudy’s? 
 
Bij dit onderzoek is gebruikgemaakt van kwalitatieve methoden voor dataverzameling, -
verwerking en -analyse. De opzet van het onderzoek omvat meerdere kwalitatieve methoden van 
dataverzameling binnen de casestudy’s. Gedurende 18 maanden is veldonderzoek verricht 
waaraan in Indonesië in totaal 129 mensen en in Myanmar 78 mensen deelnamen in de vorm van 
semigestructureerde interviews of focusgroepsdiscussies. Onder de respondenten waren zowel 
overheidsfunctionarissen als medewerkers van onafhankelijke organisaties (vertegenwoordigers 
van internationale organisaties en ngo’s). 
 
Om structuur aan te brengen in het betoog is dit proefschrift onderverdeeld in zes 
hoofdstukken. Na een inleidend hoofdstuk behandelt hoofdstuk 2 de dynamiek van mondiale 
DRG om de vorming van inclusieve DRR als een mondiaal kader te introduceren. Dit hoofdstuk 
is gebaseerd op de observatie van twee internationale DRR-conferenties waarin verschillende 
stakeholders vertegenwoordigd waren: de WCDRR (World Conference on Disaster Risk 
Reduction) in Japan in 2015 en de Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR in Thailand in 2014. 
Hoofdstuk 3 bevat een verkenning van gedecentraliseerde DRG in Indonesië om te onderzoeken 
in hoeverre veranderingen in het politieke stelsel van invloed zijn op hoe DRG in de praktijk 
wordt gebracht. Hoofdstuk 4 gaat over de dynamiek van DRG tegen de achtergrond van de 
politieke verandering in Myanmar. Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt de rol van ngo’s bij 
belangenbehartigingsmechanismen van DRR in Indonesië en Myanmar waarbij verschillende 
stakeholders betrokken zijn. In dit hoofdstuk wordt de nadruk gelegd op het proces van 
agendering, machtsverhoudingen tussen overheids- en niet-overheidsactoren en 
belangenbehartigingskanalen voor de DRR-agenda in beide landen. Het proefschrift eindigt met 
een afsluitend hoofdstuk dat de uitkomsten van de vier onderzoeken samenvoegt en antwoorden 
geeft op de onderzoeksvragen. 
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De belangrijkste uitkomsten van het onderzoek zijn: (1) DRR is in de praktijk omgevormd 
van een top-down, staatsgerichte en grotendeels niet-politieke kwestie tot een pluricentrischer 
governance-netwerk. Het is een mondiaal paradigma geworden dat wordt gekenmerkt door een 
krachtig politiek engagement, een hoge mate van participatie van verschillende actoren en 
belangenbehartiging op diverse niveaus. (2) Politieke veranderingen in Indonesië en Myanmar 
hebben het proces van versterking van DRG in beide landen wezenlijk beïnvloed. Deze 
verandering heeft een pluricentrische benadering van DRG gestimuleerd en heeft de praktijk van 
inclusiviteit bevorderd door middel van initiatieven van verschillende stakeholders op het gebeid 
van beleidsbeïnvloeding. (3) In de praktijk waren er problemen bij de implementatie van 
inclusieve DRR in DRG in beide landen: een zeer bureaucratische organisatiestructuur, 
gebrekkige integratie van werkzaamheden, coördinatieproblemen en een organisatie-ego. De 
belangenbehartigingsarena van ngo’s en andere niet-oveheidsactoren wordt breder, maar 
tegelijkertijd smaller omdat het besluitvormingsproces geen allesomvattend plan voor het 
opbouwen van een samenwerkingsverband heeft opgeleverd en de overheid dominant blijft in het 
proces van agendering. (4) Uiteenlopende percepties van betrokken actoren vertalen zich in 
verschillende agenda's voor DRR. (5) In Indonesië en Myanmar ontwikkelt de 
belangenbehartiging zich voortdurend via allianties en consortia: verbeteringen in de capaciteit, 
middelen en strategie om een krachtig belangenbehartigingsprofiel op te bouwen versterken de 
geloofwaardigheid en onderhandelingspositie ten opzichte van de overheid aanzienlijk. De 
effectiviteit van belangenbehartiging wordt bepaald door zowel het netwerk als de positie die het 
netwerk inneemt ten opzichte van de overheid, en het proces van interactief bestuur vereist dat 
actoren aan beide zijden (overheids- en niet-overheidsactoren) een actieve rol spelen. 
 
 De conclusie van dit proefschrift is dat de massale steun voor inclusieve DRR en 
beleidsveranderingen in die richting een negatieve invloed lijken te hebben op het vermogen om 
de gevolgen van rampen effectief en efficiënt te beperken. Zowel overheids- als niet-
overheidsactoren beschouwen DRG vaak als te complex, te concurrerend en ineffectief. 
 
Dit onderzoek heeft geleid tot de volgende vier aanbevelingen: (1) Er moet een specifiek 
coördinatiemechanisme worden ontwikkeld om het proces van informatie- en kennisuitwisseling 
binnen de overheidsstructuur te vergemakkelijken. Dit mechanisme moet periodieke en 
regelmatige rapportages van voor DRR relevante overheidsinstanties omvatten om de 
werkzaamheden in alle sectoren te ondersteunen. Tegelijkertijd zou dit mechanisme ook de 
dynamiek van het governance-netwerk beïnvloeden door middel van beter gecoördineerde 
inspanningen voor beleidssturing. Belangenbehartiging, die vaak wordt belemmerd door zeer 
bureaucratische procedures, zou ook vergemakkelijkt kunnen worden door een open 
coördinatiemechanisme in het interministeriële stelsel. (2) Wat de middelen betreft, wijst het 
huidige mondiale kader van DRR specifiek op de agenda van regelgevingsmaatregelen en 
financiële middelen als manier om de lokale autoriteiten meer macht te geven. Een sterke 
politieke wil van lidstaten is onontbeerlijk om dit doel en een betere verdeling van middelen 
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tussen nationale en lokale overheden te bereiken. (3) Een duidelijke strategische agenda voor 
belangenbehartiging door niet-overheidsactoren en de beschikking over voldoende middelen en 
kennis zouden meetbare actie mogelijk maken om deze actoren een sterkere positie te geven in 
de onderhandelingen met de overheid binnen het DRR-governance-netwerk. (4) De leden van het 
governance-netwerk moeten een sterke politieke wil, een concreet strategisch plan en afdoende 
middelen hebben. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Asia has the highest number of disaster events in the world. Data from the Asian Disaster 
Reduction Centre show that 44.4% of the world’s disaster events have occurred in Asia. This 
hazardous profile in Asia corresponds to 82% of the people killed, 94% of those affected and 
88.7% of the total economic damage from disaster events worldwide (ADRC, 2011). Among 
other Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia and Myanmar have the highest levels of vulnerability, 
based on the indicator of the average annual number of casualties per one million residents 
(UNISDR, 2010). The enormous number of people killed in the 2004 tsunami mega-disaster and 
in cyclone Nargis in 2008 clearly showed both countries’ high level of susceptibility to disaster. 
This study of Indonesia and Myanmar was initially motivated by the intriguing question of 
what makes these countries vulnerable to disaster. More specifically, I was interested in 
understanding to what extent disaster risk reduction (DRR) has been integrated into the national 
plans of these countries’ governments. Do these governments play their roles on DRR? These 
questions are seemingly relevant for the investigation of vulnerability in both countries. 
However, beyond these basic questions about policy, what seemed even more crucial is the 
investigation of the actual practice of disaster risk governance (DRG). As the core infrastructure 
for DRR action, DRG requires a strong engagement among multiple actors involved in DRR in a 
country. This principle of ‘inclusive DRR’ on DRG seemingly becomes the principle of DRR. It 
is believed by the global community that inclusive DRR is a crucial factor for DRG. This can be 
illustrated by the constant commitment on strengthening inclusive DRR throughout the past three 
decades. 
However, even though the policy practice has consistently advocated the principle of 
inclusive DRR on DRG, study on the actual practice of this subject is relatively thin. While it is 
often suggested in the literature and in policy reports that inclusive DRR and effective DRG face 
challenges, not much is known about the daily practices, problems and experiences of state and 
non-state actors involved in DRR. Therefore, an in-depth study into the daily politics of inclusive 
DRR on DRG is highly relevant to investigate whether and how the principle is working to meet 
the goal of achieving effective DRR. 
Before elaborating on the findings, it is useful to offer some background on the political 
context of DRR and DRG. This chapter traces the narrative of DRG at the global level by 
looking into the historical milestones of the principle of inclusive DRR on DRG and how it has 
been institutionalised at both the global and the national level. This study also elaborates the 
development of DRG as a subject in the academic world, introducing the key concepts related to 
it (i.e. interactive governance), before finally introducing two case studies of Indonesia and 
Myanmar to gain focused perspectives on the actual practice of inclusive DRR on DRG. Are 
Indonesia and Myanmar committed on the principle of inclusive DRR on DRG? If so, what is 
hampering the implementation of this principle in achieving effective DRR? 
The importance of DRG as a crucial element for reducing risk comes from the narrative of 
the DRR movement at the global level. For the last three decades, the global community on DRR 
has consistently repeated their commitment to strengthening DRG. In academic and policy 
literature, DRR is defined as a means of ‘preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk to 
strengthen resilience’ (UNISDR, 2007). Beyond this definition, DRR has been understood as a 
‘conceptual framework to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks, to avoid (prevention) and 
to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards’ (UNISDR, 2008). Every 
10 to 15 years, DRR-related stakeholders, including governments, international organisations, 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), academicians, the private sector, youth and disability 
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groups, have gathered to discuss the global priorities for action on DRR at the World Conference 
on DRR (WCDRR). This conference is an avenue for stakeholders to agree on the DRR global 
framework, a document signed and ratified by United Nations (UN) member states to guide DRR 
in terms of expected outcomes, principles, priorities for action and roles of the stakeholders. For 
decades, these member states and non-state agencies have agreed that strengthening DRG is a 
systematic action for reducing risk effectively and efficiently. To achieve inclusive DRR, the 
governance of disaster risk also needs to provide space for the multiplicity of actors who have a 
stake in DRR. This idea is translated by engaging multiple stakeholders in institutionalised 
platforms, in the form of national committees, national platforms or working groups. Inspired by 
these works, this thesis studies pluricentric mechanisms to reduce disaster risk. 
Advocacy for the practice of inclusiveness has found wide global support. Since 1987, UN 
member states have been invited to established ‘national committees’, as a platform to assemble 
multiple actors working on DRR, including representatives of governments, international 
organisations, NGOs and the scientific community. This inclusive approach to DRG has been 
consistently adopted over the decades, as the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UNISDR) has actively encouraged the establishment of national platforms as a manifestation of 
the multi-stakeholder spirit. For UNISDR, national platforms are a very good venue ‘to provide 
and mobilize knowledge, skills and resources required for mainstreaming DRR into development 
policies, planning and programmes’ (UNISDR, 2007). Data from UNISDR indicate that around 
93 national platforms on DRR had developed worldwide as of 2016 (PreventionWeb, 2017). 
Despite the international convergence on the idea that DRG has to be inclusive and should 
bring in public and private actors, crucially, the actual practice of DRG faces challenges. At the 
beginning of this PhD trajectory, there were already signs of growing frustrations that appeared 
to overshadow the spirit of inclusiveness. This situation leads to several intriguing questions 
about the process of inclusive DRR on DRG. For instance, how does the principle of 
inclusiveness work in practice? Has it lived up to its promise to achieve common objectives and 
resolve conflicts? To what extent are states willing to negotiate the power arrangements in their 
partnerships with non-state actors? 
Looking beyond the consistent commitments and current challenges on inclusiveness, this 
thesis investigated the realities of the actual practice of inclusive DRR on DRG in Indonesia and 
Myanmar. This study framed the practice of inclusive DRR on DRG through the framework of 
interactive governance. As an academic concept, interactive governance aims to understand the 
complexity of processes in the work of plural actors who stand independently but act 
interdependently through shared goals in the decentred coordination. The research examined this 
complex dynamics through three dimensions: the institutional setting (polity), power relations 
(politics) and policy advocacy (policy). This introductory chapter discusses DRG as a complex 
arena where multiple actors negotiate to manage and govern DRR. The chapter begins by 
describing agenda setting on DRR in the global arena and showing how ideas have travelled 
from this arena to the national level through global framework arrangements. The chapter then 
elaborates on the concept of DRG, discussing its relevance to policy practice and academic 
debate. The chapter ends with a research outline that traces the main research focus, background 
setting for the case studies, conceptual frameworks, research questions and outline of the 
structure of the thesis. 
The next section provides an introduction to the academic debate on DRR, a fundamental 
element of the infrastructure of DRG, to explain the main agenda for DRG. DRR is an idea and 
objective that inspires the development of the complex structure of DRG. The discussion of DRR 
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touches on the transformation of this notion from a phase to an approach, and from being hazard-
oriented to working to counteract vulnerability and achieve resilience. This discussion later 
moves on to the adoption of DRR as a global collective agenda with a complete structure of 
political support, guiding principles and priorities for action. 
1.1. DRR in academic debate 
In policy practice and academic discussions, DRR has generally come to be viewed as the 
main approach to disaster management. As a process, disaster management moves sequentially 
through preparation for, responding to and recovering from disaster. Traditional perceptions of 
DRR see the process of reducing risk as one of the phases of disaster management (preparation). 
However, this narrow perception has been shifted by the rise of the understanding of DRR as an 
approach rather than a phase. As an approach, DRR aims to transform the underlying risk factors 
throughout the entire cycle of disaster management. DRR is thus integrated throughout the 
phases of preparation, response, recovery, mitigation and development (Helmer and Hilhorst, 
2007). This approach aims to lessen losses by reducing hazards, lowering the level of 
vulnerability and introducing adaptive capacity (Helmer and Hilhorst, 2007). These aims 
demonstrate that DRR should be understood as more than a phase: It is an approach that cuts 
across all the different phases of disaster response. 
The concept of reducing risk first appeared in academic debate only in the 1970s. Disaster 
has long been associated with disaster response and military involvement in the recovery 
process. Approaches to DRR were initially dominated by hazard analysis. The hazard-oriented 
paradigm strongly connects disasters with natural hazards (Cannon, 2004: 14; Helmer and 
Hilhorst, 2007; Smith, 2013). In this approach, the underlying factors of disaster are seen as 
‘physical occurrences’ (Hilhorst and Bankoff, 2004: 1), and details of the ‘frequency, 
seasonality, [and] geographical area of the hazards occurrence’ are the analytical domain of DRR 
(Earthmind, 2005). Geographers and anthropologists have strived to understand disaster beyond 
this somewhat traditional paradigm (Oliver Smith, 2013). Around the 1970s–1980s, intensive 
academic debate led to an alternative paradigm (Hagelsteen and Per Becker, 2012; Oliver Smith, 
2013). The ‘vulnerability approach’, an analytical tool emphasising human capacity as the 
fundamental way to reduce risk, shifted the paradigm from being natural hazard-centred to being 
human-centred. Combining the two paradigms led to the ‘equation that Disaster = Hazard + 
Vulnerable People’ (Cannon, 2000: 45), indicating that there is a need to understand ‘the 
interaction of hazards and vulnerability’ rather than viewing these paradigms as completely 
separate (Cannon, 2000: 45). There is a robust connection between ‘risk and reasons for their 
vulnerability for hazards’ (Cannon, 1994: 14) and ‘human societies and their environment’ 
(Hilhorst and Bankoff, 2004: 1). Some have argued that disaster casualties and impacts are 
higher when there is poor disaster knowledge, marginalisation, lack of access to resources and 
insufficient means of protection (Hagelsteen and Per Becker, 2012). Scholars advocating this 
approach have argued that ‘vulnerability is the key to an understanding of risk’ (Hilhorst and 
Bankoff, 2004: 1) and therefore a core concept in disaster risk (Miller et al., 2010). 
In the tradition of DRR study and practice, the concept of ‘vulnerability’ has been closely 
intertwined with the idea of ‘resilience’. Scholars have noted the commonalities and distinctions 
between the concepts of vulnerability and resilience in terms of the response to disaster. These 
two concepts are perceived as ‘related’ (Miller et al., 2010), but they can also be understood as 
‘opposite sides of the same coin’ (Twigg, 2009: 8). The concepts share a focus on examining 
how systems respond to disaster (Miller et al., 2010), but they have different points of emphasis. 
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Resilience has been emphasised in work on complex ‘socio, ecological and geophysical’ systems 
with plural interfaces among agents, whereas vulnerability has been used to focus more on 
‘actors’. The vulnerability approach focuses on ‘the underlying causes of vulnerability, the scale, 
main actors and possible opportunities for risk reduction’ (Miller et al., 2010: 5). Resilience 
derives from the Latin word ‘resilio’, meaning ‘to jump back’ (Comfort, Boin and Demchak, 
2010). It refers to ‘the ability to resist disorder’ (Comfort, Boin and Demchak, 2010) through the 
capacity to ‘bounce back’, learn and adapt (adaptive capacity) (Miller et al., 2010). 
Correspondingly, the focus of resilience is on the long-term community trajectory of building 
capacity (Miller et al., 2010; Twigg, 2009) through ‘understanding the socio-political process 
and environmental linkages that underpin the foundations of vulnerability’ (Miller et al., 2010: 
5–6). 
While DRR has been widely discussed in relation to the themes of risk, vulnerability and 
resilience, another stream of scholars has strived to understand and give meaning to the growing 
global movement on DRR. Those following this approach have recognised the slow development 
and gradual acceptance of the idea of framing ‘disaster’ within the context of international 
relations. Many scholars have pointed out the lack of formal definitions of principles, metrics of 
success and strategy for the integration of the disaster agenda into diplomatic practice (Yim, 
Calkway, Fares and Ciottone, 2009). The concept of ‘disaster diplomacy’, which is commonly 
used as an analytical tool, has led to two interlinked, yet different, understandings of diplomatic 
practice. 
The first of these understandings attempts to frame diplomatic practice on disaster 
management as a way to contribute to conflict resolution (Kelman, 2011), for instance around 
technical assistance on climate monitoring provided to Cuba by the United States (Glantz, 2007) 
or Greek–Turkish relations regarding earthquake response (Lindsay, 2007). The second 
understanding involves discussing disaster diplomacy within the overall framework of the 
disaster cycle (i.e. prevention, preparedness, response and rehabilitation) (Banerjee, 2008; 
Callaway, Stack and Burkle, 2012). Examples of this approach include access to negotiations 
about health care for vulnerable populations (Callaway, Stack and Burkle, 2012) and diplomatic 
activity by foreign countries regarding relief (Banarjee, 2008). 
Within the context of diplomatic practice, other scholars define the meaning of the DRR 
global movement as beyond the concept of ‘disaster diplomacy.’ In this line of thinking, disaster 
in international relations corresponds to the global political arena, where conflicting interests 
among UN member countries are the dominant dynamics. Hannigan called this the ‘global policy 
field’ (Hannigan, 2012: 1), where the issue of disaster is actively articulated within the global 
arena. This has been shown by the engagement of multiple stakeholders in the DRR multilateral 
policy arena. Specifically, Hannigan defined nine DRR actors in the global arena: (1) national 
and local governments; (2) regional organisations; (3) international finance institutions; (4) UN 
disaster agencies; (5) NGOs; (6) multi-actor initiatives and partnerships; (7) scientific, technical 
and academic communities; (8) private actors; and (9) the mass media (Hannigan, 2012). In 
short, scholars working in this vein argue that DRR has been increasingly integrated in 
diplomatic practice in the domain of the global policy arena. This thesis builds upon academic 
work on disasters in international relations, which has shown not only the relevance of this topic 
for the global arena, but also the proliferation of actors and ideas in this area. 
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1.2. DRR in the global policy arena 
For decades, the growing global attention directed towards disasters has pushed DRR into the 
spotlight. Data from the Disaster Database has shown that the number of disasters increased from 
the 1980s to 2010 (UNESCAP, 2010). In 2012, UNISDR reported that 4.4 billion people had 
been affected and a total of 1.3 million lives had been lost due to disaster events since 1992 
(UNISDR, 2012). The immense impact of disaster has called for global collective action to 
develop and generate support for a systematic framework and strategy in a binding political 
agreement. Three international organisations (the World Bank, the UN and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]) have developed specific institutional 
mechanisms to address disaster challenges. The World Bank has framed itself as the ‘global 
leader in disaster risk management’ by establishing the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction 
and Recovery (World Bank, 2016). This is a partnership mechanism that the World Bank uses to 
assist countries with overarching issues linked to disaster risk management. UNISDR is the focal 
point in the UN system for the implementation of the International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction, and OECD offers the framework of ‘disaster risk financing’ as a mode to assist 
member countries in achieving effective financing for disaster risk (OECD, 2017). 
In the policy domain, over the decades, DRR has been transformed from a growing global 
concern into a structured and institutionalised system of governance and norms. This 
transformation process started when the first global framework on disaster management was 
developed 30 years ago in 1987 around the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 
(IDNDR). This framework was adopted by UN member states in response to calamities caused 
by natural disasters around the world. The framework aimed to foster international cooperation 
among member countries through improving their capacity for mitigation, formulating guidelines 
and strategy, and developing methods to address the knowledge gap (United Nations, 1989). 
Following the adoption of this framework, the international community has consistently made 
efforts to renew the strategy and priorities for action on DRR. To date, four DRR global 
frameworks have been adopted by the international community: the IDNDR (1987), the 
Yokohama Strategy (1994), the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005) and the Sendai Framework 
for Action (2015). For the purpose of renewing this framework, the WCDRR is organised to 
negotiate and adopt a new global framework, taking into account the achievements, challenges 
and lessons learned from the previous international strategy. 
These global frameworks on DRR have become a complex set of norms, rules, values and 
guidelines for governing DRR global action. Past work has defined global norms as ‘the shared 
expectations or standards of appropriate behaviour accepted by states and intergovernmental 
organizations that can be applied to states, intergovernmental organizations, and/or non-state 
actors of various kinds’ (Martinsson, 2011: 2; Rum, 2016; Zweegers and Groot, 2012: 3). This 
definition reveals three components of global norms. First, global norms consist of a complex set 
of standards or guidelines. Second, these norms are to be agreed upon by member states. Third, 
these norms have the power to be implemented in the member states. In the case of DRR, global 
norms are taking shape through the legal setting, where these norms are formulated and 
advocated through agreements, conventions, declarations, treaties and so forth (Martinsson, 
2011: 2). Examining the preceding and current DRR global frameworks, this thesis argues that 
these frameworks have several things in common, as Figure 1 illustrates. 
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Figure 1. DRR as structured and institutionalised governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
drr 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In sum, it is clear that DRR mainstreaming has been well advocated in the global policy 
context through the adoption of DRR global frameworks and priorities for action. The 
consistency of renewing and agreeing on the global frameworks indicates the member countries’ 
strong political commitment to collectively address this issue at the global level. DRR has been 
transformed from a single phase in disaster management into a complex structured of global 
governance with a complex set of norms, principles, rules and guidelines. This has been 
institutionalised not only as a global framework, but also as a mechanism and instrument of 
organisation in many major international organisations. 
1.3. Disaster risk governance  
The phrase ‘disaster risk governance’ has been used extensively in policy practice. A 
definition of DRG by UNISDR can be given as an illustration of how DRG has been adopted in 
the global policy field. UNISDR refers to DRG as ‘the system of institutions, mechanisms, 
policy and legal frameworks and other arrangements to guide, coordinate and oversee disaster 
risk reduction and related areas of policy’ (UNISDR, 2007). This concept has been used as a 
frame to explain structural arrangements and multifaceted interaction among actors working with 
the objective of reducing risk. In academic work, this concept is treated as interchangeable with 
the idea of disaster governance. DRG aims to approach the complex dynamics of institutional 
settings, power relations and policy advocacy in the specific context of reducing risk. 
Although DRG has been used specifically to discuss global policy frameworks, the 
exploration of this concept is relatively thin in the academic literature. The growing body of 
literature mostly refers to ‘disaster governance’ to explain the overreaching analysis of the entire 
structure of the phases of disaster management (preparedness, response, recovery and 
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rehabilitation). Consequently, a substantial number of well-written journal articles that touch on 
the theme of disaster governance actually speak about DRG. 
Reviewing the literature, it becomes clear that the study of ‘disaster governance’ can be 
clustered into three predominant themes: structural arrangements, roles of institutions and the 
systemic approach. First, a group of scholars has dedicated their work to examining the structural 
arrangement of disaster governance through studying the configuration of actors within this 
complex setting (Enia, 2013; Gerber, 2007; Lassa, 2010; Lindsay, 2014; Seng, 2010). The work 
of these scholars has focused on the institutional setting of disaster governance to explain the 
roles of different DRR-related institutions in a country. An important concept to frame the 
arrangement of disaster governance is the idea of pluricentric networks. A ‘pluricentric network’ 
describes the complex arrangement of multiple actors who work independently but act 
collaboratively to achieve a common goal. The second major theme involves the role of 
institutions. Here, another group of scholars working on disaster governance have analysed the 
intertwining issues of mismanagement and vulnerability (Ahrens and Rudoplh, 2006; Moe, 
2010). This work shows the negative effects of bad governance as detrimental for disaster 
management, criticising the failure of commitment on sustainable development as an underlying 
risk factor for disaster (Ahrens and Rudolph, 2006). Studies on this theme have explored the 
ineffectiveness of DRG as a result of poorly integrated planning and problems with inter-sectoral 
coordination (Moe, 2010). Finally, the systemic approach to disaster governance (e.g. Cho, 2014; 
Niekerk, 2015; Tierney, 2012) aims to capture DRR in conjunction with other topics. This third 
theme involves discussion on the external dimensions that shape the arena of DRG, such as 
globalisation, international constellations, social disparities, population issues (Tierney, 2012), 
political systems (Cho, 2014) and DRR global frameworks (Niekerk, 2015). 
1.4. Research outline 
1.4.1. Main research focus 
As was argued above, the principle of inclusiveness in DRR is the most general characteristic 
of DRG. Gaillard and Mercer (2012) hold that inclusiveness in DRR has three characteristics: (1) 
recognising that different forms of knowledge are valuable in addressing disaster risk; (2) 
acknowledging that actions at different scales, from the top down and from the bottom up, are 
necessary to reduce the risk of disaster in a sustainable manner; and (3) understanding that the 
two previous points require the collaboration of a wide array of stakeholders operating across 
different scales (Gaillard and Mercer, 2012: 95). Inspired by the operationalisation of 
inclusiveness in the third characteristic above, this thesis defines ‘inclusiveness’ as the process of 
using pluricentric mechanisms in reducing disaster risk. Through this kind of mechanism, 
multiple stakeholders work together to achieve common goals on DRR. The Sendai Framework 
for Action 2015–2030, the current DRR global plan of action, also uses the term ‘inclusiveness’. 
As part of the ‘Guiding Principles’, the framework explicitly states that ‘disaster risk reduction 
requires an all-of-society engagement and partnership’. It also requires empowerment and 
inclusive, accessible and non-discriminatory participation, paying special attention to people 
disproportionately affected by disasters, especially the poorest groups in society. Inclusiveness 
on DRR is strongly related to the involvement of all actors in collective action on DRR. 
Advocacy on the principle of inclusiveness was introduced almost 30 years ago in the 1990s 
around the IDNDR. The four global frameworks on DRR have used different terminology to 
discuss initiatives on inclusive DRR. The IDNDR advocated ‘national committees’ as a 
mechanism to gather government and non-state actors to participate in reducing loss and 
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mitigating the disruptions caused by natural disasters (UNISDR, 2017). The Yokohama Strategy 
and Plan of Action for a Safer World (1994) reframed this emphasis under the framework of 
‘partnership’ to describe cooperation among stakeholders working together in the spirit of 
‘common interests and shared responsibilities’ (UNISDR, 2017). Next, the Hyogo Framework 
for Action (2005) strengthened this idea by introducing the specific mechanism of ‘multi-
stakeholder platforms’. UNISDR defines ‘multi-stakeholder platforms’ as mechanisms that serve 
to advocate for DRR through coordination, analysis and advice on areas of priority that require 
concerted action (Djalante, 2012). Finally, the Sendai Framework for DRR 2015–2030 
incorporates the collaboration of various stakeholders within the framework of DRG. In policy 
practice, the Sendai Framework for Action (UNISDR, 2016) also adopted the agenda of 
strengthening DRG as one of the priorities for action. 
Exploring this consistent and strong commitment, this thesis investigated the relevance of 
inclusiveness in the actual practice of DRG in Indonesia and Myanmar. For this purpose, the 
present research examined the dynamics of DRG through three dimensions: the institutional 
setting (polity), power relations (politics) and policy advocacy (policy). In policy practice, 
inclusiveness has been claimed as key for achieving effective DRR planning and implementation 
(UNISDR, 2013). The idea of inclusiveness has been adapted to mean either empowering and 
involving non-state actors or strengthening the commitment to embrace policy input from 
interest groups in DRR. This idea of inclusiveness encompasses different scales and levels. 
Referring to the work of Gerber (2007), there are two types of coordination in disaster 
management: vertical coordination between government organisations, and horizontal 
coordination among local governments and public–private organisations (Gerber, 2007). The 
grouping by Gerber represents the mechanism of disaster management developed by many 
countries. In the document of Sendai Framework for Action (SFA), one of the guiding principle 
for the framework explicitly stated that the ‘coordination mechanisms  requires full engagement 
of all State institutions of an executive and legislative nature at national and local levels and a 
clear articulation of responsibilities across public and private stakeholders.’ This statement  
indicated the horizontal and vertical coordination on disaster management.  In particular case, the 
Indonesian Law of Disaster Management Number 24 year 2007 also explicitly highlighted 
national and regional governments to bear responsibility on disaster management including 
Business and International Organizations to play its roles ‘severely, jointly, and/or together’ with 
working partners. Aside from the used of Gerber classification on the policy document, further 
explanation why it is highly relevant to frame the interaction among actors under ‘horizontal and 
vertical coordination’ is partly because the used of this classification on actual practice in the 
field. Those types of coordination are mostly used as a reference to pointing the interplay within 
government organizations and the cross-cutting interaction with the non-government 
organizations. Note that this coordination’s are exceedingly actualized in policy document, Law 
and practice, this thesis aimed to explore the practice of inclusiveness in the vertical and 
horizontal coordination.  
1.4.2. Case studies: Indonesia and Myanmar 
The selection of Indonesia and Myanmar as the case study was driven by methodological 
justification and characteristic case argument. By definition, case study refers to a qualitative 
method in which the approach used ‘comprehensive examination’ to produce evidence by 
investigating ‘single observation or single phenomenon’ (Gerring, 2013). Case study is often 
performing ‘heterogeneous research design’ (Seawright & Gerring, 2008) to search for causal 
investigation (Gerring, 2013) and gain holistic in-depth knowledge (Tellis, 1997: 3).  Referring 
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to the framework of ‘Cross-Case Methods of Case Selection and Analysis’ developed by Gerring 
(2008), there are seven methods of case selection on case study: (1) typical (2) diverse (3) 
extreme (4) deviant (5) influential (6) most similar (7) most different (Gerring, 2008). Each of 
the methods possesses different definition, technique, use and representativeness. In this context, 
the process of case selection for Indonesia and Myanmar mostly related to the ‘typical example 
of cross case relationship to confirm or disconfirm a given theory.’ It serves for a case to draw a 
distinctive similarity on some phenomenon (Gerring, 2008).   
In regard to the characteristic of the case, Indonesia and Myanmar are ideal cases for 
capturing the interplay between DRG and the influence of the wider political environment on the 
dynamics of interactive governance. Several important shared characteristics make the two 
countries parallel cases. First, in both countries, major disasters (the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 
and cyclone Nargis in 2008) have induced policy transformation on disaster management. 
Second, Indonesia and Myanmar share similar political backgrounds: Indonesia experienced 32 
years of military-type leadership prior to the 1998 political reform, whereas Myanmar 
experienced 38 years of full military command before the political transition in 2011. Literature 
on political changes describe political transition in a country as driven either by a shift from an 
old regime to a new regime (regime change) (Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Munck, 1996) or by the 
reformation of the political system (i.e. a shift from authoritarianism to democracy). These 
changes lead to policy transformations, governance shifts and changes in values. Given both 
countries’ political histories, it is compelling to study how the idea of inclusiveness in DRR has 
evolved within the respective shifting political settings. In its implementation, the practice of 
inclusive DRR is often hindered by many challenges driven by either endogenous or exogenous 
factors, for instance the dynamics of the political environment of DRG. Indonesia and Myanmar 
are two examples of how DRG develops in a country with historical political changes and 
extreme risks. Both countries have experienced a shift from a long period of authoritarian rule to 
a more democratic transitional process. This section provides a general overview of domestic 
politics in both countries, including an analysis of how political changes have influenced the 
political arena. The section also presents broad indications of how these political environments 
have influenced DRG. 
1.4.2.1. Indonesia 
For almost 32 years, Indonesia was ruled under a centralistic, military-type regime. Soeharto, 
the second Indonesian president, came to power after a bloody political transition in 1965. An 
attempted coup d’etat that was supposedly supported by the Indonesian Communist Party 
provided political momentum for Soeharto to gain the presidency. Under his administration, 
Indonesia was described as ‘the most centralist’ country in the world (Mietzner, 2014). The 
central government dominated almost all sectors, leaving the regional government to fill the role 
of the ‘policy executor of Jakarta’. The head of the regional administration was appointed by the 
central government, and local parliament was dominated by the ruling political party (Golongan 
Karya) (Morishita, 2008). In 1997, the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia’s economy very hard. 
This had a spill-over effect, creating further multidimensional economic, social and political 
crises, which triggered demonstrations challenging Soeharto’s leadership. Soeharto’s 
administration was blamed for economic disparities between Java and other areas in the country, 
minority discrimination and corrupt bureaucracy. Massive protests by the student movement 
caused Soeharto to step down after 32 years of presidency. This political momentum, called 
‘Reformasi’ (reform), marked the beginning of the transformation of the Indonesian political 
system. Decentralisation was one of the Reformasi agenda points. 
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The major power transfer from the central government to government at the local level came 
into force in 2001 (Mietzner, 2014). It was framed under the Decentralisation Law (№ 22/1999, 
later revised by Law № 32/2004 regarding Regional Government) and Law № 25/1999 (later 
revised by Law №33/2004 regarding the Fiscal Balance between Central Government and the 
Regions) (Hill, 2014; Ilmma and Wai-Poi, 2014). As a new paradigm and principle, 
decentralisation has restructured policy practice in all aspects of governance in Indonesia, 
including the institutional setting of disaster management. The process of policy reform 
regarding disaster management was inevitable after the major shock from the tsunami event in 
2004. Policy transformation on disaster management came to fruition when the House of 
Representative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) passed a new bill relating to disaster management. 
Law № 24 in 2007 distributed the governance of disaster management between the central and 
regional levels. This new bill acted as a legal framework to regulate the decentralisation of DRG 
in Indonesia by establishing two specific bodies for disaster management: the Indonesian 
National Disaster Management Authority (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana) at the 
national level and the Regional Disaster Management Authority (Badan Penanggulangan 
Bencana Daerah) at the local level. 
1.4.2.2. Myanmar 
Compared with Indonesia, which was under a militarised regime until 1998, Myanmar’s 
political and economic systems are still less open and flexible (Steinberg, 2001). Myanmar was 
once ‘one of the wealthiest countries in Southeast Asia’, owing to its rich national resources 
(Gravers and Ytzen, 2014). Compared with other countries in Southeast Asia, Myanmar slowly 
declined, eventually becoming the country with the highest percentage of its population living 
under the poverty line (25.2%) (ADB, 2016), the lowest life expectancy (World Bank, 2016) and 
the lowest rank on competitiveness (WEF, 2016). Military rule changed the country into an 
authoritarian, centralised and unitary hierarchy. The regime was the main player and ultimate 
power in all aspects of governance (Egreteau and Jagan, 2013). Furthermore, since 1962, the 
people of Burma have been intimidated by various forms of human rights abuses committed by 
the military junta. 
 An important milestone for political life in Burma was seen in 2003, when the seven stages 
of the ‘Roadmap to Democracy’ were introduced by the Prime Minister, Khin Nyut. This 
decision was made following a great deal of international pressure on Myanmar to respect 
democracy and civil rights. Following this pressure, the government released the ‘Seven Steps to 
Democracy’, committing to (1) reconvening the National Convention; (2) the step-by-step 
implementation of the process necessary to create a genuine and disciplined democratic state; (3) 
drafting a new constitution; (4) adapting the constitution through a national referendum; (5) 
holding free and fair elections; (6) convening Huttaws (House of Representatives) attended by 
Huttaw members, in accordance with the new constitution; and (7) building a modern, developed 
and democratic nation. The political changes seen in Myanmar can be seen as ‘top-down 
transition with democratization coming from above’ (Egreteau and Jagan, 2013: 340). Since the 
introduction of the ‘Roadmap to Democracy’, Myanmar has been implementing major political 
reforms. This began with the adoption of a new constitution (2008), a multi-party election 
(2010), the release of political prisoners (including Aung San Suu Kyi) (2010), the beginning of 
a new government regime under President Thein Sein (2011), a general election at the end of 
2015 (Skidmore and Wilson, 2012) and a new civilian-led government. 
In 2016, Htin Kyaw, from the winning political party, the National League for Democracy, 
was elected as Myanmar’s first civilian president. Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the National 
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League for Democracy, was appointed as the State Counsellor and Union Minster for Foreign 
Affairs (BBC, 2016; Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). This new government marked 
a ‘triple transition’ in the country: (1) from an authoritarian system to democratic governance; 
(2) from a central-directed economy to a market-oriented economy; and (3) from insurgent 
conflicts to peaceful reconciliation (World Bank, 2016). 
The structure of DRG is relatively more complex in Myanmar than in Indonesia. The key 
bodies for DRR at the national and local levels are not directly linked by a line of authority or a 
bureaucratic structure. The government structure of Myanmar consists of five levels: (1) the 
Union Government (central level); (2) region and state governments (region level); (3) district 
level; (4) township level; and (5) village-tracts. The line of authority from the Union 
Government (the Relief and Recovery Department, the Ministry of Social Welfare—the focal 
ministry for disaster management) to lower levels of government administration only reaches the 
region level. Work on DRR at the lower level of district (township, village-tract and community 
levels) is the responsibility of the General Administrator in the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
Therefore, unlike in Indonesia, where DRR mainstreaming is institutionalised at the community 
level through the Regional Disaster Management Authority (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana 
Daerah), in Myanmar, the Relief and Recovery Department—the focal point of DRR—has no 
power of authority beyond the district level. This situation has resulted from the construction of 
the legal framework on decentralisation, which mainly justifies the division of power down to 
the regional government. Different from Indonesia, which has a standalone legal framework on 
decentralisation, Myanmar’s 2008 constitution has moved the country further towards 
decentralisation through developing region- and state-elected assemblies (Gravers and Ytzen, 
2014). 
1.4.3. Conceptual frameworks 
1.4.3.1. Interactive governance 
To understand the practice of inclusive DRR on DRG, this study applied the concept of 
interactive governance. ‘Governance’ is different from ‘government’. Whereas government is 
associated with the giving ‘authoritative expression to the state’ and is ‘usually thought to dictate 
to and control other state bodies […]’ (Heywood, 2004: 77), governance denotes 
‘interorganizational networks’ that ‘complement markets and hierarchies as governing 
structures’ (Rhodes, 1996: 652). The concept of governance is defined as ‘a complex set of 
values, norms, processes and institutions used by a society to manage its development and 
resolve conflict’ (Kohler-Koch, 2005). As a concept, governance has been discussed extensively 
in the context of self-organising networks (Rhodes, 1996); rules of collective decision making 
(Chottray and Stoker, 2009); and sets of values/norms, processes and institutions (Kohler-Koch, 
2005). Governance is a new way of steering and governing by embracing non-state actors in the 
policy process (Ewalt et al., 2001; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010; Peters and Pierre, 
1998; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998). Governance aims to challenge the traditional policy process, 
where the state stands as the core entity. The concept brought an analytical breakthrough when 
‘networks’ were revealed as an innovative alternative mechanism to promote a pluricentric 
approach (Rhodes, 1996). Networks are considered to be ‘self-organising’ when actors develop 
and regulate the interactions using rules of the game that are ‘negotiated and agreed’ by the 
participants (Rhodes, 1996). Governance scholars frequently use terms such as ‘coordination, 
cooperation, partnership, joint-working, alliance, collaboration, and network’ (Mardiah, Lovett 
and Evanty, 2017: 58). 
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Since the 1990s, the increasingly scientific research and practical context around the idea of 
governance has led this concept to be introduced in various models: ‘network governance’ 
(Peters and Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1996; Scholtz, 2008; Stokker, 1998), ‘good governance’ 
(Grindle, 2004), ‘adaptive governance’ (Djalante, 2012) and ‘interactive governance’ (Torfing et 
al., 2012). This thesis uses the concept of ‘interactive governance’ to give meaning and context 
to the collective action of DRR networks. Interactive governance has been defined as ‘the 
complex process through which a plurality of social and political actors with diverging interests 
interact in order to formulate, promote and achieve common objectives by means of mobilizing, 
exchanging, and deploying a range of ideas, rules and resources’ (Torfing et al., 2012: 2). This 
concept offers a more overarching scope by bringing in ideas of complex processes, common 
objectives and decentred coordination to the analysis. Meanwhile, other conceptualisations of 
governance are mostly focuses on the horizontal interaction among plural actors (network 
governance) Torfing et al., 2012: 14), the principles of accountability, transparency and equality 
(‘good governance’) (Grindle, 2004) and the multi-stakeholder platforms as the way to manage 
problems using flexible and adjustable governance systems.  
Interactive governance also has the analytical advantage of providing a lens to analyse the 
complexity of collective action through DRR networks without neglecting the issues of 
coordination and control. This thesis consistently uses the phrase ‘governance network’ as a 
mechanism to operationalise the principle of inclusive DRR. Governance networks are one of the 
typical forms of arrangement of interactive governance, in addition to the forms of quasi-markets 
and partnerships (Torfing et al., 2012: 17). Governance networks emphasise the work of multiple 
actors who act autonomously but relate interdependently within the institutionalised framework 
of the policy-making process (Torfing et al., 2012). 
Building upon the aforementioned points, this thesis adopted four governance concepts that 
are keys for understanding the argument and context. First, this thesis studied the inclusiveness 
approach to DRR policy steering. Second, the idea of governance networks was used 
extensively in framing collective action. Third, the study examined the governing structure of 
DRR at the global, national and local levels. Fourth, the dynamics of DRG were analysed by 
adapting the ‘triangle of governance’ tool to capture the dimension of polity, politics and 
policy. 
 
1.4.3.1. The politics of DRG: Key concepts 
This thesis built upon the basic assumption that DRR has political meanings and 
implications. In actual practice, DRR has consistently adopted multi-stakeholder and network 
approaches. Actors, agendas and arenas are interconnected. This has shaped DRG into a 
multifaceted, political and competitive arena. To understand this arena, research for this thesis 
used a political lens to explore interests, positions and power relations among actors. 
Specifically, the ‘triangle of governance’ framework was used as the foundation in developing 
the concept of the ‘politics of DRG’. 
This section presents the ‘politics of DRG’, beginning with the phrase’s etymology and 
moving towards the current use of the concept in the context of DRR and DRG. As a newly 
developed analytical tool, there are limited academic references on this phrase. Therefore, it is 
necessary to clarify the phrase through the etymology of its components to introduce the 
meaning in literal way. The first term, ‘politics’, derives from the Greek word ‘politika’, which 
means ‘affairs of the cities’. Through the centuries, ‘politics’ has been defined extensively, with 
a focus expanding from the classical model of government behaviour studies to the wider 
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spectrum of the public sphere (Palonen, 2011). Politics is no longer seen from the traditional 
perspective of the authoritarian realm; rather, politics is now more associated with ‘metaphoric 
space’ (Palonen, 2011). Politics revolves around the imaginary space of ‘arena’, where influence, 
interests and preferences are contested. The second term, ‘disaster’, originally came from the 
French word ‘désastre’ and the Italian word ‘disastro’ (Fekete, 2012: 68). The Greek word 
disastro means ‘bad star’. In policy practice, disaster is defined as ‘a serious disruption of the 
functioning of a community […] leading to […] human, material, economic and environmental 
losses and impacts’ (UNISDR, 2009). The term ‘risk’ comes from the Greek word ‘rhiza’, 
meaning the ‘root’ of a mountain or ‘basis’ (Fekete, 2012: 68). UNISDR defines ‘risk’ as ‘the 
combination of the probability of a hazardous event and its consequences which result from 
interaction(s) between natural or man-made hazard(s), vulnerability, exposure and capacity’ 
(Prevention Web, 2015: 27). Finally, the word ‘governance’ is derived from the Greek word 
‘kubernáo’, meaning ‘to steer’. The idea of governance has changed the locus and focus of 
governing by promoting new actors and new levels in the decision-making process (locus) while 
also changing the rules of the game and the steering mechanism (focus) (van Leeuwen and van 
Tatenhove, 2010). This etymological elaboration shows that the politics of DRG is related to the 
metaphoric arena of competition over influence (politics) on reducing disaster risk (disaster and 
risk). 
 Although the explanation of the etymology of the ‘politics of DRG’ can give us the gist of 
its meaning, of course, several concerns about the use of the politics of DRG as analytical tool: 
How do we analyse the political dimension of DRG? What analytical tools should be used? This 
thesis adopted the framework of the ‘triangle of governance’ to structure the political dimension 
of DRG (see Figure 2). The triangle of governance has been used in different ways by various 
scholars. Most scholars and practitioners have viewed this framework as a ‘multi-dimensional 
simplex representing three respective shares of business, NGOs and states’ (Abbott and Snidal, 
2006). However, inspired by the work of Treib et al. (2007) and van Leeuwen and van 
Tatenhove (2010), this thesis associated the ‘triangle of governance’ with policy, politics and 
polity. This comes from the fundamental credo of politics: polity, politics and policy (Mouffe, 
2005). Van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove (2010: 590) refer to the triangle of governance as 
‘policy making processes (policy), power balances (politics) and the institutional setting 
(polity)’. 
This thesis applied van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove’s (2010) concept of the ‘triangle of 
governance’ to the context of DRG. Employing the ‘triangle of governance’ was not undertaken 
only to explain the dynamics of governance but also to comprehend three different dimensions of 
the governance arena. 
First, DRG is a complex process of interactive governance through which diverse actors 
institute a common platform/network with shared goals and contested conflicts of interest. This 
dimension of the institutional setting (polity) is influential for the other two dimensions of the 
‘triangle of governance’: policy and politics. Polity drives the flow of power games and policy 
steering (van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010). It brings in the rules of the game to govern the 
multifaceted interactions among actors that are often associated with tension, ego, inherent 
paradox, inequality and complex coordination (Saz-Carranza and Ospina, 2010; Moe, 2010). 
Second, DRG is an arena of competition among actors with different interests, positions and 
preferences. In many settings, the interaction process on governance is a reflection of power 
relations (politics) (Brunnengraeber et al., 2006; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010; Leroy 
and Arts, 2006; Rhodes, 1996; Stokker, 1998; Treib et al., 2007). DRG can be seen as a sort of 
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political ‘arena’ (De Haan and Long, 1997; Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010) where negotiation over 
rules including the agenda and policy direction are embedded within the networks (politics). 
Third, these relations are aimed at steering the process of policy formulation and decision 
making (policy) (Hirst, 2000; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010; Leroy and Arts, 2006; 
Rhodes, 1996; Treib et al., 2007). Referring to the basic concept of ‘interactive governance’, the 
interplay among multiple actors on governance is strongly related to the ‘steering and control of 
society through collective action’ (Torfing et al., 2012: 2). Through the dimension of policy 
steering, this thesis explored the complex process of advocacy by non-state actors in DRG. This 
required investigating the processes of agenda setting, the roles of non-state actors and the 
interface between state and non-state actors in the advocacy arena. 
 
Figure 2. The politics of disaster risk governance in Indonesia and Myanmar 
 
Political dimension of DRG   Case studies        Actor 
interactions  
  
          Polity     Global Level 
 
                                                                        
 
                     Indonesia        
 
Politics   Policy 
                                                                            Myanmar 
 
 
 
 
Note: Disaster risk governance (DRG) is ‘the system of institutions, mechanisms, policy and legal frameworks 
and other arrangements to guide, coordinate and oversee disaster risk reduction and related areas of policy’ 
(UNISDR, 2007) 
1.4.3.2. Research questions and objectives 
This research aimed to critically assess how inclusive DRR on DRG has worked out in 
practice and to investigate to what extent the actual practice of inclusiveness has been affected 
by the domestic political environment. Referring to the work of Gaillard and Mercer (2012), 
inclusive DRR refers to ‘the collaboration of a wide array of stakeholders operating across 
different scales’ (Gaillard and Mercer, 2012: 95). This study used the concept of interactive 
governance to understand these collaborations of different stakeholders. In short, interactive 
governance refers to the complexity of processes in the work of plural actors, who stand 
‘independently but act interdependently’ (Torfing et al., 2012 & Sorensen & Torfing, 2004). The 
word ‘independency’ refers to the autonomy of organization to represent their own mandate, 
mission and strategic goals in condition they bind to the shared goals of multi-stakeholders 
network (interdependency). Accordingly, despite the difference organizational mandate and 
structure, every organization is moving toward the same direction on the network. Within the 
complex interaction, it argues that the interactions among plural actors are polit ical in three 
dimensions: the institutional setting (polity), power relations (politics) and policy advocacy 
(policy). 
To fulfil these objectives, the following questions guided the research: 
Horizontal 
V
ertical 
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(1) How has inclusive DRR been developed at the global level? 
(2) How does the principle of inclusiveness on DRG work in practice in Indonesia and 
Myanmar? 
a. What are the characteristics of the polity, policy and politics of DRG in Indonesia and 
Myanmar? 
b. To what extent has the actual practice of inclusiveness been affected by the domestic 
political environment? 
 To what extent has decentralisation in Indonesia contributed to DRG? 
 To what extent has political transition in Myanmar influenced the dynamics of 
DRG? 
(3) How has the idea of an interactive structure for DRR governance networks played out in 
Indonesia and Myanmar? 
 What explains the different perceptions of risk among multiple actors involved in 
the process of interactive governance?  
 What are the actual challenges to the practice of inclusive DRR in DRG? 
(4) What are the lessons learned on interactive governance from the two case studies? 
1.4.4. Research design and methods of data collection 
This research used qualitative methods for data collection, processing and analysis. 
Qualitative research aims to describe complex interactions between different stakeholders. It 
relies on the essence of experiences, meanings and perceptions to acquire knowledge (Kumar, 
2005). The underpinning philosophy of qualitative research involves the process of answering 
questions such as ‘how x plays a role in causing y’ and ‘what the process is that connects x and 
y’ (Maxwell, 2005). Such causal explanations are intended to describe variation in a 
phenomenon, situation or issue (Kumar, 2005) to investigate the ‘causes of effects’ (Mahoney, 
2010). 
For this thesis, the main objective of the research was to investigate how the principle of 
inclusiveness in DRR works in practice in relation to government power in Indonesia and 
Myanmar. The aim of the thesis was to provide evidence on how political changes play a role in 
influencing the dynamics of DRG. In attempting to draw these causal connections, the analysis 
was undertaken through the framework of the ‘politics of DRG.’ This framework built upon the 
concept of the ‘triangle of governance’: polity, politics and policy. The main focus was on 
exploring the multifaceted interactions within the institutional setting (polity), patterns of power 
(politics) and the advocacy process (policy) within the wider context of political change. 
To achieve the study objectives, the research used the case study method to gain holistic and 
in-depth knowledge (Tellis, 1997). Case studies are intended to bring in characteristics from 
specific selected contexts. In practical terms, it was beneficial to break down the extensive 
research field into more precise and ‘researchable’ settings (Maciel, 2015). Further, comparisons 
between cases allow for exploring rival explanations and causal relations, as well as 
contextualising differences (Lancaster and Montinola, 1997). The selection of Indonesia and 
Myanmar was intended to bring together two case studies within the framework of DRG. This 
should facilitate the identification of key patterns of DRG in the two countries, including an 
examination of the similarities and differences confronted in reality. 
The research design was further developed by including multiple qualitative methods of data 
collection within the case studies (see Figure 3). Field research was conducted over 18 months, 
and a total of 129 people in Indonesia and 78 in Myanmar participated in this research through 
semi-structured interviews or focus group discussions. These participants included both 
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government officials and non-state actors (international organisation and NGO representatives). 
The following points provide more detail on the methods of data collection used in this research: 
 
 Document review techniques were used to collect information on the basic conceptual 
framework of the politics of DRG, global frameworks on DRR, global norms, political 
changes and decentralisation. The work done here included but was not limited to the 
development of a review article to formulate and synthesise the analytical tool of the 
politics of DRG and the analysis of the following policy documents to gather data on 
Indonesia’s and Myanmar’s policy on DRR: the ‘Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Agreement on Disaster Emergency Response’, ‘the Indonesian Disaster Management 
Law (№ 24/2007)’, ‘the Matrix on Input of Indonesian Alliance for the Revision of 
Disaster Management Law’, ‘the Myanmar Standing Position on Natural Disaster 
Management’, ‘the Strategic Framework of the Myanmar DRR Working Group’ and ‘the 
Situational Analysis of DRR in Myanmar’. 
 
 Semi-structured interviews were used as an instrument to gain in-depth knowledge and 
information on DRG. This method of data collection covered exploration on the subject 
of actors’ mapping, multifaceted interactions and the advocacy process. Specifically, the 
interview questions revolved around the topic of organisational roles in DRR, the 
interplay with other actors and perceptions of challenges to collaboration. The 
interviewees included government officials and non-state actors from both international 
organisations and NGOs. From the government side, several semi-structured interviews 
were conducted in Jakarta, Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw with mid-level bureaucrats from 
different ministries such as the Indonesian National Agency for Disaster Management 
(Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana), the Indonesian Regional Agency for 
Disaster Management (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah), the Indonesian 
Ministry of National Development Planning, the Coordinating Ministry of Human 
Development and Culture, the Ministry of Social Welfare, the Ministry of Village, the 
Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Education, and the 
Myanmar Ministry of Social Welfare and Resettlement. Interviews were also conducted 
with government administrative workers at provincial, state, region, regency, district, 
village and township levels, at agencies such as the Indonesian Regional Agency for 
Disaster Management (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana), the Myanmar 
Township Government, the Myanmar General Administration, and the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. In addition to government respondents, a series of semi-structured interviews 
was conducted with international organisations (UN Development Programme in 
Indonesia and Myanmar, UN Habitat in Myanmar), NGOs (Dompet Dhuafa, 
Muhamadiyah Disaster Management Center, Malteser Myanmar, World Vision 
Myanmar, ActionAid Myanmar, PLAN Myanmar, Oxfam Myanmar and nine local 
NGOs in Myanmar) and auxiliary organisations (The Red Cross in Indonesia and 
Myanmar). 
 
 The research also included a qualitative impact study to observe the implementation of a 
DRR project at the community level by an alliance of NGOs. For this purpose, various 
community groups at the village level were interviewed to study community perspectives 
towards risk, the DRR project, NGOs and the roles of the government. Collecting 
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primary data from community members was important for investigating the relevance of 
the DRR programme conducted by the government and NGOs for the community. In 
Indonesia, the selected project for study and observation was the ‘DRR Integrated 
Approach Project’, which was conducted by an NGO alliance called Mitra. Mitra is an 
alliance of five international NGOs based in the Netherlands that work to reduce the 
impact of natural hazards on the livelihoods of vulnerable people in nine countries 
(Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mali, Guatemala and 
Nicaragua). In Myanmar, the selected project was ‘Myanmar for Resilience’. This 
consortium is a European-funded project consisting of six organisations aiming to 
increase resilience in coastal and urban communities by institutionalising an inclusive 
approach to DRR. The implementing agency and donor names are withheld in this thesis 
for reasons of confidentiality. In Indonesia, the targeted community respondents were 
representatives of the project groups. In total, approximately 99 community members 
participated in the research. In Myanmar, the interviews targeted women, youth and the 
elderly, in line with the principle of DRR inclusiveness. Thirty-six community members 
were interviewed in this part of the field research. Focus group discussions were 
organised at the community level to gain an overarching understanding of the community 
perspective on the implementation of the DRR project. At this level, five focus groups 
were conducted each inIndonesia and Myanmar. In total, approximately 51 respondents 
participated in these focus group discussions. 
 
 Participant observation was also used to collect data, drawing on unstructured interviews, 
focus group discussions, minutes of meetings and observations from national and 
international conferences/workshops. As a method, participant observation provides room 
for exploration, allowing the researcher to experience the interaction and situation of the 
research subject. It is a way of ‘living in the situation’ (Kumar, 2011: 125). In Myanmar, 
the researcher engaged in a series of activities: monthly meetings of the DRR Working 
Group (September and October 2014); the ASEAN committee for Disaster Management 
Working Group on Recovery and the Consultation Workshop for ASEAN Guidelines on 
Recovery Planning (22 September 2014); and the International Day for Disaster 
Reduction in Yangon (11 October 2014). Participant observation was also conducted at 
government coordination meetings at the WCDRR (Japan, 14–18 March 2015) and Asian 
Ministerial Conference on DRR (Thailand, 22–26 June 2014), where the researcher was a 
member of the Indonesian delegation. 
 
 At the national level, the researcher engaged in an internship programme at a UN agency 
in Myanmar. This agency was a key member of the DRR Working Group, the active 
DRR multi-stakeholder platform in Myanmar. The internship began from the practical 
need to gain access and permission to conduct the research for this thesis, which required 
the endorsement of an established organisation. After difficulties were encountered in 
conducting preliminary research in 2013, the decision was made to secure organisational 
support for this research. The aim was to gain access to the meetings and activities of two 
DRR governance networks in Myanmar—the DRR Working Group and the Myanmar 
Consortium for DRR. Because this required organisational support, an opportunity to 
engage with a project involving the government, international organisations and NGOs in 
Myanmar was sought. Having this organisational support provided access to the main 
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actors in the DRR Working Group and the Myanmar Consortium for DRR, including 
opportunities to observe discussions, meetings and informal conversations. 
 
In confronting ethical issues in this research and maintaining an ethical code of conduct, the 
researcher protected the identity of the research participants and organisations by withholding 
their names and locations. Considering the potential for bias after engaging in the two qualitative 
impact studies of the projects of Mitra and Myanmar for Resilience, including the internship with 
one of the UN agencies working in Myanmar, the researcher also committed to upholding the 
principle of independence. Three steps were taken to reduce bias. First, a clear research design 
was developed to guide the direction of the research. Second, multiple perspectives and cross-
cutting information on the research topics were actively sought by recruiting a wide range of 
participants with various backgrounds. Third, open-ended questions were used in the interviews 
to allow room for the exploration of unanticipated perspectives and topics—for instance, ‘What 
happened when cyclone Nargis struck the village?’ and ‘To what extent has the government 
engaged in collaborative work with non-state actors on DRR?’ 
Figure 3. Framework for the research methodology 
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1.4.5. Organisation of the thesis 
This thesis is developed through a series of steps. Overall, it flows through the presentation 
and analysis of four academic discussions: the politics of global DRG, decentralised DRG in 
Indonesia, DRG in transitional Myanmar and DRR advocacy platforms in Indonesia and 
Myanmar. The thesis ends with a concluding chapter that synthesises the outcomes of the four 
studies and provides answers to the research questions. 
Chapter 2 traces the dynamics of global DRG to present the construction of inclusive DRR 
as a global framework. This analysis was undertaken through the frameworks of interactive 
governance and the ‘triangle of governance’ (polity, politics and policy). This chapter draws on 
the observation of two multi-stakeholder DRR events: the WCDRR in Japan in 2015 and the 
Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR in Thailand in 2014. These two events were included in 
the case study to explain the reality of global DRG. 
In Chapter 3, the case of decentralised DRG in Indonesia is explored with the objective of 
examining how changes in the political system influence the practice and reality of DRG. 
Chapter 4 turns to Myanmar, analysing the dynamics of DRG in the setting of political change. 
In Chapter 5, the thesis focuses on the role of NGOs in DRR multi-stakeholder advocacy 
mechanisms in Indonesia and Myanmar. This chapter emphasises the process of agenda setting, 
power relations between state and non-state actors, and advocacy channels for the DRR agenda 
in both countries. Chapter 6 provides the overall conclusions drawn from the preceding chapters 
of the thesis and analyses how the findings of this research might contribute to more effective 
DRG. This chapter also reflects on the initial problematic of this research—how, in reality, the 
principle of inclusiveness on DRR has to compete with the dominance of government power. 
Throughout the discussion in this chapter, topics for future research are suggested. 
 
References Chapter 1 
 
Abbott, K., & Snidal, D. (2008). The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the 
Shadow State. In Politics of Global Regulation, 1–67. Princeton, USA: Princeton University 
Press.  
ADRC. (2010). Natural Disaster Data Book: An Analytical Overview. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.adrc.asia/publications/databook/ORG/databook_2011/pdf/DataBook2011_e.pdf> 
Ahrens, J., & Rudolph, P. (2006). The Importance of Risk Governance. Journal of Contigencies and 
Crises Management, 14(4), 207–220.  
Asian Development Bank (ADB). (2016). Poverty in Myanmar. Retrieved from: 
<https://www.adb.org/countries/myanmar/poverty> 
Banerjee, M.G.D. (2008). Disaster Diplomacy in Asia- An Indian Perspective. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.disasterdiplomacy.org/pb/banerjee2008.pdf> 
Bankoff, G. & Cannon, T., Kruger, F., & Schipper, L. (2015). Introduction: Exploring the Links Between 
Cultures and Disasters. In Bankoff, G., Cannon, T., Kruger, F., & Schipper, L. Cultures and 
Disaster: Understanding Cultural Framings in Disaster Risk Reduction. New York, USA: 
Routledge, 1 – 16.  
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2016). Hundreds Days of Myanmar Democracy. Retrieved 
from: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36732270> 
Brunnengraeber, A., Dietz, K., Hirschl, B., Walk, H., & Berlin, F. (2006). Interdisciplinary in Governance 
Research. GARNET Working Paper, 08 (06).  
 Page | 34  
 
Callaway, D.W., Yim, E.S., Stack, C., & Burkle, F.M. Jr. (2012). Integrating the Disaster Cycle Model 
into Traditional Disaster Diplomacy Concepts. Disaster Medicine and Public Health 
Preparedness, 6 (1), 53–59. 
Cannon, T. (1994). Vulnerability, Analysis and the Explanation of Natural Disasters. In Varley, A. (Ed), 
Disasters, Development, Environment.. Chichester, UK: John Willey & Sons, Ltd, 13 - 30 
Cannon, T. (2000). Vulnerability Analysis and Disasters. In Parker, D. J. (Ed), Floods, Vol 1, London, 
UK: Routledge, 13 - 29.  
Cho, A. (2014). Post-tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction: Governance Issues and Implications of the 
Great East Japan Earthquake. Journal of Disasters, 38 (2), 157– 178.  
Chottray, V., & Stoker, G. (2009). Governance Theory: A Cross Disciplinary Approach. Public 
Administration, 4, 982–983.  
Comfort, L.K., Boin, A., & Demchak, C.C. (2010). Designing Resilience. Preparing for Extreme Events. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.  
Djalante, R. (2012). Adaptive Governance and Resilience: The Role of Multi-stakeholder Platforms in 
Indonesia. Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 12 (9), 2923–2942. Retrieved from: 
<https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-12-2923-2012> 
Earthmind. (2005). Approaches to Disaster Risk Reduction. Retrieved from: 
<http://earthmind.org/files/risk/Concern_ApproachestoDRR-paper-final.pdf> 
Egreteau, R, & Jagan, L. (2013). Soldiers and Diplomacy in Burma: Understanding the Foreign Relations 
of the Burmese Praetorian State. Singapore: NUS Press.  
Enia, J. (2013). The spotty record of the Hyogo Framework for Action: Understanding the incentives of 
natural disaster politics and policy making. The Social Science Journal, 50 (2), 213-224. 
Retrieved from: <doi: 10.1016/j.soscij.2012.12.004> 
Ewalt, J.G. (2001). Theories of Governance and New Public Management: Links to Understanding 
Welfare Policy Implementation. Prepared for presentation at the Annual conference of the 
American Society for Public Administration. Newark, NJ. March 12, 2001.  
Fekete, A. (2012). Safety and Security Target Levels: Opportunities and Challenges for Risk Management 
and Risk Communication. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 2, 67–76.  
Fleck, R., & Kilby, C. (2006). How Do Political Changes Influence United States Bilateral Aid 
Allocations? Evidence from Panel Data. Review of Development Economics, 10(2), 210 – 223. 
Retrieved from: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-
9361.2006.00313.x/epdf?r3_referer=wol&tracking_action=preview_click&show_checkout=1&p
urchase_referrer=onlinelibrary.wiley.com&purchase_site_license=LICENSE_DENIED_NO_CU
STOMER> 
Gaillard. J.C. & Mercer, J. (2012). From Knowledge to Action: Bridging Gaps in Disaster Risk 
Reduction. Progress in Human Geography, 37(1) 93–114. DOI: 10.1177/0309132512446717 
Gerber, B. (2007). Disaster Management in the United States: Examining Key Political Changes and 
Policy Challenges. The Policy Studies Journal. 35(2).  
Gerring, J. (2013). What It Is and What It Does? The Oxford Handbook of Political Sciences. Retrieved 
from: <10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.013.0051> 
Gravers, M & Ytzen, F (eds). (2014). Burma Myanmar: Where Now? Copenhagen, Denmark: NIAS 
Press.  
Grindle, M. (2004). Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries. 
Retrieved from: < http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic845003.files/Session%2016%20-
%20Mar%2024/Grindle_2004_Good%20Enough%20Governance.pdf> 
Hagelsteen, M & Becker, P. (2013). Challenging Disparities in Capacity Development for Disaster Risk 
Reduction. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 3, 4 – 13.  
Hannigan, J. (2012). Disasters without Borders. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.  
Heywood, A. (2004). Political Theory: An Introduction. London: UK, Palgrave Macmillan 
Hill, H. (2014). An Introduction, Regional Dynamics in a Decentralized Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 1 – 24. 
 Page | 35  
 
Hilhorst, D. & Bankoff, G. (2004). Introduction: Mapping Vulnerability. In Bankoff, Greg & Frerks, 
Georg & Hilhorst, Dorothea, Disasters, Development and People. Sterling, USA: Earthscan, 1- 
9.  
Hirst, P. (2000). Democracy and Governance, In Jon Pierre (Ed), Debating Governance. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2000, 14-19.  
Ilmma, A & Wai-Po, M. (2014). Twelve Years of Fiscal Decentralization: A Balance Sheet. In Hal, Hill 
(Ed) Regional Dynamics in a Decentralized Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies (ISEAS), 98 – 134.  
Inclusive Community Resilience for Sustainable Disaster Risk Management (INCRISD). The 4 
Dimensions of Inclusion: 4 Framework for Inclusive DRM. Retrieved from: < 
http://www.incrisd.org/toolkit/frameworkpdf/PART%202.pdf> 
Kelman, I. (2011). Disaster Diplomacy: How disasters affect peace and conflict. London, Routledge. 
Kerkvliet, B.J.T. (2009). Everyday politics in peasant societies (and ours). Journal of Peasant Studies, 
36(1), 227-243 
Kohler-Koch, B. (2005). European Governance & System Integration, European Governance Papers, No. 
N-05-02. 
Kumar, R. (2005). Research Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners. California, USA: Sage 
Publications. Retrieved from: <http://www.sociology.kpi.ua/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/Ranjit_Kumar-Research_Methodology_A_Step-by-Step_G.pdf> 
Lancaster, T & Montinola, G. (1997). Toward a Methodology for the Comparative Study of Political 
Corruption. Journal of Crime, Law & Social Change, 27, 185–206. 
Lassa, J. (2010). Institutional Vulnerability and Governance of Disaster Risk Reduction: Macro, Meso, 
Micro Scale Assessment. Dissertation University of Bonn, Germany.  
Leroy, P.& Arts, B. (Ed). (2006). Institutional Dynamics on Environment Governance. Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands : Springer. Retrieved from: <Doi: 10.1007/1-4020-5079-8> 
Lindsay, J. (2014). Multilevel Governance and Emergency Management in Canadian Municipalities. 
Journal of Disaster Prevention and Management, 23(3), 309-310, Retrieved from: <Doi: 
10.1108/DPM-01-2014-0017> 
Maciel, Carolina. (2015). Public Morals in Private Hands? A Study into the Evolving Path of Animal 
Welfare Governance. Dissertation University of Wageningen, The Netherlands.  
Mahoney, J. (2010). After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research. Journal of World 
Politics, 62(1), 120-147. 
Miller, F., H. Osbahr, E. Boyd, F. Thomalla, S. Bharwani, G. Ziervogel, B. Walker, J. Birkmann, S. Van 
der Leeuw, J. Rockström, J. Hinkel, T. Downing, C. Folke, and D. Nelson 2010. Resilience and 
vulnerability: complementary or conflicting concepts?. Ecology and Society 15(3): 1. 
Mardiah, A., Lovett, J., & Evanty, N. (2017) Toward Integrated and Inclusive Disaster Risk Reduction in 
Indonesia: Review of Regulatory Frameworks and Institutional Networks. In Djalante, R., 
Garschagen, M., Thomalla, F., & Shaw, R. (Eds). Disaster Risk Reduction in Indonesia: 
Progress, Challenges, and Issues. Cham, Switzerland: Springer (57 – 84).  
Martinsson (2011). Global Norms: Creation, Diffusion and Limits perspective. Retrieved from: 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVACC/Resources/FinalGlobalNormsv1.pdf> 
Maxwell, J. (2005). Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach. California, USA: SAGE. 15–
32. 
Mietzener, M. (2014). Indonesia’s Decentralization: The Rise of Local Identities and The Survival of 
Nation State. In Hal, Hill, Regional Dynamics in a Decentralized Indonesia, Singapore: Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) (45–67). 
Moe, T.L. (2010). Cleanup after Katrina: an analysis on policy, process, priorities, problems, and politics. 
Disaster Prevention and Management, 19(3), 314–332. Retrieved from: <doi: 
10.1108/09653561011052493> 
 Page | 36  
 
Morishita, A. (2008). Contesting Power in Indonesia’s Resources Rich Regions in the Era of 
Decentralization: New Strategy for Central Control over the Regions. Indonesia, No. 86 (Oct., 
2008), 81-107. Retrieved from: <Doi: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40376461> 
Munck, G. (1996). Disaggregating Political Regime: Conceptual Issues in the Study of Democratization. 
Working Paper #228. The Helen Kellog Institute for International Studies. Retrieved from 
<https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/228.pdf> 
Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2016). Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Departments. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.mofa.gov.mm/?page_id=12> 
Nelson, T. (2010). Rejecting The Gift Horse: International Politics of Disaster Aid Refusal. Conflict, 
Security & Development, 10 (3), 379 – 402.  
Niekerk, D. (2015). Disaster risk governance in Africa: A retrospective assessment of progress in against 
the Hyogo Framework for Action (2000–2012), Journal of Disaster Prevention and Management, 
24(3), 397–416. 
Oliver Smith, A. (2003). Editor: A Matter of Choice. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 3, 
1-3. 
Organisation for Economic and Co-operation Development (OECD). (2016). Disaster Risk Financing. 
Retrieved from: <http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-
markets/oecdinternationalnetworkonthefinancialmanagementoflarge-scalecatastrophes.htm> 
Ospina, S., & Saz-Carranza, A. (2005). Paradox and Collaboration in Coalition Work. Paper for Annual 
Meeting of the Academy of the Management ‘Anew Vision of Management in the 21st century. 
Retrieved from: < 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6b4d/48b62ef43ba13642288377f5d49af1e4a247.pdf> 
Palonen, K. (2006). Two Concepts of Politics. Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory, 7(1), 
11–25. Retrieved from: <doi: 10.1080/1600910x.2006.9672919> 
Peters, G., & Pierre, J. (1998). Governance without Government. Journal of Public Administration, 8(2), 
223-243.  
PreventionWeb. (2015). Proposed Updated Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction: A Technical 
Review. Retrieved from: < 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/45462_backgoundpaperonterminologyaugust20.pdf> 
PreventionWeb. (2017). Words Into Action: National Focal Points for DRR, Platforms for DRR, Local 
Platforms for DRR. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.preventionweb.net/files/53055_npslpswiapublicconsultation2017.pdf> 
Rhodes, R. (1996). The New Governance: Governing without Government. Political Studies, XLIV, 652-
667.  
Risse-Kappen, T (Ed). (1995). Bringing transnational relations back in: Non-state actors, domestic 
structures and international institutions. Cambridge Studies in International Relations.  
Rum, M. (2016). The Case of Regional Disaster Management Cooperation in ASEAN: A Constructivist 
Approach to Understanding How International Norms Travel. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 
5(3), 419–514. Retrieved from: <DOI: 10.20495/seas.5.3_491> 
Scholtz, J., Berardo, R., & Kile, B. (2008). Do Networks Solve Collective Action Problems: Credibility, 
Search and Collaboration. The Journal of Politics, 7(2). 
Seawright, J & Gerring, J. Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and 
Quantitative Options. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 61 (2), 294 – 308.  
Seng, D.C. (2010). The Role of Governance, Multi Institutional Arrangements and Polycentric 
Frameworks for a Resilient Tsunami Early Warning System in Indonesia. Dissertation University 
of Bonn, Germany. 
Skidmore, M., & Wilson, T. (2012). Interpreting the Transition in Myanmar. In Cheesman, N, Farrelly, 
N, & Wilson, T. (Eds), Myanmar’s Transition: Openings, Obstacles and Opportunities. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), (3–20). 
Sorensen, E & Torfing, J. (2004). Making Governance Networks Democratic. Roskilde: Roskilde 
Universiteit.  
 Page | 37  
 
Steinberg, D. (2001). Burma: The State of Myanmar. David I Steinberg. Georgetown, USA: Georgetown 
University Press.  
Stoker, G. (1998). Governance as a Theory: Five Propositions. UNSECO, 17–28. 
Tellis, W. (1997). Application of a Case Study Methodology. The Qualitative Report, 3(3), Retrieved 
from: <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-3/tellis2.html> 
Tierney, K. (2012). Disaster Governance: Social, Political and Economic Dimensions. Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources, 37: 341–363.  
Torfing, J., Peters, G., Pierre, J., & Sørensen, E. (2012). Interactive Governance: Advancing the 
Paradigm. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Treib, O., Bähr, H., & Falkner, G. (2007). Modes of Governance: Towards A Conceptual Clarification. 
Journal of European Public Policy, 14(1), 1–20.  
Twigg, J. (2009). Characteristics of a Disaster Resilient Community. Interagency Group (ActionAid, 
British Red Cross, Christian Aid, Practical Action, Plan UK and Tearfund). Retrieved from: 
<http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1346086/1/1346086.pdf> 
United Nations. (1989). International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r236.htm> 
UNESCAP. (2010). Protecting Development Gains. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.unescap.org/idd/pubs/Asia-Pacific-Disaster-Report-2010.pdf> 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). (2007). Terminology. Retrieved 
from: <https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology#letter-d> 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). (2007). Guidelines: National 
Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). Retrieved from: < 
http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/601> 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). (2008). Disaster Risk 
Management System Analysis: A Guide Book. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.unisdr.org/files/3769_ai504e00.pdf> 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). (2009). Terminology on 
Disaster Risk Reduction. Retrieved from: <http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology#letter-
d> 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). (2010). Synthesis Report on Ten 
ASEAN Countries Disaster Risk Assessment. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.unisdr.org/files/18872_asean.pdf> 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). (2012). Rio’s Call to Action on 
Disaster Rrsk Reduction. Retrieved from: <http://www.unisdr.org/archive/27335> 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). (2013). Findings of the Review 
of National Platforms for DRR 2012–2013.  
van Leeuwen, J., & van Tatenhove, J. (2010). The Triangle of Marine Governance in the Environmental 
Governance of Dutch Offshore Platforms. Marine Policy, 34(3), 590–597. Retrieved from: <doi: 
10.1016/j.marpol.2009.11.006> 
Warner, J., Waalewijn, P., & Hilhorst, D. (2002). Public Participation in Disaster-Prone Watersheds: 
Time for Multi-stakeholder Platforms? Paper for the Water and Climate Dialogue, 1–36.  
Wisner, B., Blaike, P., Cannon, T., & Daus, I. (2004). At Risk: Natural Hazards, People Vulnerability and 
Disaster. New York, USA: Routledge. 
World Bank. (2016). Disaster Risk Management: Overview. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/disasterriskmanagement/overview#2> 
World Bank (2016). Myanmar: Overview. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/myanmar/overview> 
World Economic Forum. (2015). Which Country is The Most Competitive? Retrieved from: 
<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/04/which-asean-country-is-the-most-competitive/> 
Yim, E.S., Callaway, D.W., Fares, S., & Cittone, G.R. (2009). Disaster Diplomacy: Current Controversies 
and Future. Retrieved from: <http://www.disasterdiplomacy.org/pb/banerjee2008.pdf>. 
 Page | 38  
 
Zweegers, S., & De Groot, A. (2012). Global Values in a Changing World. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: 
KIT Publishers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Page | 39  
 
Chapter 2 - The Politics of Global Disaster Risk Governance 
 
In the past 10 years, disaster risk governance has shifted from a top-down, state-centric issue 
to a more interactive governance, with strong political commitment. Disaster risk reduction 
(DRR) has become a global paradigm with high participation of diverse actors and advocacy 
carried out at a wide range of levels. The present study aimed to develop an approach to 
understanding the changing reality of global disaster risk governance. This chapter explains the 
complex, messy, competitive and political dynamics of global disaster risk governance and offers 
an analytical tool for understanding the interaction of DRR multi-stakeholder initiatives through 
examining the institutional setting, advocacy politics and power relations. The study is based on 
a literature review and in-depth participatory observation of two major DRR multi-stakeholder 
forums at the global (the World Conference on DRR 2015) and regional (Asian Ministerial 
Conference on DRR 2014) levels. 
 
Keywords: Disaster risk reduction, regimes, governance, politics 
 
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is thought to be significantly more inclusive when the 
involvement of non-state actors grows in parallel with strong political commitment on this 
agenda. Over the last 50 years, DRR has passed through four historical phases in its 
transformation from a technical approach to a global movement (UNISDR, 2015). First, in the 
1960s, severe natural disasters struck Iraq, Yugoslavia and several Central American countries, 
causing the United Nations (UN) to release a General Assembly resolution aiming to manage 
humanitarian assistance during natural disasters. This first initiative inspired the second phase, 
the institutionalisation of global assistance specific to natural disasters in the 1970s through the 
establishment of the UN Natural Disaster Relief Office. Then, from the early 1990s to 2000, the 
initiative to push DRR as a global framework developed as an expression of the strong political 
commitment of the UN member states to DRR. This initiative began with the adoption of two 
global frameworks—the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR, 1987) 
and the Yokohama Strategy (1994). As a continuation, in the fourth phase, the Hyogo Framework 
for Action (HFA, 2005) brought DRR into an even more comprehensive global framework, 
where multiple stakeholders actively participate in engaging cross-cutting DRR-related issues. In 
2015, the World Conference on DRR (WCDRR) proved to be another important step in building 
momentum for the political commitment of multiple stakeholders on DRR; here, 187 countries, 
represented by 25 heads of state and 6500 delegates, agreed to work together to achieve DRR 
global priorities. 
The interactive governance on DRR appears as a common method for achieving effective 
DRR planning and implementation (UNISDR, 2013; Warner et al., 2002). This approach has 
been adopted in various initiatives and at multiple levels as a new way of governing, introducing 
a pluricentric, bottom-up and network-oriented approach to DRR. Since the HFA, the UN Office 
for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) has actively encouraged the establishment of national 
platforms as one manifestation of the multi-stakeholder spirit. These coordination initiatives 
through DRR national platforms range in scale from local to national level, with the idea and 
format being adapted at the sub-national level.  
However, as DRR has incrementally moved towards this new approach, in-depth studies 
analysing the internal dynamics of the practice of disaster risk governance have remained 
lacking. Academic literature has predominantly discussed disaster governance as a way to 
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describe the complex set of structures and networks of the overarching phases of disaster 
management, namely preparedness, response and rehabilitation. DRR, which is often understood 
as one of the phases of disaster management, is often discussed and imbedded within the subject 
of disaster governance. In the academic literature, disaster governance predominantly examines 
three themes: the structural arrangement of disaster governance (Enia, 2013; Gerber, 2007; 
Lassa, 2010; Lindsay, 2014; Seng, 2010), the roles of institutions (Ahrens and Rudolph, 2006; 
Joachim, 2006; Moe, 2010) and the systemic approach to disaster governance (Cho, 2014; 
Niekerk, 2015; Tierney, 2012). The first theme focuses on the institutional setting of disaster risk 
governance, seeking to explain the involvement of different DRR-related institutions in a 
country, including the mechanisms of pluricentric networks. The second theme concerns the 
detrimental effect of bad governance on disaster management. Research on this theme has 
identified the failure to achieve commitment to sustainable development as the major underlying 
risk factor for disaster (Ahrens and Rudolph, 2006; Joachim, 2006). Scholars working on this 
theme have also studied how poorly integrated planning and inter-sectorial coordination 
problems have resulted in the ineffectiveness of disaster risk governance (Moe, 2010). Finally, 
the third theme involves the investigation of external dimensions shaping the arena of disaster 
risk governance, such as globalisation, international constellations, social disparities, population 
density (Tierney, 2012), political systems (Cho, 2014) and DRR global frameworks (Niekerk, 
2015). 
There is a gap in the existing academic work in terms of the dynamics of actors’ interactions 
in the network practices of disaster risk governance. Addressing these internal dynamics is very 
important. This chapter argues that the absence of an analysis of these endogenous dynamics 
risks the generation of ill-advised academic recommendations on DRR. It is crucial to study the 
endogenous dynamics of governance because this kind of work can highlight the nature of 
interests and agenda setting among actors in the complex context of governance interaction. It 
can also help to explain the construction of discourses, negotiations over interests and power 
relations. Through exploring these internal dynamics, the present study aims to contribute to the 
growing body of literature on disaster governance. 
This chapter seeks to investigate how the complex dynamics of disaster risk governance 
work in practice at the global level. To examine these internal dynamics, the chapter analyses 
three strands of disaster risk governance: the institutional setting (polity), power relations 
(politics) and advocacy politics (policy). The chapter analyses the dynamics of disaster risk 
governance in the global policy setting. DRR has developed beyond an approach and action on 
disaster management. It transformed into a global framework with a specific set-up of guidelines 
and priorities for action for governing the behaviour of countries to achieve common objectives 
on DRR. The agreement of 187 countries on the new global framework on DRR (Sendai 
Framework for 2015–2030) provided political momentum for global collective action on DRR. 
Although the framework has no binding power of enforcement regarding the target of reducing 
disaster risk, it can act as a reference, guideline and target for governments, but also for donors, 
international organisations (IOs) and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). 
The analysis presented in this chapter is based on a literature review and participatory 
observation at two major DRR conferences: the Wold Conference on DRR (WCDRR, Sendai, 
Japan, 14–18 March 2015) and the Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR (AMCDRR, Bangkok, 
Thailand, 22–26 June 2014). At both the WCDRR and the AMCDRR, I engaged in the public 
sessions. Moreover, at the AMCDRR, I had the opportunity to attend a high-level ministerial 
meeting as an observer. 
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Participatory observation is a qualitative technique that aims to understand the research 
object through observing actions (Maxwell, 2005). Compared with other qualitative techniques, 
participatory observation provides a means of understanding the wider engagement of actors 
within the arena of interaction. Participatory observation gathers empirical evidence to draw 
conclusions (Maxwell, 2005). The WCDRR and the AMCDRR were selected because they were 
highly political multi-stakeholder conferences on DRR at the global and regional levels. Both 
conferences involved states, NGOs, academics, the private sector and the community. The 
WCDRR aimed to discuss and negotiate the new DRR global framework, including the priorities 
for action for DRR 2015–2030. Prior to the world conference, the AMCDRR was organised as 
the regional consultative forum for multiple stakeholders in Asia Pacific to gather input, ideas 
and reflections on the new frameworks. At this meeting,  I observed both the public session and 
high-level ministerial meeting in which governments, NGOs and private sector discussed, 
debated and formulated proposed recommendations for the upcoming DRR framework. 
This chapter is divided into four parts—the first being this introduction. The next section 
discusses the architecture of disaster risk governance in the global policy setting. This section 
begins by tracing the past development of DRR in the global policy setting, describing the 
infrastructure of disaster risk governance and comparing the characteristics of disaster risk 
governance with two different disaster management cycles: response and reconstruction. This 
comparison systematically assesses the differences in governance of disaster management, 
helping to draw the overall picture of governance in global disaster management. The third 
section elaborates on the three dimensions of dynamics of the WCDRR and the AMCDRR: 
polity, policy and politics. The final section of the chapter considers the lessons learned from the 
practice of disaster risk governance at the global level. 
2.1. Understanding the DRR global policy setting 
2.1.1. Historical setting 
Beginning in 1987, the international community has agreed to adopt four DRR frameworks: 
the IDNDR (1987), the Yokohama Strategy (1994), the HFA (2005) and the Sendai Framework 
for DRR (2015) (UNISDR, 2015). As the first global initiative on DRR, the IDNDR called for 
global collective action to reduce disaster risk by acknowledging the importance of DRR and the 
role of the scientific and technical approach in reducing disaster risk. To strengthen this global 
commitment, within a decade, the UN also released six General Assembly resolutions (UNISDR, 
2015) as mechanical instruments to govern the framework of IDNDR. The aims of these 
resolutions included establishing international commitment to reducing the impact of natural 
disaster, especially in developing countries; calling for member countries to establish national 
secretariats for the IDNDR; and initiating the World Conference on Natural Disasters in 
Yokohama (UNISDR, 2015). 
Unlike the IDNDR, which started by calling for member states’ political commitment to 
global collective action on DRR, the Yokohama Strategy (1994) attempted to focus the 
commitment on a more specific action plan by encouraging the political commitment of member 
states to DRR through adopting regulations, policies and plans, including mobilising national 
resources for reducing disaster. Both the IDNDR and the Yokohama Strategy were state-centric 
and said little about the role of non-state actors (Hannigan, 2012). 
In the HFA (2005), the involvement of multiple stakeholders was widely acknowledged. The 
framework established five priorities for reducing disaster risk from 2005 to 2015: ensuring DRR 
is a national and local priority; identifying, assessing and monitoring DRR and enhancing 
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disaster risk governance; using knowledge to build a culture of safety; reducing the underlying 
risk factors; and strengthening disaster preparedness for an effective response at all levels (Enia, 
2013). At the end of the execution of the HFA, the framework was criticised for the ‘spotty 
progress of implementation’ (Enia, 2013: 213) and ‘a top-down, UN- and donor-driven process’ 
(Heijmans, 2012: 117). 
Despite contextual and other differences, these frameworks consistently repeated three 
common global commitments on DRR: the importance of prevention measures as the most 
effective method of disaster management, the responsibility of countries to protect their people 
and the essential nature of global collective action in tackling these challenges. Although these 
global frameworks do not have power of enforcement, in practice, they have served as guidance 
for countries implementing DRR priorities for action. In their official AMCDRR statement, 
Brunei Darussalam and Nepal explicitly acknowledged the role of the HFA as the guiding 
principles behind the development of their national action plans on DRR (AMCDRR, 2014). The 
consistency of member states’ agreeing to the DRR agenda in international frameworks reflects 
their collective commitment to achieving global targets on DRR. Specifically, the Sendai 
Framework for 2015–2030 affirmed the priority of strengthening disaster risk governance at 
global level through active engagement in global, regional and sub-regional platforms to enhance 
partnership, assess the progress of implementation and share knowledge (Article 28.2). 
At the global level, member states have appointed UNISDR as the focal point to ensure the 
implementation of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. Within this mandate, 
UNISDR facilitates dialogue and negotiation on issues related to DRR. The WCDRR is 
organised every 15 years to negotiate and adopt a new global framework, taking into account the 
achievements, challenges and lessons learned from the previous international strategy. In 
addition to UNISDR, a specific global-level multi-stakeholder platform was initiated as 
consultation forums for multiple stakeholders to discuss progress reports and exchange 
knowledge on the realisation of the global frameworks. This platform, the Global Platform for 
DRR, aims ‘to coalesce into one strong community involvement and engagement in DRR and 
Climate Change Adaptation’ (Global Platform for DRR, 2011). At the regional level, multi-
stakeholder consultations are set up based on geographical proximity, resulting in Regional 
Platforms for DRR in Africa, the Americas, Europe, the Arab States, Asia and the Pacific. 
2.1.2. Disaster risk governance: Theoretical development 
The initiative to include DRR in high-level political frameworks marked the beginning of the 
analysis of DRR in international relations. A moderate amount of in-depth research seeking to 
capture the dynamics of disaster from an international relations perspective has been conducted 
(Hannigan, 2012). However, in practice, DRR has been transformed into concrete global 
frameworks with the political capacity to guide countries in terms of national action taken on 
DRR. DRR now consists of globally structured arrangements comprising a complex set of 
guidelines to govern states’ behaviour (DRR global frameworks), high-level political agreements 
among member states (the adoption of DRR frameworks) and an institutional body specifically 
tasked with coordinating DRR global collective action (UNISDR). 
The present chapter analyses global collective action on DRR by framing it within 
international relations theory. Four waves of theoretical development characterise international 
relations studies of the discourse on the collective action of states in international politics. These 
waves have focused on inter-governmental organisation (first wave, 1970s), transnationalism 
(second wave, 1970s), regimes (early 1980s) and global governance (1990s) (Weiss and 
Ozgerein, 2008). The first wave frames collectivity among states as ‘inter-governmental 
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organisation’, seeking to explain the multilateral relations among countries in international 
relations. During this period in the development of theory in international relations, state 
sovereignty was placed highly in inter-governmental relations. 
The second wave was framed in response to the increasing role of non-state actors in 
international relations. Keohane and Nye introduced the phrase ‘transnational activity’ to explain 
the growing influence of international organisations in the ‘multilateral context’ (in Weiss and 
Ozgerein, 2008). This involved the active role played by IOs and NGOs. 
Then, in the third wave, scholars shifted their attention to the idea of ‘regimes’ as a concept 
to understand a global set of ideas and structures governing the behaviour of states. Krasner 
defined regimes as a complex set of principles, norms, rules and procedures’ (Krasner, 1982: 
185), which function as mutual arrangements to facilitate cooperation and agreement among 
countries on a given issue (Krasner, 1982). This definition became subject to debate when Susan 
Strange, a well-known international relations scholar, criticised the concept of regimes as 
‘conceptually thin’ and lacking in norms, rules and procedures (in Hasenclever, Mayer and 
Rittberger, 1996). Young reconstructed the definition, proposing a more versatile understanding 
of regimes as social institutions that guide interaction (Stokke, 2001). This facilitated the 
application of the concept of regimes to other domains. 
In the fourth theoretical wave, the concept of ‘global governance’ was discussed as a 
counterargument to the traditional conception of ‘realism’ in international relations theory, which 
saw the state as the centre. Global governance emerged in response to the changing nature of 
international relations, where the entanglement of states, non-state actors and the private sector is 
apparent. The concept of global governance achieved ‘near celebrity status’ because of its high 
relevance to international phenomena occurring at the time (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 1). Most 
scholars defined global governance as ‘a way of organizing international politics in a more 
inclusive and consensual manner’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 2). In defining global governance, 
the Commission on Global Governance highlighted the idea of how ‘individuals and institutions, 
public and private, manage their common affairs’ in the ‘process through which conflict or 
diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken’ (Barnett and 
Duvall, 2005: 2). 
We can see DRR as being subject to global governance processes. First, DRR has shifted to 
become a more inclusive arena, where non-state actors have actively engaged on DRR work. 
Global civil society on DRR was initiated to create a civil society platform across different 
countries. The establishment of the Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster 
Reduction (GNDR) in 2007 was a pivotal moment for DRR advocacy. GNDR became an 
umbrella for 850 organisations from 137 countries, articulating their voices on DRR (GNDR, 
2015). Second, different from the concepts of ‘inter-governmental organisations’ and ‘regimes’, 
which placed the ‘state’ as the core focus of collective action, global governance promoted non-
state actors as important in interactions in the global arena. Third, DRR is not associated only 
with the solid structural arrangements that characterise the concept of ‘regime’ (sets of rules and 
procedures); rather, DRR involves a network of actors and the ‘rules of the game’ governing 
their interactions. Therefore, here, disaster risk governance is taken up as a framework for 
analysing interactive governance and multifaceted interactions within DRR networks. 
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2.2. DRR, disaster response and disaster recovery: Comparative 
governance characteristics 
For the purpose of understanding the characteristics of disaster risk governance, this section 
identifies the comparative characteristics of disaster risk governance among other disaster 
management phases: emergency response and disaster recovery. In terms of structure and 
approach, disaster risk governance has distinct characteristics compared with the governance of 
disaster response and recovery. In disaster response, the predominant practices are mostly top-
down and state-centric (Heijmans, 2012). In the aftermath of disaster, public expectation rises 
following serious loss and a scarcity of resources. The detrimental effects of disaster on basic 
needs quickly affects the psychology of the people (Olson and Gawronski, 2010). The shock of 
the aftermath has been referred to as ‘Maslowian Shock’, as people’s needs fulfilment on the 
hierarchy of human needs is reduced suddenly when disaster pushes the affected people back 
down to ‘the search for basic needs’ (Olson and Gawronski, 2010). People are vulnerable, and 
there is a high surge of demand for basic needs provision. The chaotic situation requires a high 
level of response in terms of action from the authorities. At this stage, people are anxious and 
attentive to relief operations, especially those of the government. Media coverage increases the 
tension by turning the event into a ‘24–7 mode’ news report (Olson and Gawronski, 2010). The 
high level of public pressure increases demands on the political system (Olson, 2000). In the 
political context of disaster, several questions are raised: What happened? Why were the losses 
so high and the responses inadequate? What will happen now with recovery and reconstruction? 
(Olson, 2000). In this context, governments need to be able to demonstrate their capability, 
capacity, credibility, correctness and anticipation (Gawronski, Hoberman and Olson, 2010). 
In practice, alongside the surge response mechanism from the government, the UN has 
established a ‘cluster approach’ system to respond to humanitarian emergencies. This approach, 
promoted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, divides the work into logistics (led by the 
World Food Programme); emergency telecommunications (led by the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs); emergency shelter (led by the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees, UNHCR); health (led by the World Health Organization); nutrition (led by 
UNICEF); water, sanitation and hygiene (led by UNICEF); early recovery (led by the UN 
Development Programme); camp coordination and camp management (led by UNHCR for 
conflict-generated internally displaced persons and by the International Organization for 
Migration for natural disasters); and protection (led by UNHCR).  
Different from disaster response, the governance of disaster recovery is performed in a long-
term setting and within a dense network. In the literature on recovery, the dynamics of 
governance in this phase have been described as ‘inter-organisational’ work requiring 
‘institutional routines’ in relationships (Raju, 2013). Within this process of inter-sectoral 
coordination, governments play the important role of institutionalising and facilitating the 
mechanism of coordination (Raju, 2013; Raju and Niekerk, 2013). 
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Table 1. Characteristics of disaster risk governance within the cycle of disaster management 
Disaster 
Cycle 
Objective Approach Features of the Dynamics 
Response Provide basic 
needs 
Top-
down 
 
 Multi-level actors 
 Dense network 
 Highly coordinated process 
 Short-term action/Surge 
response 
 High level of financial support 
 
Recovery Restore 
livelihoods/ 
Re-establish the 
environment 
Pluricent
ric 
 
 Multi-level actors 
 Low-density network 
 Low level of coordination  
 Long-term planning 
 Medium level of financial 
support 
 
Reduction Build capacity 
to reduce disaster 
risk  
Pluricent
ric 
 
 Multi-level actors 
 Dispersed network 
 Low level of coordination  
 Long-term planning 
 Low level of financial support 
 
 
2.3. Politics of disaster risk governance 
The present chapter aimed to examine DRR global policy setting through a political lens. 
This approach takes as a starting point the argument that, as a structured arrangement of regimes, 
DRR negotiation has political meanings and implications. The research explored the endogenous 
dynamics of two multi-stakeholder conferences on DRR: the WCDRR and the AMCDRR. To 
capture the reality of these dynamics, this chapter introduces the ‘politics of disaster risk 
governance’ framework as an analytical tool for explaining the political meanings behind DRR 
negotiations. 
The basic assumption of the ‘politics of disaster risk governance’ framework is that ‘politics’ 
should be understood beyond its traditional focus on the sovereignty of the state. Politics has 
expanded its focus from the classical model of government behaviour studies to include the 
wider public sphere (Mouffe, 2005; Palonen, 2011). Politics is no longer solely concerned with 
the state. Rather, politics can be examined everywhere (Artur and Hilhorst 2012; Kerkvliet, 
2009). The focus of the classical model of politics on formal authority institutions created a 
distance from the public political realm (Kerkvliet, 2009; Palonen, 2011), seemingly ignoring the 
reality of complex interactions among people as part of the everyday practice of politics. 
However, politics should rigorously embrace the dynamics of both the formal and the informal 
practices of human interaction within any sphere of action. The non-classical idea of politics has 
incrementally developed to be understood through conventional politics, advocacy politics and 
everyday politics (Kerkvliet, 2009). Conventional politics covers the domain of authority in 
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organising resource allocation, whereas advocacy politics revolves around the idea of providing 
policy input by articulating proposed programmes and procedures (Kerkvliet, 2009). Everyday 
politics derives from the premise of ‘people embracing, complying with, adjusting, and 
contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources’ 
(Kerkvliet, 2009). Everyday politics is characterised by attention to the limited organisation of 
action, informal tools of interest articulation (low-profile and private behaviour), and interaction 
in daily life without realising ‘it’s political’ (Kerkvliet, 2009). Politics is not captured by the idea 
of a solid or arranged arena; instead, it is more associated with ‘metaphoric space’, ‘sphere’ and 
‘activity’ (Palonen, 2011). 
The politics of disaster risk governance framework explains the political context around the 
DRR arena through an examination of the institutional setting, power relations and policy 
advocacy. This builds on the ‘triangle of governance’, comprising policy, politics and polity (van 
Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010; Treib et al, 2007). Scholars have used the triangle of 
governance in different ways. Most scholars and practitioners have approached this framework 
as interfaces with private sector, with respective shares of business, NGOs and states (Abbott and 
Snidal, 2006). As it is used in the present chapter, the triangle of governance is characterised by 
three interconnected aspects: ‘policy making processes [policy], power balances [politics] and 
the institutional setting [polity]’ (van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010), taken from the 
fundamental credo of politics: polity, policy and politics (Mouffe, 2005). Previous work on 
governance has given attention to these three dimensions, seeing power relations as an embedded 
part of networks (politics) (Brunnengraeber et al., 2006; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010; 
Leroy and Arts, 2006; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998; Treib et al., 2007) that steers the process of 
policy formulation and decision making (policy) (Hirst, 2000; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 
2010; Leroy and Arts, 2006; Rhodes, 1996; Treib et al., 2007). The triangle of governance will 
be used here to analyse the politics of disaster risk governance to unveil the dynamics of politics, 
polity and policy. 
2.3.1. Polity (the institutional setting) 
The institutional setting is used as a means to institutionalise actors’ commitment to 
cooperation (Hadfield, 2005). Here, actors are confined by formal rules and restrictions (Jutting, 
2003). This drives the flow of power games and policy steering (van Leeuwen and van 
Tatenhove, 2010). The concept of institutional setting is also used as a framework to identify and 
analyse different dimensions within institutions, using the idea of a game arena (e.g. players, 
common objectives and structure), rules of the game (formal and informal rules, norms and 
enforcement) and the action situation (North, 1991; Ostrom, 2011; Saleth and Dinnar, 2004; 
Selznick, 1996). 
In general, the institutional setting of disaster risk governance is based upon the principle of a 
multi-stakeholder approach. In the global policy setting, nine actors are actively engaged in 
disaster politics: (a) states (both national and local); (b) regional organisations; (c) international 
finance institutions; (d) UN disaster agencies; (e) NGOs; (f) multi-actor initiatives and 
partnerships; (g) scientific, technical and academic entities; (h) private actors and (i) the mass 
media (Hannigan, 2012). Taking a multi-stakeholder approach is a common pathway to 
achieving effective DRR planning and implementation (UNISDR, 2013; Warner et al., 2002). 
This method has been adopted in various initiatives and at multiple levels as a new way of 
governing by introducing a pluricentric, bottom-up and network-oriented approach to DRR.  
The paradigm shift from a more top-down and state-centric approach to DRR to one that is 
more pluricentric was inspired by three conditions. First, DRR is a complex arena with a high 
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level of engagement of cross-cutting issues; in this context, dependence on the government 
would not be effective in reducing disaster risk. Second, the top-down approach has failed to 
achieve well-coordinated disaster management. Third, participation in reducing disaster risk is 
part of individuals’ human rights (Warner, Waalewijn and Hilhorst, 2002).  
The involvement of multiple stakeholders is seen as a network of governance, or what some 
scholars have called the interlink between public–private relations and multilevel governance 
(Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004; Klijn, 2007). As an arena, disaster risk governance is 
characterised by messy and competitive interactions, social and political proximity among 
members, the capacity to steer public goods, the possibility to pursue cooperation and 
compromise, interdependency and resources exchange (i.e. knowledge and information). 
Disaster risk governance is manifested through different forms of institutional set-up, including 
inter-ministerial coordination; national, regional and global platforms; and DRR village forums. 
In multi-stakeholder DRR forums, specific mechanisms are used to address divergences by 
introducing the format of multi-stakeholder panels. 
At the WCDRR and the AMCDRR, these panels were promoted to gather representatives 
from stakeholder groups to discuss relevant topics at the conference. The AMCDRR plenary 
session on multi-stakeholder dialogue attempted to bring together representatives from NGOs, 
youth organisations, the private sector, disability groups, academicians and the media. In this 
panel, all stakeholders addressed their concerns and provided input towards the new global 
frameworks. The session was led by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
DRR, Margareta Wahlström. The complexity of interaction began to surface during the dialogue 
session, where different actors shared their thoughts, experiences and interests on the way 
forward after HFA. Although the session chair had provided specific questions to guide the 
discussion, the advocacy process was messy and disorganised. The plenary session became the 
arena where volunteer groups could articulate their voices in the regional forum. The interests 
voiced were not only driven by the specific post-HFA agenda, but also by the best practices and 
specific interests of different DRR stakeholders. It was observed that the denser the networks, the 
more challenging it is to manage them. 
Within this complex example of multi-stakeholder dialogue, the willingness of actors to reach 
an agreement was crucial in determining the success of the dialogue. In the closing ceremony of 
the AMCDRR, Margareta Wahlström conveyed the importance of a ‘consensus spirit’ as the 
driving force necessary to navigate the complexity of negotiations on DRR. Indeed, in past work, 
reaching consensus has been used as one indicator of the effectiveness of network governance 
(Agranof, 2001). However, consensus can be difficult to achieve in multi-faceted interactions, 
where the actors have divergent interests and preferences. The question, then, is how the 
complexity of power relations can be understood within the arena. 
 
2.3.2. Power relations (politics) 
Power relations are the dominant feature of the dynamics of disaster risk governance. An 
analysis of power relations shows the capacity of stakeholders to influence other actors to behave 
in certain ways that benefit their interests. The game arena transforms into a battlefield over 
capacity to influence decision making, shape the political agenda and construct a sense of control 
(Heywood, 2004). In theory, the characteristics of power relations within governance include the 
interdependency of actors within networks, interactions to gain access to resources and to 
exchange resources, and the rules of the game, which are rooted in trust (Rhodes, 1996). Studies 
of power relations have often identified ‘powerful actors’ based upon their roles, responsibilities 
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and resources (Smith et al., 2014). However, in the context of networks, power relations should 
be examined through patterns of interests. This approach aims to identify the initial motives of 
the actors and the strategies they use to exercise influence within the complex dynamics of 
disaster governance. 
Actors formulate their interests through ‘rationalities, capacities, practices, experiences, 
knowledge and capability’ (Long, 2001). Actors define, formulate and arrange their interests 
before entering the process of policy making (Mouffe, 2005). Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 
(1996) identified three types of interests within the interaction of regimes: interest-based, 
knowledge-based and power-based theories. 
 
2.3.2.1. Interest-based theory 
This theory argues that, as it is a rational actor, the state’s behaviour is predominantly driven 
by specific interests. The present study found that most of the UN member countries openly 
acknowledged the importance of a DRR global framework and actively called for mutual 
cooperation on DRR. In the high-level ministerial meeting of the AMCDRR in 2014, Asia 
Pacific countries shared a common position on the importance of collaboration on DRR. Still, 
countries’ statements presented at multilateral conferences or in negotiations have political 
meanings beyond their normative sentences. The country statements made at the AMCDRR 
reveal that Asia Pacific countries addressed their priorities in different fashions: Some called for 
strengthening collaboration by emphasising the importance of information sharing (e.g. 
Australia, Iran and China), whereas a few countries stressed the issues of capacity building (e.g. 
Timor-Leste) and the investment in and financing of DRR (e.g. Nepal, Pakistan, Japan and 
Bangladesh) (AMCDRR, 2014). In this case, the interests from Asia Pacific countries on 
AMCDRR were revolved around: 
 
(1) Called for strengthening regional collaboration on disaster management to gain access on 
information by proposing idea of ‘information sharing’ 
(2) Used the platform of regional collaboration to improve national capacity especially in the 
developing countries 
(3) Highlighted the crucial issue of DRR financing mostly articulated by developing 
countries 
2.3.2.2. Knowledge-based theory 
Knowledge-based theory highlights the importance of normative roles and beliefs in driving 
the nature of the state’s interests (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996). This theory builds 
on the foundation that the state moves collectively based on a consensus regarding the common 
problem and regime-specific topics. At the AMCDRR, some countries acknowledged the 
importance of knowledge exchange on DRR as a means to achieve resiliency. Following up on 
this premise, just under half of the Asia Pacific countries requested more collaboration on 
institutions and capacity building to strengthen DRR (Timor-Leste, Brunei Darussalam, 
Indonesia, The Philippines, New Zealand) (AMCDRR, 2014). 
2.3.2.3. Power-based theory  
Power-based theory sees regime as a metaphoric space representing different power relations 
among countries. The infrastructure of regimes is supported by powerful actors with strong 
political and economic capacity (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996). This tradition argues 
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that the use of power helps to solve disputes or stalemates in cooperation. Krasner highlights the 
ability of powerful actors to determine and drive the direction of the regime towards their 
interests (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996). During the negotiation of the Sendai 
Framework for 2015–2030, countries struggled to achieve agreement on several issues, including 
the text about ‘international cooperation’. Both developed and developing countries debated the 
phrase ‘predictable and additional finance’, which implied that developed countries had the role 
of supporting long-term DRR financing, including providing technical support to poor countries 
(Trust, 2015). Developed countries responded to the draft by calling for ‘ownership’ for 
developing countries (Trust, 2015) through taking responsibility for strengthening and financing 
DRR. For developing countries, this text was crucial to ensure additional financial support for 
DRR. The GNDR criticised the weak political commitment from countries regarding the need of 
poor countries for financing DRR (GNDR, 2015). This competition between the interests of 
developed and developing countries illustrates the political struggle on DRR negotiation. 
The negotiation at the WCDRR was extended because of deadlock among member states. 
‘The negotiation machinery is not neutral, it is a fundamentally political mechanism’ (Wilkinson, 
2015). The present research found a positive relation between high resource capacity and the 
power to determine the agenda of the negotiations. These processes were still predominantly 
driven by states and by the UN at the WCDRR and the AMCDRR. During the negotiation 
process, most of the dominant and vocal countries were the major contributors to financing DRR. 
For instance, in the last round, Japan, as the host country and one of the largest DRR donors, 
called on countries to compromise to move past the negotiation stalemate. Japan, which is 
actively engaged in disaster diplomacy (Hannigan, 2012), has achieved international support to 
host almost all world conferences on DRR, including those producing the global frameworks (the 
Yokohama Strategy, the HFA and the Sendai Framework). According to the Overseas 
Development Institute, in 2013, Japan contributed 20% of the global financing for DRR, making 
it the largest country donor to DRR (ODI, 2013). 
2.3.3. Advocacy politics (policy) 
Advocacy is used as a means to penetrate and influence policy formulation. Advocacy 
revolves around the idea of providing policy input by ‘advocating alternative programs, 
procedures, and political systems’ while taking an open, direct and concerted approach 
(Kerkvliet, 2009: 227). The idea behind advocacy is to convince others to follow certain ideas 
and agendas. ‘Being convincing’ is another way to control others (Scott, 1985). 
For this chapter, the concept of advocacy politics is explored through ‘disaster diplomacy’. In 
the context of DRR, the WCDRR and the AMCDRR are examples of disaster diplomacy, where 
countries and non-state actors gather to discuss future strategy on DRR. Disaster diplomacy has 
evolved to give expression to the idea that ‘grassroots movements can promote change’ (Yim 
and Burkle, 2012). Diplomacy is done ‘to address the other, express views to the other, and reach 
agreements with the other in which business is usually done through diplomatic agents’ 
(Berridge and James, 2001: 3). This is accomplished through the process of ‘lobbying, gleaning 
information and negotiation’ (Murray, 2006). Diplomacy is used as a tool to influence decision-
making processes through two modalities: (1) the advocacy, self-promotion, policy 
implementation mode; and (2) the reflexive, self-inquisitive, questioning mode (Constantinou, 
2013). Through this combination, diplomacy becomes ‘a game of persuasion, bargaining of 
interests (advocacy) and a room for philosophy and perpetual problematisation of interests 
(reflexive)’ (Constantinou, 2013: 142). In actual practice, diplomacy has expanded beyond its 
traditional focus on states and occurs beyond the context of communication among states. The 
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process of cross-boundary connections among different stakeholders can be viewed through the 
framework of multi-track diplomacy. This concept embraces the roles and functions of multiple 
actors in international relations. Multi-track diplomacy consists of nine tracks representing states; 
non-governmental actors; businesses; private citizens; academics, researchers and trainers; 
activists; religious actors; funders; and the media (Diamond and McDonald, 1996).  
The negotiation of the draft of the Sendai Framework reflected a highly political agenda. 
During the negotiation process, non-state actors pushed the governments to accommodate their 
concerns about specific topics such as political commitment on financing DRR, support from 
developed to developing countries and technology transfer issues. The WCDRR is an avenue for 
networking and advocating where high-level political actors (i.e. states and UN agencies) meet 
non-state platforms to achieve their interests. How people approach and build relations are key 
points for understanding the advocacy process. Actors can use multiple channels in social 
negotiation, including formal and informal interaction, written statements, official processes and 
everyday gossip (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010). In the negotiation at the WCDRR, non-state actors 
such as GNDR and TearFund used their observer status to monitor the process of formal 
negotiation, sitting behind the negotiation table. Outside the negotiation room, an informal 
approach was taken in the convention hall, in the cafe and even in the restrooms. 
The WCDRR has provided a fruitful platform for civil society to influence governments 
directly by performing what Smith et al. (2014) have called ‘network positional power’. This 
power comes from two sources: the capacity of actors to approach other actors’ resources 
(power-as-access) and the dependency among actors (power-as-control) (Smith et al., 2014). At 
the WCDRR, civil society used their access as observers in the formal negotiations. 
Governments acknowledged the importance of civil society in opening the dialogue and lobby. 
In preparing for the WCDRR, the government of Indonesia invited DRR civil society, such as 
the Indonesian National Platform (Platform Nasional Indonesia), the Indonesian Society for 
Disaster Management (Masyarakat Peduli Bencana Indonesia), NGOs and academicians, to a 
public hearing and consultation meeting. This initiative facilitated non-state actors to provide 
input to the government in formulating Indonesia’s position on the next DRR global framework 
(2015–2030). In Myanmar, the DRR Working Group—the most active DRR network in the 
country—assisted the government in developing the Myanmar HFA implementation report. 
Although governmental and non-state actors actively engaged in preparing national positions 
on the HFA national progress report and the draft of the Sendai Framework during the 
preparation process for the WCDRR, state-to-state diplomacy dominated the negotiation process 
at the WCDRR. For five days, country representatives gathered at the negotiation table to discuss 
every clause of the Sendai Framework for Action. At this stage, civil society was present in the 
negotiation room as observers, and lobby and advocacy processes continued outside of the 
formal negotiations. However, states hold more positional power because non-state actors are 
highly dependent on the willingness of states to accommodate their interests at the negotiation 
table. Informal communication was the most used channel for social negotiation within the arena 
of the WCDRR. Outside the formal negotiations, multi-track diplomacy actors articulated their 
interests as resource persons and audiences in various high-level partnership dialogue panels and 
working sessions. Advocacy also took the form of promotion and exhibition in different 
platforms such the ignite stage and side events. 
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2.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that the dynamics of disaster risk governance are political, 
multifaceted and competitive. It has argued, first, that DRR should be understood as a complex 
structure of international regimes, where global norms, principles and rules guide the behaviour 
of actors at the regional, national and local levels, and, second, that the dynamics of disaster risk, 
as a political arena, should be explored through three political dimensions: the institutional 
setting (polity), advocacy politics (policy) and power relations (politics). 
Throughout the study, the findings reveal that DRR has transformed into a more pluricentric 
network with strong political commitment and a wide range of advocacy initiatives. This 
changing new reality follows the long historical context of DRR over the last 50 years. In 
examining DRR network governance, this study has shown the highly political context of 
negotiation among actors in the process of exercising and articulating power through the three 
dimensions of the institutional setting (arena, rules of the game, action situation), power relations 
(motives of interests and strategies) and advocacy politics (agenda and channels). 
Although disaster risk governance has displayed the characteristic of pluricentrism, in reality, 
states consistently emerge as the most powerful actors in these complex dynamics. This has been 
shown from the formulation of DRR policy document both at the regional and global level. 
Observation at the AMCDRR (2014) and WCDRR (2015) revealed that although the concept of 
governance promises the engagement of non-state actors in pluricentric networks; but in reality, 
the nature of DRG at the global and regional level remains highly political and involves state-
centric domination. The wide range of multiple stakeholders in DRR is reduced in value if the 
room for manoeuvre to engage in political negotiation regarding the future of DRR remains 
limited. 
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Chapter 3 - Decentralised Disaster Risk Governance in Indonesia 
 
In the disaster risk reduction (DRR) policy context, the idea of ‘empowering local authorities’ 
has consistently been encouraged, as their thorough understanding of the local context will 
supposedly make DRR more effective. In the current DRR global framework, the Sendai 
Framework for Action 2015–2030, which governs the global priority plan of action, the 
commitment to strongly advocating the full engagement of local-level social and political 
institutions has been stated explicitly. One of the modes for empowering local government is 
giving them more political power through decentralisation. This study is based on participatory 
fieldwork among Indonesian DRR policymakers and community advocacy groups. Analysing 
decentralised disaster risk governance in Indonesia, the study shows that the implementation of 
‘decentralised DRR’ remains problematic, potentially hindering the ultimate goal of DRR to 
reduce risk in effective manner. This situation has been driven by the complexity of power 
sharing between the central and local governments, bureaucratic heaviness and bottom-up 
community advocacy. Tracing the practice of bureaucratic governance and community DRR 
capacity in Indonesia, this chapter poses two critical questions: (1) To what extent has 
decentralisation contributed to improving the practice of disaster risk governance? (2) What are 
the current challenges within the dynamics of the decentralisation of disaster risk governance? 
The findings show that changes related to the decentralisation process in the aspects of the 
institutional setting, power relations and advocacy politics of disaster risk governance in 
Indonesia have consistently created serious challenges for local authorities. This applies 
specifically to the issues of resource distribution, effective bureaucratic government and 
inclusive advocacy. In sum, the goal of empowering local authorities on DRR has been hindered 
significantly by the poor infrastructure of decentralisation. 
 
Keywords: decentralisation, politics, disaster risk governance 
 
Decentralisation is widely perceived as a booster of democratisation. With decentralisation, 
authorities supposedly move ‘closer’ to the population because of the creation of a type of 
governance that is directed more towards citizens (Hill, 2014: 1; Miller, 2013: 834; Winter 2012: 
322). Decentralisation aims to empower both local government and ordinary citizens through 
advancing public service and actively engaging citizens (Miller and Bunner, 2013: 715; van 
Voorst, 2016: 5). It is associated with community-driven development, where decentralisation 
has the potential to improve (1) the design of contextually appropriate projects; (2) the targeting 
of beneficiaries and (3) the accountability to local residents (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007: 231). 
In Indonesia, decentralisation has met with serious obstacles, and a great deal of research has 
highlighted the gap between the ideal objective and everyday practice. Miller (2013: 834) 
describes decentralisation in Indonesia as a process that is ‘neither smooth nor straightforward’. 
Heryanto & Hadiz argues that decentralization in Indonesia has ‘created great confusion on the 
ground’ (2005: 263) and significantly ‘rise the local practice of corruption, collusion and 
nepotism’ (Hadiz, 2003: 602). The formal procedure of decentralisation (i.e. elections and local 
institutions) is negatively related to local government’s performance, mainly because local 
administration suffers from a serious ‘lack of means or capacities’ (van Voorst, 2016: 5), 
mismanagement and corruption (Miller, 2013: 834). Ultimately, this has led to poor public 
service delivery (Lewis, 2017). 
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Disaster risk governance in Indonesia is a particularly interesting case for studying the 
critical juncture between decentralisation and governance. There are two reasons for this. First, 
in 1998, Indonesian political reforms introduced decentralisation as a new way of steering 
policy. Indonesia has experienced the ‘largest decentralisation in the world in terms of power, 
responsibilities and resources’ (Miller, 2013: 834), and decentralisation and democratisation 
have become distinguishing aspects of Indonesia’s reformed policymaking and advocacy 
channels across all sectors. This was emphasised in the 2004 Decentralisation Law (№ 32), 
which states that decentralisation should foster the fulfilment of public welfare and 
democratisation at the local level. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is among the sectors most 
heavily impacted by the development and implementation of decentralisation policies in 
Indonesia. The power shift from national to regency level has made provincial and regency 
governments entirely responsible for the implementation of the DRR strategic agenda. In 
specific, DRR is a means of ‘preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk to strengthen 
resilience’ (UNISDR, 2007). It is a ‘conceptual framework to minimize vulnerabilities and 
disaster risks, to avoid (prevention) and to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse 
impacts of hazards’ (UNISDR, 2008). 
Second, the growth of democratisation beginning in 1998 has led to the increasing influence 
of non-state actors and community initiatives. There are at least two indicators how 
democratization has changed the involvement of non-state actors: (1) freedom of speech is one of 
the pillars of political reform in Indonesia. The momentum of Reformasi has embarked the 
‘freedom, free elections and the liberty to organize themselves’ (Bunte & Ufan, 2009). The 
freedom to gather and organize has inspired the development of civil society work on specific 
topic. In the context of DRR, Indonesian civil society actively engages in DRR through several 
multi-stakeholder platforms independent from the government: the National Platform (Platform 
Nasional [PLANAS]), Indonesian Civil Society for Disaster Management (Masyarakat Peduli 
Bencana Indonesia [MPBI]), Indonesian Expertise on Disaster Management (Ikatan Ahli 
Bencana Indonesia [IABI]), the University Forum (Forum Universitas), the Region DRR Forum 
(Forum Peduli Bencana Daerah. These organization and platform has actively shared their roles 
as a voice in DRR politics in Indonesia. PLANAS, MPBI actively engaged on policy discussion 
with the Indonesian Government for instance in the formulation of Integration of DRR on 
National Development Plan and Government position on World Conference on DRR 2015. (2) 
The increasing role of community on DRR. During the administration of Soeharto, there was no 
room for community to discuss the structural issue with the government (ADB, 2006). The main 
approach was mostly top-down from the central government. After the reform, the initiative to 
bring the community voice was institutionalized. For example, the formulation of development 
planning in the village level has facilitated community voice. It was reflected from the 
mechanism of Consultation Forum for Development Planning (Musyawarah Rencana 
Pembangunan [Musrembang]) at the village level. In DRR specific agenda, the Village DRR 
Forum (Forum Peduli Bencana Desa) also represent the role of community in DRR movement 
and planning. 
In the context of these radical changes in the political structure, to what extent has the reality 
of DRR practice in Indonesia lived up to the expectations that decentralisation will lead to better 
and more democratic governance? This chapter explores how decentralised disaster risk 
governance in Indonesia has worked out in practice. Rather than studying governance and 
decentralisation from a normative policy perspective, the chapter highlights what happens in the 
daily reality of political life. 
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In attempting to illustrate how decentralised disaster risk governance is articulated and 
implemented in practice in Indonesia, this chapter examines this process in relation to three 
levels, or political ‘arenas’ (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010: 1120; Long, 2001: 2): the national policy 
level, based in Indonesia’s capital of Jakarta; policy coordination at the regency level and 
community advocacy at the village level. The chapter’s main argument revolves how 
decentralisation has shaped the changes in disaster risk governance in Indonesia at each of these 
three levels in terms of the institutional setting (polity), power relations (politics) and policy 
advocacy (policy). 
Decentralisation in Indonesia has shifted the coordination of disaster management from 
national to provincial and regency levels (polity). This raises the question of how national and 
local (regency) levels perceive and experience the impacts of decentralisation policies. In the 
decentralised era, local government (at both provincial and regency levels) has become the 
frontline for DRR politics, but it is unknown to what extent local actors have developed their 
resources and capacities through interaction with the national government and non-state actors 
(politics). As one of the premises of decentralisation is ‘bringing authority closer to its citizens’, 
the present study investigates how this promise has worked in reality (policy). 
The chapter is organised in five sections. First, I present the background of the case study and 
define the research questions. The second section discusses the conceptual framework, 
explaining why the concepts of decentralisation and the politics of disaster risk governance are 
useful for the present analysis. The next section summarises the research methods used. The 
fourth section presents the findings on the dynamics of disaster risk governance and considers 
the major issues at national, regency and community levels. It highlights problems related to 
resources, bureaucratic heaviness and state–non-state relations on policy advocacy. Although 
decentralisation has tended to raise expectations about the abilities and power of actors involved 
in DRR, these political actors’ possibilities have actually remained limited, and the roles played 
by government bodies diverge from the decentralisation policy ideal. The final section 
summarises the findings and lessons learned, and considers their value for understanding other 
political contexts. 
3.1. Decentralisation of disaster risk governance in Indonesia 
The aim of this study was to explore the dynamics of disaster risk governance in the context 
of decentralisation in Indonesia. Decentralisation is an important part of the Indonesian political 
reforms that have taken place since 1998) (Erb, Sulistyanto and Faucher, 2005: 6), when massive 
student demonstrations in Jakarta pushed the second Indonesian president, Soeharto, to step 
down, ushering in an era known as Reformasi. During Soeharto’s three-decade administration 
(1966–1998), Indonesia was ruled under an authoritarian dictatorship (Blair, 2005: 78; Booth, 
2014: 25; Hill, 2014: 2; Lewis, 2014: 135; Mietzner, 2014: 45). The central government held 
complete power, managing and regulating policies on the administrative, fiscal and political 
levels, making Indonesia ‘the most centralist’ country in the world (Mietzner, 2014: 46). This 
political environment fundamentally changed with the decentralisation agenda of the Reformasi 
process. 
A major power transfer from the central government to the local level was realized in 2001 
(Mietzner, 2014: 46). Since that time, decentralisation has shifted the authority of power from 
Jakarta to the local level in almost all aspects of governance.
1
 Decentralisation is regarded as a 
                                               
1 Five sectors are exceptions to this rule: foreign policy, defence, security, the judiciary, the national fiscal/monetary 
sector and religious affairs (Law № 32/2004, Article 10). 
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step towards democratisation in Indonesia. It has been part of a greater transformation towards 
democratisation through three distinct phases: the establishment of a democratic system, 
including the restructuring of state institutions (1998–2004); political stability and democracy 
(2004–2009); and the strengthening of democratic life (2009–present) (Setkab, 2013). 
As a new paradigm, decentralisation has restructured policy practice in governance in 
Indonesia, including disaster management. The idea that reform was crucial for more effective 
disaster management became prominent after a tsunami created a major shock in 2004. This 
tragedy resulted in 115,229 casualties and left widespread destruction in the provinces of Aceh 
and North Sumatra (ReliefWeb, 2005). In the decade following the tsunami, Indonesia continued 
to suffer from massive natural disasters, including earthquakes in Jogjakarta (2006, 5,716 
causalities) and West Sumatra (2010, 6,234 casualties). To many Indonesian policymakers and 
scholars, more effective DRR was clearly needed, and it was hoped and expected that 
decentralisation would contribute to that. 
3.2. Concepts: Decentralization, Governance and Disaster Risk 
Governance in Indonesia 
 
The concepts of governance, decentralisation and disaster risk governance form the 
theoretical framework for this chapter. This framework facilitated the identification of indicators 
for effective decentralised disaster risk governance. 
3.2.1. Decentralisation 
Falleti (2004) defines decentralisation as ‘a set of policy reforms aiming at transferring 
responsibilities, resources or authority from higher to lower levels of government’ (Erb, 
Sulistyanto and Faucher, 2005: 2). This process of power transfer gradually evolved from the 
‘de-concentration’ and ‘delegation’ to ‘devolution’ (Pomeroy & Berkes, 2007 & Satria, Matsuda, 
2004).  Decentralisation is widely thought to encourage democratisation, resulting in a bottom-up 
approach to policy steering, and to facilitate improvements in public services (Miller, 2001: 835; 
Winters, 2012: 316) particularly in In the process of ‘devolution. In addition, decentralisation is 
often presented as a solution to counter highly dominant centralistic government control by 
bringing the authorities closer to the citizens (Hill, 2014: 1). In this regard, government becomes 
more accountable, more effective and stronger (Hill, 2014: 2; Mietzner, 2014: 46; Schulze and 
Sjahrir, 2014: 186). Literature about decentralisation generally stresses the administrative, 
political and fiscal aspects of power redistribution. Taking this as a point of departure, the 
present study considers three analytical indicators: (a) shifting power in the context of the 
institutional setting (administrative); (b) an inclusive decision-making process (politics) and (c) 
decentralised budget management (fiscal). In this context, the national government devolved its 
power as a way to strengthen the local government (Hill, 2014). In this context, administrative 
aspect considered as delegation while political and fiscal transfer examined as ‘devolution’.  
The process of decentralisation in Indonesia has created a political space at local 
(provincial/regency) levels by taking power away from central, national government bodies and 
giving it to local bodies. The local government structure in Indonesia consists of four levels: the 
province (Provinsi), regency/municipality (Kabupaten/Kotamadya), sub-regency (Kecamatan) 
and village administrative (Kelurahan) levels. 
The Indonesian Decentralisation Law not only legalised the redistribution of power from 
central to provincial government control (Winters, 2012: 315); it also strengthened the role of the 
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local parliament by granting the power to supervise, monitor and even fire the governor and 
mayor (Erb, Sulistyanto and Faucher, 2005: 4). Under this law, all government bodies at the 
provincial level are responsible to the governor. The relations between government at the central 
and provincial levels lean more towards a ‘coordination line’ than a ‘command line’, meaning 
that the responsibility of the national government is mostly to provide policy guidelines, with 
limited authority in controlling the programme of the local government. 
Within the framework of decentralisation, local bodies take on responsibility in three areas: 
(a) social service administration and other functions are transferred to lower levels 
(administrative decentralisation); (b) the engagement of citizens or their representatives in policy 
processes increases (political decentralisation); and (c) fiscal autonomy for lower levels of 
government increases (fiscal decentralisation) (Erb, Sulistyanto and Faucher, 2005: 2). Referring 
to these areas, political and fiscal decentralisation  
Decentralisation in Indonesia has created complex interactions among stakeholders in 
disaster management. In addition to shifting the authority and power away from a centralistic 
mechanism, decentralisation generates a pluricentric network (multi-stakeholder platform). 
Interactions among stakeholders play out in wide-ranging interfaces among government and non-
state actors at different policy levels. Yet, while the initiative on multi-stakeholders approach is 
generated, the political will and support from local government play a crucial role to create the 
political space for non-state actors on policy process. 
3.2.2. Disaster risk governance  
As a concept, governance has been discussed extensively in the contexts of self-organising 
networks (Rhodes, 1996: 657); the rules of collective decision making (Chottray and Stoker, 
2009: 3); and sets of values, norms, processes and institutions (Kohler-Koch, 2005: 5). 
Governance aims to steer the process of policy formulation and decision making (policy) (Leroy 
and Arts, 2006: 3; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010: 590; Hirst, 2000: 13; Rhodes, 1996: 
657; Treib, et al., 2007: 1). 
Governance has four main characteristics (Rhodes, 1996). First, it is pluricentric rather than 
unicentric, thus involving the wide participation of state and non-state actors in policy steering. 
Second, multi-stakeholder networks play a major role in the decision-making process, indicating 
an inclusive policymaking process. Third, there is a shift in the focus of governing; the state is no 
longer the sole actor in the policy arena. Fourth, specific risks and uncertainties in the relations 
among actors result from the complexity of interactions with multiple actors. In this context of 
networks, actors and institutions interacting in a political arena, the ‘rules of the game’ are 
constantly contested, negotiated and agreed by the participants (Rhodes, 1996: 657–660). The 
arena of interaction is political, with highly involved competition and power relations (politics) 
(Brunnengraeber, et al., 2006: 4; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010: 590; Leroy and Arts, 
2006: 13; Rhodes, 1996: 659; Stokker, 1998: 18; Treib, et al., 2007: 1). 
In their studies of governance, Treib et al. (2007) and van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove 
(2010) highlighted three predominant ‘structured dimensions of governance’, namely political 
institutes (polity), networks of power and influence (politics) and the decision-making process on 
policy steering (policy). These contexts of polity, politics and policy are explicitly integrated as 
characteristics of governance. The present study aimed to explore the politics of disaster risk 
governance by investigating the political context and practice of DRR in three political spheres: 
the institutional setting (polity), power relations (politics) and policy advocacy (policy). 
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3.2.3. Disaster risk governance in Indonesia 
A disaster management policy was instigated in Indonesia well before the country’s 
independence in 1998. The policy and governance of disaster management in Indonesia is 
typically classified into six phases: (1) 1930s–1945, war emergencies; (2) 1945–1960s, war and 
natural disaster; (3) 1960s–1990, ad hoc emergency response committees for natural disasters, 
government-centric; (4) 1990–2000, the National Coordinating Council for Disaster 
Management (Badan Koordinasi Nasional [Bakornas]); (5) 2001–2007, amendments to 
accommodate aid distribution for internally displaced persons; and (6) 2007–onwards, the 
Disaster Management Law 24/2007 (Lassa, 2010: 101–111). From these historical periods, there 
were three specific bodies on disaster management: Bakornas at the national level, under the 
Ministry of Social Welfare; Satuan Koordinator Pelaksana at the provincial level and Satuan 
Pelaksana at the region/city levels (Lassa, 2010: 117). From 2000 to 2007, the Bakornas 
coordination line shifted from the Ministry of Social Welfare to the Vice President’s Office, 
following major catastrophes in Indonesia. However, these three bodies remained ineffective 
because their roles were not clearly described. The centralistic mechanism, leaning on Jakarta, 
caused overlap and bureaucratic burden. 
A more effective era of decentralised disaster risk governance began after the Disaster 
Management Law (№ 24) was enacted in 2007. Article 5 of this law mandates the central and 
regency governments to share responsibility and authority for disaster management. At the 
national level, the Indonesian National Agency for Disaster Management (Badan Nasional 
Penanggulangan Bencana [BNPB]) was established to perform several duties such as providing 
guidance, direction, standards and requirements for disaster management (Article 12). BNPB is 
supervised directly by the president and can therefore be perceived as a ministry-level organ. 
Since the enactment of Law № 24, disaster management in Indonesia has had a strong legal 
basis, with the Regency Disaster Management Agency (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana 
Daerah [BPBD]) as the main steering committee for disaster management at the provincial and 
regency/municipality levels. BPBD is thus legally tasked with taking responsibility for local-
level disaster management (Article 18). Additionally, 22 other ministries and government bodies 
work on cross-cutting DRR-related issues, under the coordination of BNPB. 
3.3. Research Methodology 
To explore the complex dynamics of disaster risk governance in Indonesia, this study used 
multiple qualitative techniques: long-term fieldwork, in-depth interviews, participant 
observation, and literature and policy document analysis. The underpinning philosophy of 
qualitative research relies on the essence of experiences, meanings and perceptions to acquire 
knowledge (Kumar, 2005: 38). The aim is to describe the complex interactions among different 
stakeholders. 
Data for this research were collected during seven months of fieldwork in Indonesia (May–
August 2014, December 2014 and March–April 2015). To gather information about the 
perceptions and practices of actors involved in DRR, a series of interviews was conducted with a 
total of 129 participants, including 20 government officials (representatives from BNPB, two 
BPBDs, the State Ministry of National Development Planning [Badan Perencanaan 
Pembangunan Nasional, BAPPENAS], the Ministry of Home Affairs [MoHA] and the Ministry 
of Education [MoE], as well as the Assistant to the Regent in Kupang and the heads of six 
villages), 10 members of DRR civil society groups such as PLANAS and MPBI, and one person 
working for a UN agency with significant DRR experience in Indonesia. The other 99 
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respondents were community residents with experience with disasters and with any of the above 
agencies. Attempting to gain an in-depth understanding of government coordination, the author 
also conducted participatory observation at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk 
Reduction (Japan, 14–18 March 2015), where I participated as a member of the Indonesian 
delegation. 
Furthermore, to gather data relevant for understanding the politics of DRR at the regency and 
local levels, community advocacy was studied in a village in the province of Nusa Tenggara 
Timur (NTT). Here, a qualitative impact study was conducted to observe the implementation of a 
DRR project by a nongovernmental organisation (NGO) alliance, Mitra. This case study was 
used to gain holistic and in-depth knowledge of the studied phenomena by focusing on particular 
issues and topics in a specific area (Tellis, 1997: 3). The qualitative impact study approach is 
typically used to gather data using sequentially applied qualitative data collection techniques, 
such as document review, interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and participant 
observation. Each of these techniques was used in the present study. 
Mitra is an alliance of five international NGOs based in the Netherlands working to reduce 
the impact of natural hazards on the livelihoods of vulnerable people in nine countries, including 
Indonesia. Mitra’s programme was designed to achieve three outcomes: (1) make communities 
resilient to climate change; (2) put in place budgeting and policy planning conducive to an 
integrated approach to DRR/climate change adaptation (CCA)/environment management and 
restoration (EMR) at local, national and international levels; and (3) enable partner 
NGOs/community-based organisations to apply DRR/CCA/EMR in assistance and advocacy 
(Mitra, 2013). Mitra developed its sui generis approach by integrating DRR/CCA/EMR as 
pathways to build resilient communities. 
In Indonesia, Mitra selected the NTT province as a project site because of its high degree of 
vulnerability to natural hazards. According to BNPB, approximately 635 disaster events occurred 
in NTT from 1815 to 2014, ranking it sixth among Indonesian provinces in terms of the most 
disaster events (BNPB, 2014). Furthermore, in 2013, NTT was the third poorest province in 
Indonesia (Liputan 6, 2014). Approximately 20.24% of NTT’s population (1,009,150 people) 
live below the poverty line (Liputan 6, 2014). Many factors contribute to the high level of 
poverty in NTT, including a low per capita income, high unemployment, an underdeveloped 
economic sector and low growth of the microeconomic sector (NTT, 2013). Of the 22 regencies 
in NTT, only nine have a per capita income above the Indonesian average (NTT, 2013). Mitra 
works in five regencies in NTT: Ende, Sikka, Lembata, Kabupaten Kupang and Timur Tengah 
Selatan, reaching approximately 37 villages. 
This part of the study involved regency- and local-level research conducted over four months 
(June–August and December 2014), focusing on six villages. This work included participatory 
observation and interviews with 99 individuals working for Mitra at programme or project level. 
These individuals were the village administration in six Mitra-selected communities under the 
regency government in Sikka and Timor, as well as community group members. FGDs were also 
organised to study community perceptions of hazards mapping, resilience capacity and NGO 
DRR interventions. 
In the presentation of findings from this part of the research, the names of the implementing 
agency and donor are withheld for reasons of confidentiality. The identities of individual 
participants and other organisations are also withheld. A fictitious name (Mitra) is used for the 
implementing agency. Considering the potential for bias after the extensive engagement through 
the qualitative impact study of Mitra’s project, the principle of independence was upheld by (1) 
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developing a clearly written research design to guide the direction of the research; (2) inviting a 
wide range of respondents from various backgrounds to gain multiple perspectives and cross-
cutting information on the research topics; and (3) asking open-ended questions in the interviews 
to allow room to explore unexpected ideas. 
3.4. Findings 
This section summarises the main findings on decentralised disaster risk governance in 
Indonesia. As noted above, I draw on three indicators for decentralised disaster risk governance: 
(1) shifting power in the context of the institutional setting (administrative); (2) an inclusive 
decision-making process (politics) and (3) decentralised budget management (fiscal). This 
section examines these three indicators at the national, regency and community levels. 
The findings reveal at least three important issues. First, decentralised disaster risk 
governance is articulated more strongly by the central government than by regency governments. 
Second, coordination among the government bodies responsible for DRR suffers from an 
extensively bureaucratic set-up. Third, the relations between state and non-state actors regarding 
DRR are asymmetrical, leading to limitations in influence in the decision-making process. 
Among the most prominent problems for decentralised disaster risk governance are financial 
incapacity, insufficient capacity of human resources, heavy bureaucracy and exclusivity in 
policymaking. 
3.4.1. Decentralised disaster risk governance in Indonesia: Resource problems 
3.4.1.1. Financial capacity 
After the enactment of Law № 24/2007, Indonesia began an era of decentralised disaster risk 
governance. From 2010 to 2013, BPBDs were established in almost 90% of provinces and 
regions in Indonesia (Indonesian National Progress Report on the Hyogo Framework for Action, 
2014). In the present organisational structure, BNPB and BPBD are connected by a ‘coordination 
line’ rather than a ‘command line’. The Head of BNPB addressed the independence of local 
government as one of the indicators for national resilience. Local government acts as the 
frontline in formulating local policy, he said, arranging resources and building community 
capacity. This idea was articulated by multiple staff members working at the national level. It 
echoes the idea of ‘empowering’ local government to govern disaster management without 
depending on a hierarchy with a top-down control mechanism. An MoHA middle-level officer 
emphasised that, as long as the provincial and regency levels can perform disaster management, 
the main responsibility of the central government is mostly to provide guidelines, assistance and 
capacity building: 
 
Like children who first learn to walk, if they [the provincial/regency governments] fall, let it be; it’s 
part of the learning process. However, if they walk and stagger unsteadily, we [the central 
government] will be there to help them. (interview with a male MoHA officer, 1 November 2015) 
 
In contrast, staff members of the regency body of BPBD spoke of ‘decentralised disaster risk 
governance’ in a negative tone. They mentioned the lack of budget, human resources and 
capacity as factors hampering their work in the region. For example, one of the heads of BPBD 
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claimed that ‘It’s better to work in a vertical structure with BNPB because the budget from the regency 
level is limited’.2 
 
The same informant also explained that staff capacity had degraded because of 
decentralisation: 
 
In bureaucracy, you will not get promoted if you’re not moving to a different office [function]; at 
minimum, you would be rotated to two different functions. Thus, on the previous DRR Day held in 
Bengkulu, we, all the heads of BPBD, wanted to have centralisation with BNPB. [Centralisation] 
would make the rotation of human resources rest on the responsibility of BNPB, and it would no 
longer be part of the authority of the Head of Regency. Here, we have often received new staff from 
different functions that have nothing to do with disaster management, for instance, the rotation of 
staff from the Department of Agriculture, so every year we received new staff who understand 
nothing. (interview with a male head of BPBD in NTT, 28 July 2014) 
 
Similar complaints were made by several of this informant’s colleagues, and these were often 
related to the regency office’s financial situation. At the meeting of the Indonesian Delegation 
for the World Conference on DRR, a high-ranking BNPB officer stated that, for the five-year 
period 2015–2019, the central agency of BNPB received IDR 8.7 trillion (equal to EUR 580 
million). This is extremely high compared with the budget of BPBD at the regency level in NTT 
(IDR 6.5 billion, equal to EUR 433,000). Although BNPB is allocated approximately IDR 1.2–
2.4 billion yearly for each province, some BPBD personnel said that they never received the 
funding. A head of BPBD explained what happens in reality: 
 
We received financial assistance from BNPB during a disaster response in the aftermath of a volcanic 
eruption; aside from that we don’t receive any. (interview with a male BPBD head in NTT, 28 July 
2014)  
 
Budget allocation from BNPB to BPBD is mostly utilised for institutional strengthening, 
capacity building, technical assistance, facilities and supporting accountability and management. 
In addition, the interview data suggest that the budget allocation for programme development 
and human resources is heavily unbalanced. As a consequence of decentralisation, the main 
financial resources for disaster management at the regency level come from regency 
governments. The BPBD budget is varied in different regencies, depending on the overall 
income of the regency. In one of the BPBDs in NTT, the yearly budget was approximately IDR 
1.3 billion (equal to EUR 86,666). As shown in  
 
 
Table 2, this annual budget is allocated for human resources, operational support and disaster 
management programmes covering DRR, response and rehabilitation. This budget accounts for 
about 0.16% of the overall budget for the region, which is significantly lower than the United 
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction guidance of spending 1% of the total 
government budget on DRR (IISD, 2010). 
 
 
                                               
2 Interview with a male BPBD head in NTT, 28 July 2014 
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Table 2. Budget allocation for BPBD Sikka for DRR, fiscal year 2015 
Proportion of 
the  
total regency 
budget 
 
A I SI Disaste
r response 
Rehabilitati
on 
DRR-specific 
budget  
0.16% 
IDR 1.3 
billion 
(equal to EUR 
86,666) 
24.
2% 
6.15
% 
5.8% 14.4% 19.9% 32.9% 
 
 
Note: BPBD: the Regency Disaster Management Agency (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah); DRR: 
disaster risk reduction; A: administration (i.e. office expenses for telecommunications, electricity, water, honoraria, 
health insurance, meals and stationery); I: infrastructure (i.e. computers, services, gasoline, spare parts and 
maintenance); SI: service improvement (i.e. incentives for extra hours, business trips, meals and stationery); DRR 
budget: DRR information dissemination (i.e. business trips), DRR socialisation (i.e. business trips, accommodation, 
transportation, consultancy and meals), village DRR (i.e. business trips, accommodation, transportation, consultancy 
and meals), and DRR training (i.e. business trips, accommodation, transportation, consultancy and meals). 
 
The limited budget allocation and the lack of capacity have led to poor comprehensive 
planning of DRR at the local level. From the budget document, BPBD formulated their DRR 
programme as follows: DRR public awareness raising, training, information sharing and resilient 
villages. For example, in one of the BPBD agencies in NTT, the main DRR programme focused 
on ‘community awareness raising’. Other programmes such as ‘safe schools’ and ‘community 
disaster management in the village’ were supported by NGOs. The majority of the participants in 
the present study rated the quality of programmes and activities as having ‘under-performed’ 
because of shortcomings caused by or related to financial issues in the agencies. 
BPBD agencies in both Sikka and Kupang encountered significant challenges related to staff 
members’ lack of knowledge about disaster management, limited budgeting from the 
regency/provincial government for disaster management and weak political support. An 
interview with BNPB revealed that there is variation and unevenness in the capacity and 
competence of BPBD agencies across Indonesia’s 34 provinces.3 Although some BPBDs were 
performing well in building disaster management regency-level plans, these agencies were in the 
minority. For instance, an interview with the head of a BPBD in NTT indicated that BPBD 
programmes and strategies for disaster management were predominantly ‘disaster response-
based’, with insufficient development of DRR. Programmes are developed around ‘raising 
awareness of DRR in communities’ rather than actual response and prevention. This 
strengthened the general perception of NGOs in Sikka towards BPBD, whose functioning was 
often described as focusing only on their ‘everyday business’. These agencies were also accused 
lacking innovation on the DRR programme. 
It became clear from the interviews that BPBD had insufficient funds to deliver services on 
DRR-specific agendas. This evidence strengthens the argument made by Lewis (2014), who 
concluded that local governments in Indonesia spend their budgets ‘in an inefficient and 
ineffective manner by spending far too much on administration and personnel’. Furthermore, the 
present analysis of the BPBD budget document (see Figure 1) showed that budget allocations for 
                                               
3 Interview with a male BNPB staff member, 22 November 2016 
 Page | 66  
 
DRR are equal to the operations budget (e.g. staff expenses, business trips, accommodations, 
transportation, consultancy and meals). Poor capacity also leads to weak budget absorption at the 
local level. The national system obliges government bodies to return unspent funds to the 
Ministry of Finance at the end of fiscal year, and, because of the obstacles described here, the 
funds often came too late at the end of the fiscal year: 
  
Most of the budget was returned to Jakarta [at the end of the fiscal year] because some BPBD 
[agencies] did not know how to use it and the budget came too late. (interview with a male BNPB 
staff member, 17 November 2014) 
3.4.1.2. Human resource capacity 
Decentralisation has created a political vacuum at the subnational level, where the governor 
and mayor possess authority to perform their administrative functions. It has given power to 
these individuals to formulate their development priorities, policies, budget and bureaucracy. 
This process, in practice, also entails the promotion and rotation of government officials within 
the administrative bodies, which hampers capacity building. 
During an interview, a head of BPBD noted that BPBD is perceived as a new player in the 
bureaucracy arena at the regency level, and as ‘hardly powerful, unpopular and an outcast’. He 
also explained that BPBD suffers from high rotation among its officials, who have insufficient 
background competencies, resulting from the effect of local politics. With decentralisation, he 
said, the governor and mayor have the authority to perform bureaucratic shifts in structure. 
The high rotation of officials hinders the sustainability of BPBD’s programme and is a 
detriment to the process of knowledge transfer within the organisation. This creates a spill-over 
effect onto policy and strategic action for BPBD at the local level. 
 
Every time we trained BPBD staff, the government officers who came to Jakarta were new staff 
members. Decentralisation has a high and dynamic rotation for government officers. I spoke in front 
of the mayor at a meeting and asked whether the head of BPBD could be exempted from bureaucratic 
rotation. But they [the mayor] said, ‘it’s a decentralisation era; we [the mayor] are the ones who know 
who have the potential to lead [BPBD]’. (interview with a male BNPB staff member, 17 November 
2014) 
 
In response to this phenomenon, the MoHA, which is responsible for monitoring 
decentralisation in Indonesia, tried to guide the local secretary (Sekretariat Daerah)—the highest 
bureaucratic position under the governor/mayor—to be more involved in the bureaucratic 
rotation. 
 
Bureaucratic rotation in BPBD is also our problem, but we can’t push more because it’s a 
decentralisation era. (interview with a male MoHA staff member, 1 November 2015) 
  
In conclusion, based on the evidence gathered for this study, BPBD suffers from insufficient 
human resource capacity caused by a premature decentralisation process with strong local 
politics, resulting in government officials not being adequately qualified based on merit.  
An interviewed representative of the national planning agency asserted that, ‘as new 
government institutions, BPBP needs tough, smart and brave people,’4 but the present findings 
suggest that decentralisation is leading to the opposite situation. 
                                               
4 Interview with a male BAPPENAS staff member, 2 November 2015 
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3.4.2. Bureaucracy-heavy organisation at the national level 
This section considers the practice of disaster risk governance in the national policy arena. 
The national-level dynamics are characterised by misinterpretation, as well as the lack of clear 
leadership and coordination among the many bodies. 
Intra-government coordination remains a major issue for disaster risk governance in 
Indonesia. Although decentralisation calls for a redistribution of power and sharing from the 
central government to local government and the constitution clearly defines the responsibilities 
of the national (BNPB) and local (BPBD) authorities, in actuality, Law № 24/2007 only 
establishes BNPB and BPBD as government bodies working on disaster management. The 
interviews and observations at staff meetings revealed that this law has led to misinterpretation 
among some ministry staff because it does not mention the roles other ministries play in DRR-
related issues. 
Approximately 22 ministries and government agencies work on DRR-related issues in 
Indonesia. In 2015, Indonesia’s president, Joko Widodo, agreed to the National Mid-term 
Development Plan 2015–2019 (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional [RPJMN]). 
This plan addresses the government’s development priorities over these five years. Disaster 
management is integrated in the plan under Priority № 7, the economic sector. Under the 
previous president, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, disaster agendas were embedded within the 
priority on the environment in the RPJMN. This change reflects a paradigm shift towards 
framing disaster as a threat to the national economy and development. The recent integration of 
the disaster agenda in the RPJMN has created opportunities for programmes relating to disaster 
risk governance in Indonesia, as ministries and government bodies can design programmes for 
cross-cutting DRR issues by referring to the RPJMN framework. Indeed, this plan has facilitated 
integrated programmes among the 22 DRR-related ministries and government agencies and 
reflected the government’s strong political willingness to focus on disaster management as an 
important agenda point (see Figure 4). Consequently, after Law № 24/2007 came into force, 
DRR was developed as a programme and activities in various ministries, including the MoHA, 
the Ministry of Forestry and Environment, the Ministry of the National Development Plan, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and the MoE. 
Figure 4. Government structure for disaster management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(BAPPENAS, 2014) 
BNPB 
BMKG, LAPAN, BPPT, BIG, 
BASARNAS 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Forestry 
and Environment 
Ministry of Fisheries and 
Marine Affairs 
Ministry of National 
Development Planning 
Ministry of Education and Research, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Industry 
Ministry of Villages 
and Transmigration 
Ministry of Public Work 
Ministry of Transportation 
Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources 
Police, Military 
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Note: BMKG: Badan Meteorologi, Klimatologi dan Geofisika (Meteorological, Climatological and Geophysical 
Agency); LAPAN: Lembaga Antariksa Penerbangan Nasional (National Institute for Aeronautics and Space); 
BPPT: Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi (Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology); 
BIG: Badan Informasi Geospatial (Geospatial Information Agency); BASARNAS: Badan SAR Nasional (National 
Rescue Agency) 
 
BNPB, a specific body assigned by law to coordinate disaster management activities in 
Indonesia (Article 13), is a relatively new player in this field. This agency was established in 
2008 as the outcome of the institutional transformation of disaster management in Indonesia. In 
their attempt to coordinate multiple ministries and other bodies around disaster management, 
BNPB positions themselves as a ‘collaborator’ rather than a ‘coordinator’ (BNPB, male, 23 
November 2013). The coordination of disaster management in Indonesia revolves around three 
ministries: BAPPENAS, BNPB and the Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and 
Culture. Officially, the roles of these three ministries are clear and distinct: BAPPENAS 
formulates and monitors RPJMN targets and programmes on DRR, BNPB coordinates cross-
cutting disaster management issues, and the Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and 
Culture synergises the DRR programme across 10 ministries (BNPB; the Ministry of Religion; 
the MoE; the Ministry of Research and Higher Education; the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of 
Social Affairs; the Ministry of Villages, Under-developed and Special Regions; the Ministry of 
Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection; and the Ministry of Youth and Sports). 
In practice, the inter-ministerial meetings were mostly conducted ad hoc around programmes 
or events, with no specific mechanism for regular coordination. For example, in 2014 several 
ministries trying to work together to integrate disaster management under the RPJMN, with 
BAPPENAS coordinating. BAPPENAS and BNPB were the two main facilitators of the RPJMN 
formulation process. In the initial stages, BAPPENAS started the process, using a technocratic 
approach. The related ministries then provided policy input for the draft of the plan. BNPB 
followed an academic approach, inviting 13 universities to analyse the policy draft (BAPPENAS, 
2015). At the end of this process, BAPPENAS and BNPB organised a public hearing on the 
RPJMN, involving various DRR platforms in Indonesia. Completing the draft in this way took 
eight months. The draft was then proposed to the new president. Moreover, the process of 
information and knowledge exchange was not exactly smooth because most of the attending 
ministries were not represented by their key bureaucratic delegates at the inter-ministerial 
coordination meeting. 
 
People who come to the meeting are not always the same. In some meetings, we need ‘key persons’ 
to do the decision making, but due to work commitments, they asked their staff to represent them. 
(interview with a male MoE staff member, 3 November 2015) 
  
Throughout the process, the author observed that BAPPENAS and BNPB were invited by 
related ministries to develop their own DRR programme under the RPJMN framework. 
Interviews with government officials and a high-ranking UN employee in Indonesia in 2015 
showed that DRR is often seen by government bodies as a stand-alone agenda that falls under 
BNPB’s mandate, and several informants said that DRR is generally framed as an irrelevant 
programme that only creates additional work and assignments for ministries. Another perceived 
problem with DRR is that it partially contradicts the ministries’ existing programmes. As the 
following interview extracts illustrate, BAPPENAS and BNPB employees generally have to 
convince other ministries about their critical role in disaster management: 
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Ministries have their own programmes, but they should also know that they involve disaster-related 
issues even in the pre-disaster phase [DRR]. We have this framework [the RPJMN] we share with 
them. We had between two or three meetings before I realised that they already have a DRR-related 
programme under a different name. Then started from there; we tried to incorporate the draft of the 
RPJMN into their working programme. (interview with a male BAPPENAS staff member, 2 
November 2015) 
 
Coordination is easy to say but difficult to implement. Each ministry has their own DRR movement, 
which sometimes is not synergised and integrated. This is something that we want to inventory under 
the National DRR Movement in 2016. We have three functions of coordination, synergy and control. 
We want to control the planning, which before was the domain of BAPPENAS and the Ministry of 
Finance. Now, all programmes are under our control before passing it to BAPPENAS. (interview with 
a male Coordinating Ministry of Human Development and Culture staff member, 4 November 2015) 
 
Although some ministries had initiated DRR-related programmes and activities within their 
organisations, the perception of this agenda as ‘BNPB’s responsibility’ was much more 
commonly expressed by the participants in the present study. Coordination of the bureaucracy-
heavy organisation at the national level appeared to be a real challenge for disaster risk 
governance in Indonesia. These findings are in line with the disaster studies literature, which 
often highlights the issue of ‘coordination’ as a constant difficulty in DRR (Raju, 2013). 
3.4.3. Inclusive decision-making process 
As noted above, decentralisation is intended to transfer power to local administrative bodies 
to bring authority closer to the people. Decentralisation is therefore associated with 
improvements in public services and a bottom-up approach to advocacy. However, in practice, 
decentralisation often fails to deliver on these promises. The present study’s findings suggest that 
the bottom-up approach to advocacy faces significant challenges. This section presents the 
empirical evidence to support this argument. 
3.4.1. Advocacy at the national level 
Through several initiatives, civil society has actively grown as an actor involved in disaster 
risk governance in Indonesia. At the national level, various forums have been initiated, including 
PLANAS, MPBI, IABI and the Indonesian University Forum (Forum Universitas Indonesia). 
Each of these forums is different in nature and fills a separate niche. PLANAS was established as 
a multi-stakeholder forum for government, academia, NGOs, civil society and the private sector. 
MPBI works through individual-based expertise on DRR, aiming to improve MPBI members’ 
capacity and to promote community-based disaster risk management. IABI and the University 
Forum follow a scientific, academic approach at both national and local (provincial and regency) 
levels. 
The interface between the government and civil society appears in activities such as the 
formulation of National Progress Report on the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), preparation 
meetings for international DRR negotiations (i.e. World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction) 
and public hearings on the RPJMN. In preparing for the World Conference on Disaster Risk 
Reduction, for instance, the first author observed representatives from the government, NGOs 
and civil society working together to formulate Indonesia’s standing position and to develop 
national interests for this conference. 
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During interviews and FGDs, both government and non-state actors acknowledged the 
important role of each party and affirmed the ‘good stage’ partnership.5 Shared narratives echoed 
policy documents such as the Government Regulations on Disaster Management (№ 21/2008), 
which states that ‘national action plans for disaster risk reduction […], thoroughly organised and 
integrated in a forum that included elements of the government, non-government organisations, 
the general public and the private sector, were coordinated by BNPB.’ 
Although on paper (and in formal interviews with outsiders such as the first author), civil 
society–government advocacy channels appear to be relatively open, the present study found 
that, in practice, the relations between government and non-state actors remained asymmetrical. 
A high-ranking PLANAS officer explained this dynamic as follows: 
 
BNPB is part of PLANAS; therefore, this national platform should be the highest [body] providing 
input over DRR, but sometimes [within the relations] there is a feeling that ‘I am the government’. 
Like a relationship between parents [the government] and children [non-state actors]. If we can’t 
follow what they [government] say, this causes anger and disappointment. If the government cannot 
embrace non-state actors in flexible way, we [Indonesia] cannot lead [in DRR]. (interview with a 
female PLANAS officer, 27 March 2015) 
 
Regarding the partnership between the government and non-state actors through PLANAS, 
both parties appeared to work together only to ‘a limited level’ (interview with a female 
PLANAS staff member, 27 March 2015). Additionally, the government only involved PLANAS 
in the final stage of policy evaluations. Clearly, PLANAS was not fully involved in the 
formulation of DRR national planning and action through the RPJMN and the National Action 
Plan on DRR (Rencana Aksi Nasional [RAN]), which serve as the primary references for the 
national programme on DRR. One participant elaborated the engagement of PLANAS in policy 
evaluations as follows: 
 
We want the position of PLANAS higher; this is a forum in which the government also sits as a 
member. We only evaluate [the implementation of] the Hyogo Framework for Action, without 
involving CSOs [civil society organisations] in the evaluation of the RPJMN and the RAN. I think 
this is unfair. Supposedly, we evaluate the RPJMN and the RAN and, from there, the HFA. From now 
on, PLANAS will concentrate on formulating yearly reports in which we discuss the evaluation of the 
RPJMN—whether the programme has been implemented up to local level. On RPJMN, there are 
details of budget, amounts of budget and ministries that are involved in the programme. We want to 
do this because we want to avoid only evaluating one institution. It can be sensitive. So far, it seems 
we only evaluate BNPB whereas we supposedly evaluate the whole [all ministries who engaged in the 
programme]. This going to be our resources for advocacy—the views from the frontline. (interview 
with a female PLANAS staff member, 27 March 2015) 
 
Literature on governance highlights a strong role of non-state actors as the pluricentric pillar 
of governance. However, the reality in the field of DRR politics in Indonesia shows how the 
government controls access for PLANAS to be engaged in policy processes. For PLANAS, 
participation in policy processes is of key importance for advocacy efforts. This was illustrated 
by the interview with the PLANAS representative extracted above in the choice of the phrase 
‘resources for advocacy’ to frame the importance of policy access. Specifically, PLANAS 
                                               
5 Interview with a male BNPB staff member, 22 November 2013; interview with a female PLANAS staff member, 
27 March 2015 
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demands greater access to policy formulation by consistently referring to the forum’s niche as 
the avenue for all stakeholders, including the government, to discuss the DRR agenda. PLANAS 
thus attempts to frame the government as an insider in the platform, inviting them to revisit their 
position towards non-state actors. Instead of framing the interaction between these actors as 
‘government–to–non-state actors’, the message from PLANAS framed the interaction with the 
government under one governance network for DRR. This perspective implies that positional 
power on policy steering would be relatively equal for the government and other actors in 
PLANAS. 
3.4.2. Advocacy at regency level 
Adopting the spirit of inclusiveness through engaging multi-stakeholder platforms on DRR, 
the prototype of PLANAS is increasingly being established at the province and regency levels in 
Indonesia. This emerging trend is a response to the institutional development of BPBD at the 
local level. This section focuses on the DRR Forum in NTT, exploring how this platform aims to 
bring state and non-state actors together. 
The DRR Forum was established in 2010 as a platform for multi-stakeholder interactions on 
DRR. This forum brings together the regency government, NGOs, academics and civil society to 
discuss disaster management plans and programmes in Sikka regency. From 2012 to 2013, the 
forum actively engaged in disaster response following the eruption of Mount Rokatenda. This 
eruption caused five deaths and affected inhabitants in two other regencies in Sikka. During the 
emergency phase, directly after the eruption, institutions cooperated through the forum. 
However, after this joint response, no regular programme or activities have been organised by 
the forum.  
When the DRR Forum was established, the head of BPBD was automatically also the head of 
the forum. Interviews with six employees working for three different NGOs revealed a good 
synergy between BPBD and DRR civil society in the regency. However, these interviews also 
revealed that, after the former head of BPBD was promoted to a different position, the forum 
became ‘silent’. The interviewees suggested the reason for this silence was the poor engagement 
of the new head of BPBD on the issue. This finding supported the initial premise regarding 
human resource capacity and its relation to programme development for disaster management. 
The sustainability of the DRR Forum appears to depend on individual BPBD leaders. 
Recognising this problem, in 2014, NGOs initiated a revitalisation of the DRR Forum. One of 
the agenda points of this revitalisation was shifting the leadership of the forum from individuals 
working for BPBD to whole NGO bodies. 
The current secretary of the DRR Forum explained in an interview why he believed that this 
leadership should shift. He offered two arguments, which were widely shared among other NGO 
members in the region. First, the participation of the local government in the forum was weak, 
and second, the DRR Forum needed to become more independent from the government to enable 
the forum to complete their monitoring function towards the government programme. By 
excluding the government from the forum, the NGOs had obtained more room to monitor and 
evaluate the government programme. This situation created tension between BPBD and the 
NGOs. The NGOs’ initiative threatened to drive the regency government out of the decision-
making arena, and the current head of BPBD felt that his institution was regarded as an outsider 
in the forum. He expressed discontent with the NGO activities: 
 
The DRR Forum should be chaired by the head of BPBD [ex officio]. I never heard about the process 
of revitalisation. What I would suggest is to disband the existing forum and establish a new one with 
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BPBD as the leader. (interview with male head of BPBD, automatically also head of the DRR Forum, 
23 October 2015) 
 
As a result of this friction, the lines of communication between the government and NGOs 
were slowly blocked. Instead of communicating and reporting their work to BPBD, the NGOs as 
the driving force of the forum started to approach the vice regent directly. The secretary of the 
forum argued for the need to establish independence from BPBD: 
 
We think BPBD has problems and issues in managing relocations in the Rokatenda region. As long as 
we have not finished our evaluation on this, we will only communicate with the vice regent. Through 
him, we would like to legalise this forum with a Regent’s Decree. (interview with the male DRR 
Forum secretary, 24 October 2015) 
 
This section has shown that the decentralisation of disaster risk governance in Indonesia has 
created a complex political arena at the provincial and regency levels. From the perspective of 
the institutional setting, the development of BPBD and the DRR Forum in Sikka reflects the idea 
of decentralisation of disaster management. It appears that decentralisation has facilitated local 
actors’ active engagement in the political arena of disaster management, and the provincial and 
regency levels soon became where the game is played. Filling the niche of a mult i-stakeholder 
forum, the strength of this platform essentially rests on the full representation of all parties in the 
forum. However, tension arose between BPBD and the other members of the DRR Forum, 
initially because of the poor engagement of a BPBD leader and because BPBD did not feel 
involved in the forum’s development. This tension has grown over time and has been counter-
productive to the development of DRR programmes and innovations. The strong position of each 
side towards the other reveals competitiveness and conflict over disaster risk governance. 
3.4.3. Advocacy at the community level 
As was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, decentralisation carries with it 
expectations of community-driven development, potentially improving the design of contextually 
appropriate projects, the targeting of beneficiaries and the accountability to local residents 
(Dasgupta and Beard, 2007: 231). Decentralisation supposedly facilitates the formulation of a 
development plan through widening stakeholders’ participation and engaging in a bottom-up 
approach. 
This section explores the community-level advocacy politics of DRR. The findings show that 
decentralisation has, indeed, led to active community participation with a bottom-up approach to 
development planning. The community has used this channel to pursue their interests through 
both formal and informal means. This section presents the impact of NGO interventions on 
community capacity. The section is divided into two parts: a description of the advocacy channel 
for decentralisation—the Consultation Forum for Development Planning (Musyawarah Rencana 
Pembangunan [Musrembang]), and a summary of the role of Mitra in building community 
capacity through advocacy. 
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Musrembang 
Community advocacy is a relatively new practice in Indonesia. Prior to the 1998 political 
reforms, no communication channels to discuss structural issues with the government had existed 
(ADB, 2006). Instead, there was an old structure of community organisations called the 
Community Resilience Group (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa), but this structure was 
mostly ineffective because of ‘uncertainty of roles and weak coordination between local 
government and the community’ (ADB, 2006: 75). When democratisation began in 1998, new 
advocacy channels were opened for the community. 
These channels, called Musrembang, are organised by the government yearly at five levels: 
national, provincial, regency, sub-regency and village. Musrembang aims to negotiate a 
development plan at every level by bringing multiple stakeholders together in a consultation 
forum. It aimed to generate a sense of ownership, promote democratic values and reduce local 
conflict (USAID, 2007). Through a bottom-up mechanism, Musrembang started from the village 
level then moved up to the sub-region, region, province and finally national level. Musrembang 
is now regarded by many Indonesian policymakers as the real mechanism for community 
advocacy politics. Musrembang is framed through legal frameworks to place public participation 
at its centre and address community welfare and public goods (Law № 32/2004) (USAID, 2007). 
It also displays the institutionalisation of a multi-stakeholder forum by synchronising top-down 
and bottom-up approaches (Law № 25/2004) (USAID, 2007). Musrembang reflected a political 
negotiation of ‘who gets what, when and how’. It is an actual arena to negotiate community 
interests and resources to ensure they are considered in the next development plan. Because of its 
strategic function, NGO interventions often target Musrembang as the forum for community 
advocacy. 
The present study investigated the role of community groups in Musrembang, including 
Mitra’s assistance in strengthening community advocacy in this forum. 
 
Intervention by Mitra 
As an alliance of five NGOs with strong expertise and experience in Indonesia, Mitra was 
able to implement a project that was complex, multifaceted and highly political. Working as an 
alliance was originally driven by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mitra’s main 
donor. Because of the role of ‘donor pressure’ in forming the alliance, it was seen as a ‘forced 
marriage’.6 The alliance’s organisational set-up in Indonesia was complex because of the 
diversity of mandates and competencies of the 11 involved organisations (five country alliances 
and six local partners). In terms of project design, the integrated approach, strategies, building 
blocks and principles were set-up by the main Mitra organisations in the Netherlands. In each 
intervention country, the project design was contextualised for the national setting. However, the 
global vision and the richness of the local context were not always ‘connected as what we [Mitra 
Indonesia] should have done’.7 The partners admitted that, when the project began, each 
organisation worked independently, without any joint strategy. Each country alliance member 
and their local partners interpreted the intervention strategies in a different way. Using their 
specific relief–development work expertise and experience, the alliance members and local 
partners defined and operationalised their project based on their separate mandates and 
                                               
6 Interview with male the head of a Mitra partner, 22 November 2014 
7 Interview with a male Mitra alliance member, 6 July 2014 
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competencies. However, following the need and pressure to work as ‘One Mitra’ (the Mitra 
Indonesia motto), the process of collaboration started to open up. 
The interviews and observations conducted for the present study showed support for Mitra’s 
intervention from the villages. Six heads of villages from the research sites appreciated Mitra’s 
contribution, claiming the project was ‘helping the work of the village administration and 
contributing to community livelihoods’. Specifically, the heads of villages even expected that 
this programme could be extended after 2015. 
On the community side, the intervention appears to have helped to enhance livelihoods and 
raise awareness about environment problems: 
 
We have been involved in many NGO projects in the past. But none of them approached the 
community as this project did. We work every day to feed ourselves. This project is not only helping 
us to protect our village from disaster, but also to help our livelihood. This is something that I like 
from this project. (interview with a male community leader, 6 July 2014) 
 
Before Mitra came to our village, we already had mangroves. But back then, our mangroves were 
easily wiped out by the waves. The threat in our village is coming from the waves because we are 
located in an open space. Mitra gave us knowledge about how to plant mangroves in the open space. 
We use hybrid systems to catch the mud and protect from the waves. We hope Partners for Resilience 
can be continue in our village. But if they don’t, we are committed to keep working on this mangrove 
conservation. (interview with a male community leader, 13 July 2014) 
 
Community members suggested that the programme strengthened their ability to articulate 
their agenda on environment issues to the government. They also revealed how the project 
helped to improve their bargaining position in advocating to the government: 
 
We said to them [village administrator] that mangrove conservation is a public need. Therefore it has 
to be included in the village programme. (interview with a male community leader, 13 July 2014) 
 
I learned how to approach the government from my field facilitator, and it helps to build my 
confidence. (interview with a male community leader, 25 October 2015) 
 
The present research observed a range of advocacy channels, including the Musrembang. At 
the hamlet level, Musrembang started with inviting multiple community group representatives to 
present perspectives from their hamlets on development priorities. For example, in a coastal 
hamlet called Darat Pantai, one community group involved with Mitra, named Kembang Bakau, 
strived to integrate the mangrove conservation programme in the village development plan. This 
integration would mean that the mangrove project would be funded by the village administration. 
The programme also had the potential to be extended when this agenda was discussed at the 
higher level of the Musrembang Desa (Village Musrembang). During the process of negotiation, 
Kembang Bakau had to compete with farmer community groups seeking financial assistance to 
support agricultural development. At the forum, the head of Kembang Bakau argued that the 
conservation of coastal areas through planting mangrove is essential because the high risk of 
erosion potentially threatens the village population. Moreover, in an interview, the head of this 
community group confided that he attempted to approach other community groups, such as 
fisheries groups, to gain support for the mangrove conservation agenda. The village 
administration ultimately decided to incorporate the coastal protection programme into their 
development plan. As a consequence, Kembang Bakau continued to work on planting mangrove 
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in coastal areas, supported by the annual village funds (approximately IDR 2 million [EUR 
133]). The same community group leader also lobbied a government officer at the regency level, 
using a personal approach to gain information about the government programme and pursue the 
possibility of integrating the work of Kembang Bakau into the programme: 
 
I went to Maumere on my motorcycle [a one-hour journey from his village]. I brought fish catches. 
Here, in Flores, it is common to approach and lobby someone by ‘bringing fish’. We have an idiom 
here: The head of the fish will make people follow what you want. (interview with a male community 
leader, 25 October 2015) 
 
In another Mitra village, Renggarasi, the community prioritised plant cultivation, particularly 
nutmeg. The economic value from nutmeg supported community livelihoods. In an attempt to 
prevail in the regency-level negotiation, the head of the village lobbied a member of legislature 
at this level (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, the Regency House of Representatives). As part 
of this politician’s constituency, Renggarasi played its bargaining position by requesting 
government assistance for the agriculture programme. The lobby succeeded, and the legislature 
bridged the communication between the village head and the regency-level government.  
3.4.4. Perceptions on risk 
Throughout the interviews with different government bodies at both national and local levels, 
it is appeared that each actor had a different paradigm and perception regarding DRR. These 
perceptions were mostly driven by the background of the organisational mandates, including the 
capacity and knowledge of actors on DRR. 
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Table 3. Different perceptions and agendas on DRR among government bodies 
Ministry/local government body DRR programmes 
 
BAPPENAS 
 
DRR as part of national development priority 
3, including the following aspects:  
(a) Land-use approach 
(b) Disaster mitigation 
(c) DRR Governance 
Coordinating Ministry of 
Human Development 
 
DRR National Movement  
(Coordination, synergy and controlling the DRR 
programme mong national government bodies) 
BNPB 
 
 DRR is no longer a stand-alone agenda on 
disaster management 
 Community-based approach through resilient 
villages 
 BPBD institutional strengthening 
Ministry of Home Affairs Capacity-building of local government 
Ministry of Social Affairs 
 
Community-based approach through Desa Siaga and 
TAGANA 
Ministry of Environment 
 
Risk assessment for climate change adaptation 
(advocacy through the spatial planning approach) 
Ministry of Forestry and 
Environment (Watershed 
Agency) 
 
 DAS planning and controlling to overcome 
disaster risk (high intensity of flood, landslides 
and drought) 
 Ensuring water quality and water security 
Ministry of Villages, 
Disadvantaged Regions and 
Transmigration 
 
 New paradigm: shifting from ‘developing the 
village’ to ‘village as development subject’ 
 Bringing authority to villages for better 
empowerment 
 Financing DRR through village funding (either 
hardware or software) 
Ministry of Education  Hardware: ‘safe schools’ 
BAPPEDA Spatial planning approach 
BPBD Raising awareness through socialisation, training 
Ministry of Forestry Changing community behaviour (promoting tree 
planting to reduce clear cutting) 
Ministry of Fisheries and 
Marine Affairs 
Regulation is important to govern the coordination 
among stakeholders  
Office of Village Administration  Capacity-building of the village apparatus  
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Note: BAPPENAS: Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (the Indonesian Ministry 
National Development Planning); BAPPEDA: Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (the 
Indonesian Regional Body for Development Planning); BNPD: Badan Nasional 
Penanggulangan Bencana (the National Agency for Disaster Management); BPBD: Badan 
Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah (the Regional Agency for Disaster Management); DAS: 
Daerah Aliran Sungai (Watershed Mangement); DRR: disaster risk reduction; TAGANA: 
Taruna Siaga Bencana (Disaster Management Cadets) 
 
Within the national government, the perceptions on DRR varied. Four ministries at the 
national level and one local government body (BAPPENAS/BAPPEDA; BNPB; the Ministry of 
Villages, Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration; and the Ministry of Environment) 
positioned DRR as an approach acting as a driving force for any action in the disaster 
management cycle (preparedness, relief/emergency, rehabilitation). This perception translated 
into different agenda setting on DRR, such as land-use/spatial planning, institutional 
strengthening, the community-based approach through resilient villages, and integration on 
development planning. Two government bodies underlined the hardware component of 
infrastructure, such as safe schools (the Ministry of Education) and watershed planning (the 
Ministry of Forestry). Meanwhile, the Ministry of Social Affairs focused on community capacity 
through establishing ‘disaster preparedness villages’ and ‘village emergency response units’ as a 
way to reduce the level of vulnerability within the community. Paradoxically, community 
perceptions of risk were mixed and predominantly revolved around the vulnerability to hazards and 
human-caused disasters. The community positioned disaster as a consequence of the climate, such as 
droughts during a long, dry season or floods after heavy rainfall. However, community members also 
highlighted the issue of illegal logging as the cause of landslides and land clearing as a driving factor 
of wildfires. For NGOs, disaster is entangled with serious issues such as illegal logging, poverty, 
poor awareness regarding environmental conservation, and weak village regulation and law 
enforcement. Therefore, as an approach, DRR should be able to cover these underlying causes. This 
translated into livelihood programmes, agricultural training and advocacy on village regulation. 
3.5. Conclusions 
The popular idea that decentralisation brings authority ‘closer’ and directs it more towards the 
needs of its citizens is challenged by different realities in the field, as discussed in this chapter. 
The chapter has presented sceptical perceptions from the local government and observations 
made in the field that stand in contrast to the purely positive view of decentralisation was 
contrasted with 
This chapter has shown, first, that decentralised disaster risk governance has been strongly 
promoted by the central government but is much less enthusiastically perceived by regency 
governments. Although local governments are framed as the frontline for disaster management, 
in practice, they work amidst complex challenges such as limited financial resources and 
insufficient knowledge and capacity. For example, the local disaster agencies (BPBD) often 
suffer from inadequate human resource capacity and insufficient budgets, with a high frequency 
of man-power rotation in the bureaucracy. DRR decentralisation policies have created huge 
disparities in capacity at central and local government level. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
local policy development for DRR has been described as inefficient and lacking in innovation. 
Policy innovation requires a strong environment, with competence, political support, financial 
resources and inclusive engagement of non-state actors. This is not currently the case in 
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Indonesia. An example of this can be seen in the decentralisation of disaster risk governance 
under the legal framework of the Disaster Management Law (№ 24/2007). The constitution 
clearly states that local authorities are obligated to ensure disaster management policy results in 
rapid, appropriate, effective and efficient actions. However, in practice, the major power transfer 
from central to local government created further confusion and distrust at both levels. 
 Second, this chapter has shown that decentralised disaster risk governance in Indonesia 
remains in the procedural stage, with only moderate development of substantive processes of 
merit-based performance. Formally, Indonesia meets specific indicators for decentralisation (i.e. 
distribution of power and fiscal resources). Indonesia’s decentralised disaster risk governance is 
regulated by a complex set of legal frameworks, institutional settings and power distribution 
mechanisms. However, the part of decentralisation emphasising service delivery improvements 
faces many hindrances. A number of classical problems regarding the current performance of 
BPBD, inter-ministerial coordination and asymmetrical relations between state and non-state 
actors reflect the most significant constraints to decentralised disaster risk governance. 
A third major issue relates to CSOs’ advocacy to articulate their interests and be involved in 
decision making. The advocacy arena for NGOs and other non-state actors is simultaneously 
widening and shrinking, as the decision-making process failed to develop through a 
comprehensive plan to build partnerships. Furthermore, aside from government channels, 
community groups used Musrembang advocacy channels to meet and articulate their interests to 
the government. The key reason for them to choose this alternative route was the local 
government’s incapacity in terms of expertise and budget leading to their inability to respond 
directly to citizens’ needs. These findings contradict the promise of decentralisation to bring 
government closer to its citizens. Overall, disaster risk governance in Indonesia is experiencing a 
premature decentralisation process, leading to further complexity in policy practice. 
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Chapter 4 - Disaster Risk Governance in Transitional Myanmar 
 
Over the past decade, Myanmar has begun the process of a political, administrative and 
institutional transition from a centralistic military regime towards an inclusive democratic 
government. The commitment to initiate democratisation began with the ‘Road Map to 
Democracy’ (2003) process, when the country agreed to undertake the ‘Seven Step Programme 
for Myanmar’s Transition to a Democratic State’. This political milestone affirmed that 
Myanmar is heading towards a democratic trajectory. It also helped to open the country to 
international engagement in many fields, including humanitarian assistance. As a country known 
for complex humanitarian emergencies, Myanmar is highly dependent on international 
assistance. The political transition has been marked not only by the influx of foreign direct 
investment, but also by increased humanitarian assistance. An important question is how this 
transition influences humanitarian practices in the field. Among other issues related to 
humanitarian action, this chapter specifically discusses the influence of the political transition on 
disaster risk governance in Myanmar. The chapter analyses the institutional setting of disaster 
risk governance, the changing nature of state relations to non-state actors, the practice of 
advocacy strategy and the practice of democracy from below driven by participation in disaster 
risk reduction. Data were collected during a total of four months of qualitative research in 
Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw. It was found that the political transition has created a conducive 
environment for non-state actors to play a role in disaster risk reduction across Myanmar. 
Government behaviour has shifted from that of a closed-minded regime to be more inclusive in 
engaging UN agencies, the Red Cross and NGOs. The involvement of these multiple actors in 
disaster management has slightly shifted practice in the field by moving away from a uni-centric 
approach towards a more pluricentric governance network. 
 
Keywords: disaster risk governance, network, politics, advocacy, institutional setting 
 
Myanmar is an example of how natural disaster can be a window to policy change. In 2008, 
cyclone Nargis created momentum for the country to become more inclusive of the international 
community. The cyclone was the worst natural disaster in Myanmar’s history, claiming the lives 
of an estimated 138,000 people (UNDP, 2010). During the response phase, the government was 
criticised for its limited reaction to humanitarian issues. The military regime was described as 
‘secretive’ and ‘xenophobic’ regarding international assistance (New York Times, 2009). 
However, after a great deal of international pressure and being approached by the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Myanmar government gradually lifted its restrictions on 
international humanitarian assistance. ASEAN started its intervention two days after Nargis by 
distributing relief assistance (Srikandini, 2010: 37). This was continued with other foreign aid 
assistance on the fourth day post-disaster (BBC, 2008). Later, the Myanmar government also 
agreed to work in coordination with ASEAN and the United Nations (UN) under the framework 
of the Tripartite Core Group. Within this group, ASEAN took on the role of bridging the 
Myanmar government and UN agencies throughout the response and rehabilitation phases 
(Srikandini, 2010: 38). 
The experience of Nargis brought lasting change to how the Myanmar government responds 
to disaster. This can be seen in how the government responded to the flood and landslide in 
2015. In June 2015, severe floods and landslides resulted in the death of 125 people, and 1.7 
million people were affected (Relief Web, 2015). Different from the previous response to Nargis, 
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from the beginning of the flood response, the Myanmar government openly appealed for 
international relief assistance. The Minister of Information and the President’s spokesperson 
affirmed to the press, ‘We are cooperating and inviting international assistance. We have started 
contacting possible donors and organizations’ (Reuters, 2015). 
Moreover, cyclone Nargis was a game changer in the policy arena of disaster risk reduction 
(DRR). Broadly speaking, DRR developed as a means of ‘preventing new and reducing existing 
disaster risk to strengthen resilience’ (UNISDR, 2007). Beyond this definition, DRR is also used 
as a ‘conceptual framework to minimize vulnerabilities & disaster risks, to avoid (prevention) 
and to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards’ (UNISDR, 2008). 
Cyclone Nargis not only shifted the government’s position towards international relief 
assistance, but also created political momentum for policy change. Prior to Nargis, DRR was not 
a premium agenda item for the Myanmar government. In addition, Myanmar has also 
experienced extensive partnerships with different non-state actors. In 2010, around 170 
organisations, including the UN, international NGOs and local NGOs, were working in 
Myanmar (Srikandini, 2010: 52). The number of local staff members employed in international 
aid agencies increased significantly after Nargis. In 2005, around 3,500 local staff members were 
employed by international aid organisations; by 2009, this number had increased to 10,000 
(Pedersen, 2012: 276). 
According to Birkland (2001), policy changes in the context of disaster were mostly driven 
by two factors: (1) major problems that required an extraordinary response and (2) the dynamics 
of the political realm (Birkmann et al., 2010: 640). Birkland argues that a major disaster draws 
the specific attention of the public and leads to change when ‘there is a clear discourse 
championed by influential policy actors’ (Birkman et al., 2010: 640). Myanmar’s experience 
strongly demonstrates how the largest natural disaster in the country’s history prompted changes 
in how disaster management is governed. As such, the present study attempted to investigate 
how the changes in disaster risk governance in Myanmar have come into practice. 
The present chapter begins by arguing for the importance of the governance of disaster 
management. The underlying risk factors of a disaster are driven by the performance of 
governance (Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006: 208). In a disaster situation, when a community suffers 
from a state of high vulnerability and high potential hazard, questions about the state are often 
raised: Where is the state? Why has the government failed to protect their people? Ahrens and 
Rudolph (2006) argue that disasters often derive from bad governance and the resulting 
institutional failure. In public policy, bad governance resonates through the chain of 
‘unpreparedness, administrative incompetence, technical incapacity and political irresponsibility’ 
(Hannigan, 2012: 6). Poor performance is often dominated by issues of inefficiency and low 
accountability, leading government programmes to fail to ‘meet societal needs’ (Farrington et al., 
2003: 29). Disaster risk governance is a political action that requires a solid policy arrangement 
from the government (Hannigan, 2012: 6). 
With this argument in mind, it is crucial to investigate the reality of disaster risk governance 
in Myanmar, including an analysis of the government’s political willingness to protect its people 
from disaster. A report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) classified Myanmar a fragile country suffering from weaknesses in ‘effective, 
accountable and inclusive’ institutions (OECD, 2015: 13). This OECD report categorises the risk 
factor indicators of fragility into five areas: (1) violence; (2) access to justice for all; (3) 
effective, accountable and inclusive institutions; (4) economic inclusion and stability; and (5) 
capacities to prevent and adapt to social, economic and environmental shocks and disasters. The 
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report positions Myanmar as a fragile state and reflects the country’s vulnerability in terms of the 
principles of good governance (OECD, 2015). 
Clearly, Myanmar faces a real struggle to uphold its political commitments related to 
governance. This raises a number of questions: Does the government keep its promise to be 
democratised and accountable? What are the biggest challenges, in practice? Can non-state 
actors contribute to ‘inclusiveness’? This chapter aims to contribute to answering these questions 
on governance by focusing on DRR during Myanmar’s political transition. In attempting to reach 
this goal, the chapter focuses on the practice of disaster risk governance through a political lens. 
Specifically, the present study sought to answer three main questions: (1) How does the 
institutional setting of disaster risk governance work in practice in Myanmar? (2) To what extent 
does the political transition in Myanmar influence the dynamics of disaster risk governance? (3) 
How is the governance network evolving in Myanmar, with its strong history of strong 
government control? To answer these questions, this chapter is divided into five parts: First, the 
introduction describes the context, details the setting for the case and introduces the research 
questions in more depth. Second, the conceptual frameworks of democracy, governance and the 
politics of disaster risk governance are introduced. Third, I describe the research methodology 
used for this study. The fourth section presents the findings, which are elaborated in four areas: 
the institutional setting, power relations, policy advocacy and democracy from below. Finally, 
the fifth section presents the study’s conclusions. 
4.1. Democracy, Governance and Networks 
In 2003, Myanmar’s Prime Minister, Khin Nyut, introduced seven steps towards democracy, 
called the ‘Roadmap to Democracy’: (1) the reconvening of the National Convention; (2) the 
step-by-step implementation of the process necessary to create a genuine and disciplined 
democratic state; (3) the drafting of a new constitution; (4) adapting the constitution through 
national referendum; (5) holding free and fair elections; (6) convening of Huttaws attended by 
Huttaw members, in accordance with the new constitution; and (7) building a modern, developed 
and democratic nation. This document highlighted Myanmar’s political action to transform their 
country into a democratic nation. Since this initial commitment to the ‘Roadmap to Democracy’, 
Myanmar has been implementing major political reforms. This began with the adoption of a new 
constitution (2008), the multi-party election (2010), the release of political prisoners (including 
Aung San Suu Kyi) (2010), a new government regime under President Thein Sein (2011) and the 
general election at the end of 2015 (Skidmore & Wilson, 2012: 4). As this process continues, the 
transition seems to have opened Pandora’s box, as Myanmar must face serious issues caused by 
living under three decades of control by a centralistic and isolated regime. Issues such as 
economic development, fiscal priorities, absence of the rule of law, human rights abuses, media 
control, environmental degradation and the high risk of disaster (Skidmore & Wilson, 2012: 4; 
Myint-U, 2012: 26) are ongoing, alongside this transition process. In his inaugural speech in 
2016, Myanmar’s first non-military president affirmed his commitment to the values of 
governance and democracy: 
 
Having been elected as president, I am supposed to be accountable to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw [the 
parliament]. […] It is that I have a responsibility to always keep my solemn oath that I have made 
earlier, and to pursue a constitution in accordance with democratic norms that will be suitable for our 
country. (Myanmar Times, 2016) 
 
 Page | 84  
 
As such, the government seemingly offers a new perspective on steering the county by 
explicitly supporting accountability (governance) and democratic norms. 
In practice, democracy and governance share the common ‘concerns and issues of 
cooperation and coordination’ (Holohan, 2005: 28). Democratisation attempts to bring in the 
fundamental freedom of expression, creating a space for non-state actors to be involved in policy 
setting and the development of a ‘conducive and accountable’ political environment (Vidal, 
2009: 161). From a different perspective, the idea of good governance frames changes to 
governing by introducing pluricentric networks into the policy setting to encourage transparency 
and accountability. The governance perspective changes the locus and focus of governing by 
bringing new actors into the decision-making process (locus) and shifting the rules of the game 
and steering mechanism (focus) (van Leeuwen & van Tatenhove, 2010: 591). 
Challenges to the practice of governance are ongoing; however, compared with other aspects 
of governance in Myanmar, the relationship between state and non-state actors involved in DRR 
is open, engaging and diverse. Disaster management has the distinctive characteristics of being a 
largely unpolitical issue that requires a great deal of attention and resources from the government 
and donors. In Myanmar, this issue highlights a national threat for the disaster-prone country, as 
it confronts many people with the real risk of danger. 
In the peace-building and development setting of this fragile state, donors tend to promote 
development changes by encouraging an ‘inclusive governance process’ (Pedersen, 2012: 282). 
In the best-case scenario, this objective leads to approaches ranging from policy advocacy at all 
levels to participatory projects in the village community. Many international organisations (IOs) 
working in Myanmar, such as UNDP, strongly advocate the practice of democratic governance—
for example, UNDP’s facilitation of the wider participation of citizens in decision-making 
processes (UNDP, 2013) and the World Bank’s promotion of the Myanmar National Community 
Driven Development Project in 2017 (World Bank, 2012).  
Concerning DRR in the national arena, the Government of Myanmar has been working 
closely with the Disaster Risk Reduction Working Group (DRR WG), which aims to assist the 
government in achieving a ‘resilient country’ environment. Since its establishment after Nargis 
in 2008, the DRR WG has transformed into a multi-stakeholder network consisting of the 
government, IOs, international and local NGOs, academics and professionals. The DRR WG has 
been involved in policy consultations, providing technical support to the government on policy 
development and report preparation, including developing a draft note for Myanmar’s 2015 
‘Action Plan for DRR’. 
The present chapter takes the concept of ‘governance network’ as the central framework of 
analysis. A network is ‘a set of actors (nodes) and ties (links) whose relationships have a 
patterned structure’ based on trust (Holohan, 2005: 28). Networks are commonly used to 
describe the intertwined nature and interaction among different actors such as the state and civil 
society organisations. The concept of ‘governance network’ is used to describe the ‘articulation 
of interdependent but operationally autonomous actors who interact through negotiations that 
take place within a relatively institutionalized framework and facilitate self-regulated policy-
making’ (Torfing et al., 2012: 16). As a concept and practice, ‘governance networks’ take three 
typical forms: (1) networks driven by the need to share knowledge; (2) networks aiming to 
improve coordination and (3) networks seeking to manage problem-solving collaboration 
(Torfing et al., 2012: 17). The governance network has been widely viewed as an analytical tool 
to explain the complexity of actors’ interaction in an assembly with a pluricentric structure. This 
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concept specifically points to the complex process of interfaces, common goals among actors and 
inclusiveness in decision-making processes through negotiation (Torfing et al., 2012: 16). 
In the context of disaster management, the idea of using networks as an analytical tool 
originated in 1970, when the complexity of actors was seen through the frame of the 
‘international disaster relief system’ (Holohan, 2005: 28). In this system, public and private 
actors assemble in one governance system for disaster relief. The concept of ‘interactive 
governance’ is used to describe this process. Interactive governance is ‘the complex process 
through which a plurality of social and political actors with diverging interests interact in order 
to formulate, promote and achieve common objectives by means of mobilising, exchanging, and 
deploying a range of ideas, rules and resources’ (Torfing et al., 2012: 2). The concept of 
governance network is type of interactive governance used in the present study to examine the 
dynamics of disaster risk governance. This concept emphasises the work of multiple actors who 
act autonomously but relate interdependently within the ‘institutionalised framework’ of the 
policy-making process (Torfing et al., 2012: 16). Specifically, in the present study, disaster risk 
governance is seen as a framework to analyse the multi-stakeholder approach and the 
multifaceted interaction within DRR networks. It presents the network of actors including the 
complexity of interaction governed by the rules of the game. The concept of governance network 
underlines the idea of the changing nature of ‘governing’, from state-centric towards a 
pluricentric approach. These changes have also had implications for the sequence of the policy-
making process (formulation, implementation and evaluation). The process of policy steering 
tends to become more inclusive through the involvement of non-state actors in the arena. 
4.2. Methods 
A qualitative method provides a framework for understanding reality by giving meaning to 
particular phenomena and contexts. It was important to capture the political setting and context 
in Myanmar. In this pursuit, this study took a qualitative approach to data collection, processing 
and analysis. In general, qualitative research aims to describe the complex interaction among 
stakeholders. The underpinning philosophy of qualitative research stresses exploring the essence 
of experiences, meanings and perceptions to acquire knowledge (Kumar, 2005: 38). 
This chapter draws on four months of field research conducted in Myanmar in December 
2013 (preliminary research), September—November 2014, February 2015 and December 2015. 
The research was designed to study the dynamics of disaster risk governance at the national and 
local levels. The aim to capture the dynamics at multi-layered levels was originally driven by my 
enthusiasm for understanding the everyday realities and distinct perspectives among actors in 
Nay Pyi Taw, Yangon and Ayeyarwady Delta. 
At the national level, the research was accomplished through my engagement in an internship 
programme at a UN agency in Myanmar. This agency is a key member of the DRR WG. The 
internship started from the practical need to gain access and permission to conduct research, 
which requires the endorsement of an established organisation. After difficulties encountered in 
conducting preliminary research in 2013, the decision was made to have organisational support 
for this research. In the preliminary phase, I found that the process of data collection was 
ineffective without organisational support, and the preliminary research did not provide the sense 
of experience of the dynamics of the governance network in Myanmar. This research was 
missing the regular participatory observation of the network interaction. Learning from this 
experience, I decided to change the field research strategy to gain in-depth understanding of the 
network dynamics. The aim was to gain access to the meetings and activities of two DRR 
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governance networks in Myanmar—the DRR WG and the Myanmar Consortium for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (MCDRR). This required organisational support, leading me to seek an 
opportunity to engage with a project involving the government, IOs and NGOs in Myanmar. 
Such an opportunity arose when I met a UN agency representative at the Asian Ministerial 
Conference on DRR in Bangkok in 2014. At this initial meeting, I shared my research objective 
and design in an informal meeting outside the event. The contact person, a high-ranking UN 
official in Myanmar, found commonalities between the research objective and the UN agency’s 
objectives. The UN agency then agreed to include my research in their organisational programme 
under the framework of an internship. The internship facilitated both data gathering and research 
uptake: As an intern, I was asked to develop and deliver policy recommendations for improving 
disaster risk governance in Myanmar. 
Several data collection methods were used during the internship:  
o Desk study to collect basic information on the conceptual framework on the politics of 
disaster governance, everyday politics, democratisation and decentralisation; 
o Review of articles to formulate and synthesise the analytical tool on the politics of disaster 
governance; 
o In-depth interviews with 19 participants, including officials from the Government of 
Myanmar (Director General of Relief and Resettlement, Ministry of Social Welfare), a 
member of the Steering Committee, and members of the DRR WG, to gather data about DRR 
policy/strategy, interaction within disaster governance and organisational preferences/roles; 
o Participant observation at the DRR WG’s monthly meetings (September and October 2014), 
the ASEAN Committee for Disaster Management Working Group on Recovery and 
Consultation Workshop for ASEAN Guidelines on Recovery Planning (22 September 2014) 
and the International Day for Disaster Reduction (IDDR) in Yangon (11 October 2014); and 
o Policy document analysis of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency 
Response, the Myanmar Standing Position on Natural Disaster Management, the Strategic 
Framework of the Myanmar DRR WG, the Situational Analysis of DRR in Myanmar. 
 
Regarding research ethics and code of conduct, I protected the identity of the respondents 
and organisations by not explicitly stating their names. Considering the potential bias because of 
the UN agency internship engagement, I took several steps to uphold the principle of 
independence: (1) developing a clear research design to navigate the direction of the research; (2) 
actively seeking out multiple perspectives and cross-cutting information on the research topics 
by recruiting a wide range of respondents from various backgrounds and (3) using open-ended 
questions in the interviews to create room for exploration. 
To capture the local dynamics on disaster risk governance, I also engaged in the Myanmar 
for Resilience (MR) project. The name of the implementing agency and donors are withheld for 
confidentiality reasons. This consortium is a European-funded project consisting of six 
organisations aiming to increase resilience in the coastal and urban communities of Myanmar by 
institutionalising an inclusive DRR approach. The initial contact with MR was established during 
the internship programme. Frequent meetings of the DRR WG helped me to study the MR 
project, leading to intensive communication with the MR contact person about the possibility of 
conducting a qualitative impact study on the project. The MR staff members perceived the 
importance of gaining academic feedback for their preliminary project evaluation from the 
qualitative impact study. MR agreed to facilitate the field research at the selected project sites. 
Over one month, I conducted three focus group discussions involving 36 participants at two 
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project sites in Ayeyarwady Division. A series of interviews was also conducted to gather 
information from MR consortium members at the national, division and community levels. At 
the village level, research for this study was conducted in two communities in Ayeyarwady 
Delta, an area that was heavily damaged by cyclone Nargis in 2008: Mangalar Thaung Tan 
Village and Aung Hlaing Village. Both villages suffered from severe damage during the cyclone 
Nargis, which claimed the lives of 27 community members from these villages. This cyclone, the 
worst natural disaster in Myanmar history, also damaged hundreds of boats, the main livelihood 
assets for these coastal communities. During the data collection, I acknowledged the challenges 
involved in seeking sensitive information, such as information on the experience of loss after 
Nargis, the role of the government and the livelihood context. To respect the community’s loss 
from Nargis, I started with general question such as, ‘Could you tell me what happened when 
Nargis hit the village?’ I then continued with more sensitive questions after the respondents were 
comfortable sharing their stories more extensively and specifically. To navigate the question on 
the role of government, I used the same techniques, inviting the respondents to share their 
observations and feelings about their government. 
4.3. Research Findings 
4.3.1. Heavy Bureaucratic Set-up of DRR Government Structures 
Disaster management in Myanmar is ruled under specific legal frameworks that were 
formulated after Nargis. Here, DRR is governed by five sets of DRR rules and regulations: (1) 
the 2013 Disaster Management Law; (2) the 2012 Myanmar Environmental Conservation Law; 
(3) the 2012 Myanmar Action Plan for DRR; (4) the National Strategic Plan for the 
Advancement of Women, 2012–2021 and (5) the 2009 Standing Order on Natural Disaster 
Management. These legal frameworks are consistently used as references to formulate and guide 
the national policy plan for disaster management in the country. In the government structure, 
there are three dominant structures on the arena: (1) the national coordination structure of the 
National Disaster Preparedness Committee (NDPC); (2) the Ministry of Social Welfare Relief 
and Resettlement, especially the Relief and Resettlement Department (RRD) as the focal point 
for disaster management; and (3) the local government administration at the state/division, 
district, township and village levels. 
In 2005, Myanmar established the NDPC as a response to the massive destruction caused by 
Tsunami Hindia in 2004. The NDPC is a manifestation of the central coordination of disaster 
management in Myanmar.
8
 As the highest government committee responsible for addressing the 
work of disaster management in the country, the NDPC is responsible for formulating issues and 
guidelines, ensuring coordination between multiple stakeholders and evaluating disaster 
preparedness measures (Standing Order, 2009). The structure of the NDPC is bureaucratically 
heavy, covering 36 government bodies ranging from Union ministries, The Division of Peace 
and the Development Council at state/division level. Specially, the NDPC was tasked with inter-
sectorial coordination. The NDPC has a working committee called the National Disaster 
Preparedness Management Working Committee, which comprises 10 subcommittees, each with 
approximately 10 members of ministries, mostly at the deputy-level, to ensure that ‘effective 
implementation is laid down by the NDPC’ (ADPC, 2009: 11). Figure 5 elaborates the Myanmar 
Government Institutional Framework for Disaster Management at the national level. 
 
                                               
8 Interview with an RRD staff member, 11 December 2013 
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Figure 5. The Myanmar government’s Institutional Framework for Disaster Management at 
national level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, 2009) 
 
In a different structure, Myanmar also established Inter-Ministerial Disaster Management 
Coordination Committee, which aims to formulate recommendations, policies, issues and 
guidelines and involves non-state actors within its structure. Policy input and recommendations 
also come from the Advisory Committee for Natural Disaster Management (ACNDM). This 
committee brings together different actors from government bodies, universities and NGOs, as 
well as hazard specialists (Standing Order, 2009). Members of this committee are the specialists 
in DRR. 
In implementing inter-ministerial coordination, information exchange processes became a 
real challenge. The coordination mechanisms among the ministries failed to fill the information 
gap with other related ministries. The Ministry of Social Welfare Relief and Resettlement, 
through the RRD, is a key government body tasked with disaster management (MSWRR, 2012). 
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The RRD plays coordinates the Relief and Rehabilitation subcommittee in the NDPC and serves 
as the chair for the inter-ministerial committee (Standing Order, 2009) and the national contact 
for ASEAN.
9
 In terms of supervision, the RRD is obliged to report to the vice president every 3–
6 months.
10
 Other relevant ministries working intensely on DRR-related issues include the 
Ministry of Environment and Conservation of Forestry, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry of Construction, the Myanmar Safer Settlement and Urban Research. 
The issue of information exchange appeared on the inter-ministerial meeting agenda when, 
regarding a dam construction project, the RRD asserted that they had not been fully informed 
about the construction process although it was crucial for them to ensure the construction was 
not taking place in ‘disaster-prone areas’: ‘We lacked complete information on what and how 
they do it [the project]’.11 
In addition to the government structure at the Union (national) level, a system of complex 
bureaucracy is also found at the region level. Myanmar has a centralistic government structure in 
which ministerial authority goes down directly to each sub-national department at the 
state/division level. DRR is engaged and regulated under the administration of the state/division, 
before moving further down to townships, wards and village districts at the local level (MSWRR, 
2012). With this structure, the RRD has no direct authority beyond the district level (i.e. at the 
level of townships or village-tracts). The budget mechanism is also separated between Union and 
subnational level. In terms of organisational structure at the lower levels (township, ward and 
village tract), the subnational-level department bodies are responsible to the General 
Administration Department (GA) in the Ministry of Home Affairs. As for DRR, the Ministry of 
Social Welfare Relief and Resettlement has stressed that it should become ‘a system and 
procedures in the related departments at national, state/region, township, ward and village district 
levels’ (MSWRR, 2012). However, the reality on the ground is contradictory. Some 
states/divisions do not see DRR as a priority on their agendas because it might be less relevant 
for their context.
12
 This lack of prioritisation of DRR in some regions creates a challenge for the 
national government.
13
 In terms of structure, there is no linkage between the government at the 
Union level, on the one hand, and state, district or township levels, on the other. The RRD at the 
Union level has no direct coordination or structure connecting it with the RRD beyond the 
district level (townships, village-tracts). At the local level, the RRD is mainly responsible for the 
General Administrator Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
In a transition setting such as Myanmar, the change process is mostly felt in urban areas like 
Yangon. At the local level (district, township, village-tract), the status quo is predominantly 
maintained, and the agenda for change is not always translated smoothly to the implementation 
stage. 
 
The top level of the government changes, but the middle level and the lower level is not [changing] as 
fast as the top level. (interview with a female UN agency programme coordinator, 17 October 2014) 
 
 
                                               
9 Interview with an RRD staff member, 11 December 2013 
10
 Interview with an RRD staff member, 11 December 2013 
11 Interview with an RRD staff member, 11 December 2013 
12 Interview with an RRD staff member, 11 December 2013; interview with an international NGO representative, 4 
October 2014 
13 Interview with an RRD staff member, 11 December 2013 
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The middle–low bureaucratic staff  have poor knowledge/capacity on disaster management and does 
not always understand the reality on the ground. (interview with a female UN agency staff member, 
17 October 2014)  
 
Evidence from the field confirmed the problem of heavy procedural bureaucracy in the 
structure of disaster management in Myanmar. First, the findings showed a top–down structure 
from the top level down through the hierarchical system of the Union level to the village tracts. 
The NDPC, the highest-level body in charge of disaster management, has heavy layers of 
bureaucracy. The structure consists of high-ranking official staff who provide general guidance 
and direction to the lower layer of the body. For execution, the NDPC adds a new layer, 
establishing a specific working group tasked with ensuring NDPC takes the right direction on the 
ground. In specific, the working group consists of ministerial bodies chaired by deputy-level 
officers. These ministerial bodies are grouped into 10 clusters, namely (1) information and 
education; (2) emergency communication; (3) search and rescue; (4) information loss and 
emergency assistance; (5) assessment of losses; (6) way clearing and transportation; (7) 
mitigation and establishing emergency shelter; (8) health; (9) rehabilitation and reconstruction; 
and (10) security. In practice, the working group itself suffers from poor coordination, which 
could hamper DRR policy implementation. This was revealed in the interview with RRD about 
the ‘missing information on the dam construction.’ In terms of policy, the coherency of disaster 
management policy is not fully supported by the bureaucratic structure. There is no direct line of 
authority between the RRD, the key government body tasked with disaster management, and the 
GA. The mother organisation of the GA (the Ministry of Home Affairs) is different from that of 
the RRD (the Ministry of Relief and Resettlement), which has led to different policy priorities in 
the two agencies. 
Second, although the experience from Nargis has not led to reform of the bureaucratic 
governance structure of disaster management, the impact of Nargis has generally encouraged the 
proliferation ideas of inclusiveness. The government framed this new way of governing through 
‘inclusive DRR’ as a process of ‘improvement of policy, knowledge and awareness, as well as 
the involvement in civil society and community’.14 NGOs appreciated these changes:  
 
In 2008 [before Nargis], there was no consultation; [the] military government was strict on the 
information to give and to disseminate. After Nargis, there is more civil society organisation 
involvement now; there is [a] law on disaster management. There is a lot of change now in the top 
level. (interview with a male international NGO representative, 4 October 2014) 
 
The new practice of the governance network has exposed the government to a new way of 
governing. It is a daily experience among public decision-makers in Myanmar to receive massive 
numbers of requests to establish cooperation and partnership from IOs, NGOs and the private 
sector. The ongoing transition, consequently, pushes the government to conduct policy reform in 
almost all aspects. The government is occupied with this reform process, including new 
partnership arrangements from various initiatives. This situation often leads to long delays in the 
decision-making process. 
 
 
                                               
14 Interview with an RRD staff member, 11 December 2013 
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Government departments in this transition period—they are very, very busy. And then, they are not 
that clear what is the direction, so there were many confusions. In the past, they needed to listen to 
only the supervisor, only the head of department. Now they have to listen to [the] media while they 
also have to listen to civil society also; then sometimes [they] take decisions very slowly. (interview 
with a female UN agency staff member, 17 October 2014) 
 
[Working with the government] is like [a] double[-edged] sword; now they are open, but everybody 
now works with them. [There is a] lack of capacity to coordinate [and] the demand is really high, 
[but] the staffing, training people is the same quantity. They don’t have a lot of capacity. They have to 
build the capacity. Because it’s evolving with [a] different structure—working groups, different 
ministries. There are so many groups—how do they talk to each other and link to each other? It has 
been a challenge for the government and also for us. (interview with a male international NGO 
programme coordinator, 4 October 2014) 
  
The above paragraphs have shown how the government’s exposure to the new practice of 
inclusiveness also has an impact on other actors in the governance network. The delay of 
responses to the initiatives from non-state actors is only one of the impacts. There are also some 
implicit problems that endanger the commitment to the governance network. In the heavily 
bureaucratic government setting of Myanmar, some NGOs admitted that it is difficult to reach 
the highest levels of government. The interfaces between the government and NGOs 
predominantly happen at the ministerial level—in this case, at the RRD. The structure is highly 
political, making it difficult for non-state actors to approach from the outside. The highly 
bureaucratic command structure has also shaped the political culture of government officials who 
have lived under decades of authoritarian leadership. While the transfiguration to open and 
engaging practice is ongoing, the old bureaucratic culture, which mostly promoted a closed and 
command-driven hierarchy, continues to exist. 
 
They [the government] were in the command system for many years, they were trained to listen [to 
the higher command]. It’s really difficult to change the mind-set of the government department 
personnel […] to have that interactive discussion, to have consultation, to find the consensus […] In 
the past, they didn’t talk to people and people didn’t talk to government departments. People never 
think that if we interact with government departments they will respond […] it’s not easy to talk 
together, to find the way together. If we think that it will work, it is just a story. It would not work in 
this short period. We need some time to bridge through that situation. (interview with a female UN 
agency staff member, 17 October 2014) 
 
In another interview, one respondent shared how the heritage of authoritarianism remains 
embedded in government culture: 
 
The structure of the government system in the past is [consists of] the top ministry and their different 
department officers at different state region levels. Some departments are down to the community 
level, like [the] General Administrative Department [in the Ministry of Home Affairs] goes to the 
township level […] Then in the past, the state region level, the township level, the district level, they 
report to the ministry [Union government] directly. So in the past, more strong power [was] with the 
ministry. But now it changed. They started to have that decentralisation. Six months ago [in early 
2014] more power was given to the state region level. The department officers at the state region 
level, township level [and] district level have their immediate supervisors, which is more clear than 
the ministry. And then some budget [is] also now not with the ministry, but with the state region 
level. But there is feedback from [the] DRR Working Group at the state region level about difficulties 
 Page | 92  
 
to engage with the RRD in their state or region. So there are two ways: One is organise themselves 
without the government [RRD], or [the] other way is to have RRD. In case they have to organise [on] 
their own—the chief ministers [Union level] and the government departments, they are watching all 
the civil society organisations [to see] how they work in some states and regions. [There is] more 
sensitivity in the border areas. Then they [the DRR WG at the state region level] want to organise 
such a kind of working meetings or coordination network; then, they have to contact to the RRD. 
Then the RRD needs to have approval from the Union government, the chief minister, but it didn’t go 
very smoothly. Then sometimes the chief minister is very tough and then the RRD [at the state region 
level] will not get that approval, will not take responsibility. There is not enough trust building 
between the agencies [the DRR WG] and the RRD [at the state region level] again. Sometimes, the 
agencies share with us that the RRD is standing alone; sometimes they didn’t get any information, 
they didn’t get any collaboration. (interview with a UN agency staff member, 17 October 2014) 
 
This illustrates a tendency that was mentioned in many interviews for the heavy bureaucratic 
structure to continuously demand a hierarchical and top-down decision-making process. Within 
this procedural structure, there are many potential pitfalls in achieving effective decision-making 
processes. Although there have been some changes introduced, the old practice of directing 
decision-making processes to higher authorities remains tangibly real. From the interview 
extracted above, it could also be sensed how the initiative to introduce a governance network on 
DRR at the local level, coming from non-state actors, can be sensitive for the government. 
However, despite this issue, the government readily acknowledged the important role of these 
non-state actors: 
 
NGOs have a big impact; without them, we don’t have that much money to use. For instance, MR 
gives training successfully. They are so helpful […] We don’t have regular meetings with them. 
There are no NGOs based in this township. If they want to come, I am here. (interview with a male 
Head of Township, 15 February 2015) 
 
The perspective towards the NGOs are mixed: The work of NGOs is perceived as ‘giving big 
impact and helpful’, but there are remaining problems with distrust, as implied by the 
government’s request for regular reports from NGOs. This condition is driven by the long period 
of authoritarianism during which the state was always the centre and sole regulator of the 
decision-making process. 
 
After completing the development project, the local government really, really appreciated what the 
NGOs did for them. And they said in the opening ceremony, ‘You are doing a good thing even 
though you are an NGO’. What kind of education did they get? It’s very much in line what has been 
expressed in the news, that NGOs are a destructive element, that they are part of the third colonialists. 
They have been educated like that. (interview with a male  international NGO representative, 30 
September 2014) 
 
This section has highlighted the role of government structure for disaster management in 
Myanmar, showing how the complex, bureaucratic structure leads to poor coordination and weak 
advocacy access. Evidence from the field revealed that the top-heavy structure of disaster 
management impacted the realities of networked governance in many different ways. First, the 
commitment of the state leaders to good governance was hindered by the latent issue of 
bureaucratic procedures. Second, although the ongoing political transition enforced the idea of 
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inclusiveness in the bureaucracy, in practice, the government structure remain closed, 
hierarchical and procedural. This makes advocacy extremely difficult. 
4.3.2. Government Dominance of the DRR Working Group: Asymmetrical Relations 
and Mutual Benefit 
In 2008, the collaboration among different stakeholders in Myanmar was institutionalised 
through the DRR WG. These actors include (1) auxiliary government bodies (e.g. Myanmar Red 
Cross); (2) IOs; (3) both international and local NGOs; (4) donor agencies (e.g. Japan 
International Cooperation Agency, Caritas Switzerland); (5) professional societies (e.g. 
Myanmar Engineering Society) and (6) academic organisations (e.g. Yangon Technological 
University, University of Yangon). The DRR WG platform is the venue and avenue to discuss, 
formulate and implement the DRR agenda. Although the government is one of the actors in this 
network, this working group is outside the government structure on disaster management. An 
earlier section of this chapter describes government bodies’ work on disaster management, 
including through the ACNDM, where non-state actors also participate to provide 
recommendations to the government. The DRR WG is different from the ACNDM, whose 
members are individuals with expertise on DRR; membership in the DRR WG is organisation-
based. 
Interviews with 17 members of the DRR WG revealed different factors driving the 
engagement of organisations in the network. DRR WG members have at least four motivations 
for engaging in the network: (1) information and knowledge exchange; (2) joining in collective 
action/advocacy; (3) participating in a venue for networking and (4) pooling/exchanging 
resources. This premise has strongly affected the DRR WG. The high value of information 
exchange and networking has inspired some members of the DRR WG to work collectively on 
projects such as the Consortium on DRR Inclusiveness, funded by European Union, and the 
Consortium on Disaster Management Training Centre, funded by USAID. 
 
Working together has more strategic advantages. Nobody can do many things which is not in your 
work plan. So, [based] on that, we have been very successful—i.e. getting the resources that we 
create. We are moving into more streamlined work. (interview with a male UN agency staff member, 
2 October 2015) 
 
As an interagency network, the DRR WG has been driven by a collective agenda initially 
propelled by the DRR WG strategic framework. The strategic framework focuses on the 
establishment of ‘collective voice’ by exchanging and combining expertise and resources from 
the network’s diverse membership (DRR Working Group Strategic Framework 2013 – 2018, 
2013). In their strategic document for 2013–2018, the dominant vision for this network involved 
empowering government policy, legal frameworks and capacities (outcomes 1, 2 and 6) (DRR 
Working Group Strategic Framework 2013–2018, 2013). 
As the most active network on DRR in Myanmar, the DRR WG plays an important role in 
steering policy. Their contribution is arranged, managed and organised through an internal 
system. The working group has three bodies: the steering committee, the secretariat and the 
technical task force. The steering committee consists of 11 elected organisations: 3 UN agencies, 
3 international NGOs, 3 local NGOs, the Red Cross and one other organisation. This 
committee’s primary functions are promoting the strategic framework of the DRR WG, 
managing the secretariat and endorsing initiatives from members/outsiders based on the strategic 
framework. The working group also has an elected chair to host the secretariat. Further, there is 
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an operational body of the working group run by two full-time staff members. Since its 
establishment, UNDP has served as the chair of the working group. Lastly, the technical task 
force is responsible for providing technical support on particular activities of the working group. 
 
Figure 6. Structure of the Disaster Risk Reduction Working Group 
 
 
(Source: DRR Working Group Strategic Framework 2013–2018, 2013) 
 
Since its establishment, the DRR WG has been involved in a series of policy consultations, 
providing technical support to the government on policy development and drafting reports such 
as a concept note for Myanmar’s Action Plan for DRR (2015), recommendations for Myanmar’s 
standing position at the World Conference on DRR (2015) and a concept note on the Standing 
Order on Disaster Management (2015). The DRR WG is also the knowledge hub for technical 
capacity-building; this role is seen in the development of a draft roadmap policy framework for 
the Inclusive Toolkit (2015) and the provision of technical support to the RRD for upgrading the 
curriculum of the Disaster Management Course for the township and the state/division levels and 
for the Township Disaster Management Planning Process. For public audiences, a series of DRR 
public campaigns were also initiated by the group. These included IDDR, ASEAN Day for 
Disaster Risk Reduction and the ASEAN Ministerial Conference on DRR (DRR WG, 2015; 
Situational Analysis of DRR in Myanmar, 2013). 
The DRR WG claimed to be the ‘government-led model of DRR Coordination’ (DRR WG 
Myanmar, 2013). This explicitly placed the government in a central position in the network, 
which was reflected in the DRR WG strategic framework, where three of six outcomes for the 
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DRR WG were directed at meeting government needs (i.e. inclusive policy and legal framework 
on DRR [outcome 1]; increase government capacity at all levels [outcome 2]; and to provide the 
government with tools, experiences and capacities [outcome 3]. Since the DRR WG’s 
establishment in 2008, the RRD has been actively involved in this network. Within the DRR 
WG’s organisational structure, the government is the honorary chair of the network. However, 
after the RRD’s office moved to Nay Pyi Taw (the new capital) in 2012, they were no longer 
fully present at the DRR WG meetings and discussions. Almost all of the DRR WG’s 
organisational members are based in Yangon—the former Myanmar capital, located 320 km 
from Nay Pyi Taw. The partnership between RRD and DRR WG is now mostly directed by 
email and telephone, so this cooperation continues to be fully functioning. 
Additionally, the network has very clearly been heading further in the direction of a 
‘government-led’ platform. Although there is room for negotiation with the government,15 the 
power relations between state and non-state actors were built on asymmetrical relations with 
mutual benefits. In interviews with government and international actors, relations between these 
actors were described as ‘interdependent’: 
 
[The] DRR WG is a good venue to coordinate and pool resources. We would like to have other 
collaboration. [The] DRR WG is a platform for communication to the government […] If you have 
project that you want to gain, the [the group] can provide technical input. For instance, we would like 
to develop [an] assessment management course. One NGO has USD 20,000 but they don’t know how 
to spend it. The government said why don’t we have this course; then we do this. [The] DRR WG 
facilitate it and announce it to the group and other people contribute to it. This course has been 
recognised by the government. (interview with a male international NGO representative, 4 October 
2014) 
 
The government works closely with the DRR WG to achieve the government’s agenda 
setting, and the relationship between the government and the DRR WG members is crucial to 
achieve their organisational mandates. 
However, the partnership initiative was predominantly undertaken to fill the government’s 
needs (demand-driven).
16
 This could be seen in the collaboration between the government and 
the DRR WG regarding the 2014 IDDR. IDDR is an annual event endorsed by United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction to be organised at the national level as a way to 
celebrate DRR in the country. For organisations working on DRR-related issue, IDDR become 
an event mostly to raise public awareness, including the dissemination and promotion of the 
DRR programme to wider audiences. For the DRR WG, IDDR is a definite agenda point on their 
yearly programme. In 2014, around two months prior to the event, the government send a request 
to the DRR WG asking for a financial contribution to the implementation of IDDR. For four 
years, the DRR WG has provided financial support for the event. The DRR WG members 
generally claimed that their contribution to the event was part of their campaign and awareness 
raising on IDDR. The request from the government was discussed in a weekly meeting of the 
DRR WG where the budget gap was presented. Support was required for items such as the venue 
cost, meals and publications.  
 
 
                                               
15 Interview with a UN agency staff member, 2 October 2014 
16 Interview with a UN agency officer, 2 October 2014 
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We do get a lot of demands from them [the government] that are not written in the memorandum of 
understanding; then you have to respect that. (interview with a male UN agency officer, 2 October 
2014) 
 
The members of the DRR WG shared the responsibility for the event by providing financial 
support to fill the gap. Three of the five biggest donors for IDDR 2014 were UNDP, UN Habitat 
and Action Aid. Although UN agencies and NGOs committed to provide financial support to 
maintain good relations with the government, the government claimed the event as their 
programme, with minimum recognition of joint collaboration. However, in 2014, the DRR WG 
pushed the government to acknowledge the DRR WG’s contribution by placing the network’s 
logo alongside the government logo on the publications. After four years of this practice, the 
government acknowledged their joint collaboration with the network on the event. 
4.3.3. Advocacy Channels: Indirectness, Avoiding Blame, Backdoor Strategy 
In a centralistic political setting such as Myanmar, advocacy is a challenging process. For 
over three decades, the government created a political environment with no opposition and no 
civil society involvement in setting policy. The current transitional era is the first time the 
government has attempted ‘to listen and receive external inputs’.17 As one international NGO 
representative noted, ‘For a very long time, they see NGOs as a destructive element’.18 
 
With this background, non-state actors tend to approach the government indirectly.
19
 
Interviews with representatives from two UN agencies and six international NGOs similarly 
addressed the topic of current advocacy strategy: 
 
The methodology—some are official and unofficial. Asians are Asians; we use subtle ways to 
communicate to the government. (interview with a male international NGO representative, 30 
September 2014)  
 
Non-state actors tend to use a backdoor, non-confrontational strategy (Ware, 2012). It is very 
important for non-state actors to frame the agenda in such a way that the government feels they 
are not being ‘blame and shamed’. 
In essence, there are two channels used by NGOs: a formal and an informal approach. 
Through formal channels, NGOs develop direct contact with the government, for instance 
through bilateral, trilateral or multilateral meetings. IOs and NGOs also make use of different 
venues to articulate their agendas: 
 
 Platform-based advocacy (e.g. the DRR Working Group, the MCDRR, Humanitarian 
Coordination, and the UNESCO-led Disaster Preparedness and Response Education;  
 Joint activities (e.g. IDDR); and 
 Approaching the government in informal ways (e.g. discussing programmes/projects over 
the telephone).  
  
                                               
17 Interview with a UN agency staff member, 17 October 2014 
18 Interview with an international NGO representative, 30 September 2014 
19 Interview with an international NGO representative, 30 September 2014 
 Page | 97  
 
In a transition setting such as Myanmar, non-state actors cannot expect rapid change in the 
behaviour of the government. For decades, people in Myanmar were under authoritarian 
leadership, with the government at the heart of the system. Within this type of setting, direct 
advocacy, which is often associated with openness and parallel relations between state and non-
state actors, could hinder the process of advocacy itself. An advocacy strategy with a more 
indirect, subtle and polite approach could ease the necessary relationship-building, allowing the 
preconditions for negotiation to develop. 
4.3.4. Power Relations in the DRR WG: The Strong Role of UN Agencies and the 
Development of Local NGOs 
This research found that UN agencies play a strong role in the DRR WG, considering their 
high levels of access to the government and their institutional resources. UNDP is the one of the 
government’s main counterparts. As the chair of the DRR WG, UNDP has been very active in 
assisting the work of the RRD at both the national and regional (ASEAN) levels. To ease the 
coordination process, UNDP even has their own satellite office in the RRD office in Nay Pyi 
Taw. The relationship between UNDP and the RRD has become stronger both formally and 
informally. The communication process between these agencies is carried out in a close and 
friendly environment where coordination and decision making are often performed through 
telephone conversations. In one of the example, UNDP convinced the government (RRD) over 
the telephone to adopt the global message as their national theme for IDDR 2014. This phone 
call was made after two international NGOs encountered difficulties in convincing the 
government to accommodate the joint campaign on ‘Elderly People for DRR.’ The capacity of 
UNDP to change the position of the government over the telephone indicates that the 
government has a high level of trust towards UNDP. This trust has eased the UNDP-driven 
advocacy process. 
Aside from its high level of access to the government, UNDP is also framed by the 
government and other DRR WG members as having a large pool of resources. In one of the DRR 
WG’s monthly meetings, several organisations referred to UNDP as an ‘organisation which has 
more money’ (compared with NGOs).20 This was confirmed in another example, when the 
government requested that UNDP provide financial support to strengthen the government in the 
area of DRR at a regional level. At the ASEAN level, together with Indonesia, Myanmar is the 
chair of the ASEAN Disaster Preparedness Committee Recovery Working Group.
21
 UNDP 
assisted the government in this role to prepare a draft on regional recovery planning for ASEAN. 
During a trilateral meeting with ASEAN, the government of Indonesia and the government of 
Myanmar, RRD, representing the Myanmar government, casually asked UNDP Myanmar to 
financially support their role in the ASEAN Disaster Preparedness Committee. This direct 
request made in a high-level official meeting came without prior formal arrangement with 
UNDP, and the UNDP representative looked unprepared to respond to this request. This specific 
example showed how the government framed UNDP not only as their strategic partner but also 
as funding supporter, at both the national and the regional level. 
In contrast to the strong roles of UN agencies in the DRR WG, the involvement of local 
NGOs is still emerging. At the time of the data collection, only 18 of 49 members of the DRR 
WG were local NGOs. This is equal to 36% of the members, whereas a higher percentage (64%) 
were international agencies (both UN agencies and NGOs). For local NGOs, the DRR WG is a 
                                               
20 DRR WG meeting, 19 September 2014 
21 Participant observation, 22 September 2014 
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strategic platform to develop a partnership with UN agencies and international NGOs Almost all 
local NGOs attested to the importance of participating in the DRR WG. 
 
In the DRR WG, we can share experience and organise partnerships […]We can improve our 
capacity and get knowledge from the DRR WG. (interview with a male local NGO representative, 7 
December 2015) 
 
The development of local NGOs for DRR began only after Nargis (Lall & Win, 2012). For 
over decade, civil society in Myanmar had suffered from systematic repression of freedom of 
speech, but the momentum of the political transition and experience after Nargis changed the 
game. Local NGOs working specifically on disaster management started to emerge, following 
intensive exposure to international relief assistance after Nargis. The opportunities to partner 
with the DRR WG are extremely important for the development of local NGOs. The 
involvement in this group, with its strong and reputable member organisations, is strategic for 
local NGOs seeking to improve their capacity.  
 
They have to make our people on the frontline. Otherwise, we are left behind from the war for more 
than 30 years. We are an isolated country, [and we] suffered from sanctions; therefore, education is 
very low. Compared with the neighbouring countries, we are very, very far left behind. I want to 
insist [to] them to take us to the frontline, to have a space, to have a chance, to build up our capacities. 
(interview with a male MCDRR member, 8 December 2015) 
 
However, the engagement of the MCDRR in the DRR WG did not come without challenges. 
The language barrier has also become a factor limiting the participation of local NGOs.
22
 All 
interaction in the DRR Working Group meetings (monthly meetings, task force meetings and 
steering committee meetings) are conducted in English.  
 
Another challenge is the language problem. Even though they listen, even though they speak English, 
because of [the] Myanmar culture and education system, they don’t speak up. Usually they do not 
speak up; they’re silent. Myanmar culture is very much quiet; especially local NGOs are not 
confident enough that they can participate, but, now, those who regularly attend this one, they, I 
think, they also build their capacity; they become active. (interview with a male UN agency staff 
member, 17 October 2014) 
 
This situation has been acknowledged as one of the key challenges in the DRR WG.
23
 The 
2014–2018 strategic framework of the DRR Working Group attempts to address the problem of 
local NGO participation by committing to empowering local organisations to take leading roles 
in the DRR sector (expected outcome 4) (DRR Working Group Strategic Framework 2013–
2018, 2013). This will be achieved through several interim outcomes: (1) participation of local 
NGOs accounts for at least 50% of the total membership of the DRR WG, with evidence of 
active participation; (2) at least 70% of sub-national level DRR coordination networks are jointly 
led by local NGOs and local government; and (3) at least 70% of field-level DRR-related 
                                               
22 Interview with a UN Agency officer, 2 October 2014; interview with an international NGO representative, 4 
October 2014 
23 Interview with a UN agency staff member, 2 October 2014; interview with an international NGO representative, 4 
October 2014 
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projects in Myanmar are implemented by local NGOs (Strategic Framework of the DRR 
Working Group, 2013).  
The network has tried to shift the language to local Burmese; however, the involvement of 
local NGOs remains the same, whereas this has caused the participation of international NGOs to 
go down.
24
 Members of the MCDRR have continued to advocate for the use of Burmese 
language in DRR WG meetings: 
 
I want to insist that international organisations and national give space, more space to local NGOs. I 
don’t mean just for [information] sharing; I mean for capacities, trainings, workshops, as well as 
giving a space to have a chance to speak at the frontline. (interview with a local NGO representative, 
7 December 2015) 
 
In addition, poor resource capacity of local NGOs also limited their level of participation in 
the DRR WG. 
 
Local NGOs are busy; we have limited human resources, so we can’t assign one person to come to 
[the] DRR WG. We can’t pay for the salary of [a] DRR specialist. This specialist is rare for local 
NGOs. For international NGOs, they can pay USD 700–800; it’s easy for them because they have 
money. Besides, [the] DRR WG meetings [are] mostly organised in the downtown area. With the 
traffic, I have to go there with money out of my own pocket. (interview with a male local NGO 
representative, 7 December 2015) 
 
Hence, insufficient capacity to communicate in English, a lack of confidence, a different 
communication culture (trained by the commando and authoritarian system to be passive) and 
poor resource capacity are real challenges for local NGOs. These challenges made the 
involvement of local NGOs in the DRR WG rather passive and less influential than international 
agencies. 
4.3.5. Governance Network at the Local Level 
The growing government commitment to an inclusive environment at the national level 
creates hopes for a more participatory approach at the local level. In terms of the governance 
network, the triangle of cooperation between the government, IOs/NGOs and the community is 
clearly reflected in DRR projects endorsed by IOs and NGOs. As such, this section investigates 
the practice of partnership among these three actors, exploring to what extent the principle of 
inclusiveness is enacted in local practice on DRR. 
For this purpose, this study focused on the intervention MR, which was introduced above. As 
a consortium project, MR is operated by six organisations in six different states in Myanmar. 
Three of the six consortium members are implementing partners (IPs), and the other three 
organisations are technical partners (TPs). The IPs organise and implement the project in the 
field, whereas TPs mainly provide additional knowledge support to the IPs. The project, funded 
by a European-based humanitarian donor, is implemented in five states/divisions in Myanmar: 
Ayeyarwady, Rakhine, Bago, Yangon and Sagaing. The present study followed the project in 
one state—Ayeyarwady Delta—where four consortium members worked together. The MR 
project aims to increase the resilience of costal and urban communities by institutionalising an 
inclusive DRR approach (Myanmar for Resilience, 2014). The ‘inclusive DRR approach’ of this 
                                               
24 Interview with a UN agency staff member, 17 October 2014 
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project refers to the engagement of women, disabled people, children and elderly people in the 
formulation and implementation of disaster management in their communities. 
Research for this chapter was conducted in two villages: Mangalar Thaung Tan Village and 
Aung Hlaing Village. Both villages are located in the outer ring Ayeyarwady Delta, an area that 
was heavily damaged by cyclone Nargis in 2008. It took 7 hours by bus from Yangon to reach 
Labutta (the capital of Ayeyarwady Delta) and an additional 6 hours by boat to reach the studied 
villages. Mangalar Thaung Tan Village has 1,400 inhabitants, and Aung Hlaing Village has a 
population of 2,000. As a coastal area, the majority of these communities’ livelihood comes from 
fishing and small-scale farming. During Nargis, approximately 27 people died in the village of 
Mangalar Thaung Tan. The storm also severely damaged boats, causing the livelihood of the 
community to reach a low point. When the cyclone hit the village, the community used their 
instincts to survive this severe disaster; most people ran to the hills to protect themselves from 
the cyclone. For days, inhabitants of the affected community members stayed in the forests until 
the rescue team from the government reached the villages. 
In 2014, the MR project was initiated in both villages. This project was carried out by one of 
MR IPs, with the support of gender and children expertise from two TPs. The interventions in the 
community took different forms, including training, simulations and campaigns. Training on 
community-based DRR aims to increase the capacity of men, women, boys and girls in 
communities and institutions by raising awareness about preparing for the impact of hazards and 
managing disaster risks (Myanmar for Resilience, 2014). During this process of community-
based DRR training, all elements of the community (i.e. men, women, children, elderly people 
and disabled people) participated in activities such as risk assessment, school-based DRR, 
childred-based DRR and women’s leadership for villages (Myanmar for Resilience, 2014). 
Based on the observations and interview with 36 respondents in both villages, this research 
noted three insights. First, the community responded to the MR project positively by 
acknowledging the importance of DRR knowledge transfer as a new set of survival skills for 
disasters. In the initial phase of the project, it was revealed that the community relied on local 
knowledge to deal with disaster. This includes knowledge about early warning and disaster 
response, such as (1) surviving by running to a higher place when disaster strikes; (2) storing 
food to prepare for disaster; (3) considering seagulls flying towards the mainland to be a storm 
warning; (4) seagulls moving to the mainland as a sign for abnormal weather; (5) understanding 
sounds echoing from large cliffs as an indication of strong winds; (6) noticing ants moving to 
higher ground and (g) using a black joint on a frog bone to predict the beginning of the rain. The 
community relied heavily on basic survival skills, with minimum knowledge of disaster 
preparedness. 
 
During Nargis, the water reached 3 feet. We ran to the coconut forest. But the water came through the 
forest. We stayed around one week in the forest. We only ate and drank coconuts. The government 
asked us to move to Labutta, but we said, ‘we love our land; we will stay here even if we have to die 
for it’. (interview with a male community member, 15 February 2015) 
 
After the intervention, the communities were able to identify a safe zone, perform first aid 
and prioritise vulnerable groups for rescue actions. The community also valued their new 
knowledge about early warning systems through the dissemination of information via radio and 
flags. 
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The experience and knowledge is extremely helpful. If the storm comes, we can reduce the loss of life 
more than before. This is all we can hope for; the training helps to save lives. As a fisherman, we 
were also trained on how to save our boat. (interview with a male community member, 15 February 
2015) 
 
Second, MR’s ‘Inclusive approach for DRR’ has contributed to the social capital of the 
community. Throughout the project, the participation of representatives from all groups, 
including women, elderly people, children and disabled people, was the main requirement for all 
of the project activities. This practice was acknowledged as something uncommon for the 
community: 
 
Having elderly people, women, children, youth and disabled people at the same forum is not a 
common practice in this village. (interview with a female community member, 15 February 2015) 
 
The community responded positively to the new idea of ‘inclusiveness’. Throughout the 
interviews and focus group discussions with the 36 respondents, almost all participants 
acknowledged the importance ‘DRR inclusiveness’ for improving the roles of community 
members. This approach brought the community together by bringing different elements of the 
community to the same forum. This included facilitating women, elderly people and disabled 
people to raise their voices. 
 
Since we work together, the older people give us [youth] space to play a role, such as to inform [the] 
community to come to the training and to provide early warnings. I also a part of the Village Disaster 
Management Committee in the information subcommittee. (interview with a male community 
member, age 14, 15 February 2015) 
 
We joined a training on Women’s Leadership and Empowerment. Women can work together with 
men. Now we can work together on the same level with men. In our mind-set, man is superior; I feel 
small because we were dependent on our husbands. Now I have become more confident. (interview 
with a female community member, age 57, 15 February 2015) 
 
This process contributes positively to building connectedness, institutionalising the inclusive 
approach through the Disaster Management Village Committees, establishing trust and 
facilitating reciprocity and exchange among community members. In communities with a long 
tradition of authoritarian control, having room for expression can indeed feel like a privilege. 
During the focus group discussions, I was surprised by the strong opinions and clear articulation 
from community members when they shared their feeling, positions and opinions. This voice 
could only appear when there is room for expression. 
Lastly, this research indicates that there is poor engagement from the local government in the 
MR project, including weak support for the programme and budget from the Union level down to 
the state/district, township and village levels. In interviews, three MR field staff members shared 
their views on the minimum participation of the government: 
 
The government only came when we invited them. Mostly, they come for a ceremonial event such as 
the event of DRR Day. They come for delivering [a] speech. (interview with a male member of the 
MR field staff, 16 February 2015) 
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From the government’s point of view, the reporting process from the NGOs to the 
government is often problematic. This leaves the government uninformed about the work of the 
NGOs. 
 
When NGOs come and work at the village/township level, the report [on the activity] often came 
late—like 3 months after the activities […] Some organisations do not let us know; sometimes they 
neglect […] If they come and give report to here […] we can help, it [the activity] can work more 
[…] can be more successful. (interview with a male Head of Township, 15 February 2015) 
 
This issue regarding NGOs’ reporting brought up by the township government is identical to 
the position of the RRD at the Union level. 
 
Every 4 months, we requested NGOs to send a report to us. Some NGOs send an uncompleted 
report. We need this report to check the budget control, in which 85% of their budget should go to the 
community. We have to check this commitment—whether every NGO reaches their budget. We also 
monitor their programme by coordinating with the region and township officials. (interview with a 
male RRD staff member, 11 December 2013) 
 
Further, an interview with the Head of Township (an upper-level administrative position) 
revealed that there are no specific DRR programmes from the township to the village. The 
township mostly refers to hardware (e.g. shelters, water reservoirs) instead of software (e.g. 
capacity building), in terms of DRR. 
 
We built five shelters so 1000 people can come in [when disaster strikes]. We also built a water 
reservoir. Last year [2014], the Vice President of Myanmar came to this township to raise awareness 
on disasters. We received logistic support [in preparation for disaster]. We have a Disaster 
Management Township Committee who we selected to sit in the function. (interview with a male 
Head of Township, 15 February 2015) 
 
When I asked about the interaction of the township with the higher levels of administration 
(district/state/Union), the respondents stated as follow:  
 
We come to the district level when they invite us for a training. We don’t have specific budget on 
DRR; the budget is owned by the district level [upper administration]. If we need budget, we send 
them [a] letter. (interview with a male Head of Township, 15 February 2015) 
 
Minimum coordination between the township and district was substantially weakened by the 
Myanmar’s heavily bureaucratic structure. The Head of Township explained the bottom-up 
approach in the formulation of the disaster management agenda: 
 
The development of the programme is bottom up. At the township level, they have to submit the work 
programme to the state government [regional level] and the head office [Union/national level]. We 
have the RRD sitting in every region/state. This office has to submit their programme to the ministries 
to ask for an advice. The ministries then send the programme to the respective government bodies 
[based on the relevancy] and to the President’s office. For the budget, we allocated the budget 
through the RRD at the state [region] level. From there, it is distributed to the district and township 
levels. (interview with a male Head of Township, 15 February 2015) 
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However, interviews with a township government officer and NGOs revealed that, in 
actuality, programme development and financial resources are absent at the township level. All 
of the budget appears to be managed at the district level. This has strengthened the argument that 
local government, as the frontline for disaster management, often faces significant challenges 
coming from limited of resources, such as a ‘lack of money, expertise or authority’ (Hannigan, 
2012: 24). 
The present study’s field research in Ayeyarwady Delta contributes to understanding the 
governance network in practice at the local level. In reality, the governance network mostly 
involves the interfaces among three actors: the state, NGOs and community. The reality in the 
field leads to the conclusion that the governance network is weak at the local level. Although the 
community and NGOs have established close connections through this project, the state remains 
disengaged. Poor DRR policy, lacking financial support and problematic authority have led to 
weak partnership interfaces. As a result, opportunities to scale up the inclusive approach are 
minimal. 
4.4. Conclusions 
This chapter examined the dynamics of disaster risk governance in the transition setting of 
Myanmar. Empirical evidence showed how the ongoing transition at the national level has taken 
place in different forms. First, the government has shown a commitment to the new practice of 
inclusiveness. Second, the governance network concerning DRR has taken shape through the 
government’s engagement in partnerships with the multi-stakeholder network. Third, advocacy 
channels are open and being used by non-state actors to influence the government. Fourth, roles 
are emerging in the governance network for local NGOs within the dominance of the UN 
agencies. Finally, the participatory approach to DRR has encouraged democracy from below 
when community members raise their voices to reduce disaster risk. 
Drawing upon empirical evidence, this chapter argues that the political transition has created 
a conducive environment for non-state actors to play a role in DRR across Myanmar. 
Government behaviour has shifted from that of a closed-minded regime to be more inclusive in 
engaging UN agencies, the Red Cross and NGOs. The involvement of these multiple actors in 
disaster management has slightly shifted practice in the field by moving away from a uni-centric 
approach towards a more pluricentric governance network. This is gradually generating a 
metaphoric space for non-state actors to articulate their policy-setting agendas. The active 
presence of the DRR WG and the participatory approach by NGOs at the community level 
provide clear evidence of this shift. 
However, in the context of this shifting governance, the government remains dominant. This 
reality is shown by the strong roles played by the government in the DRR WG, where the 
government remains influential, dominant and a determining force in the DRR arena. The 
government has the power to determine the agenda of the partnership by using its power to 
access resources and control. The RRD receives financial, technical and knowledge assistance 
from the DRR WG. The power relations among the actors involved in disaster risk governance 
are asymmetrical, keeping the government at the heart of the arena. The norm of a ‘centralistic’ 
government is yet to be relegated to history, leading to the conclusion that, although the 
government espouses a commitment to the governance network, in practice, they want to 
maintain their controlling position. This reality is contradictory to the spirit of the governance 
network in terms of advocating open, engaging and parallel partnerships. 
 Page | 104  
 
Finally, some critical points emerging from the field work also showed how the commitment 
and performance of the government has significantly influenced the governance network in 
practice in terms of DRR. The dynamics at the national and local levels contribute differently to 
this conclusion. At the national level, the heavily bureaucratic government and a high workload 
resulting from ongoing political changes have, to some extent, delayed the decision-making 
process. In this very structured setting, the predominant bureaucratic culture remains hierarchical 
and command-based. Meanwhile, at the local level, NGOs interventions in communities have 
promoted a new practice for decision making in the villages. After living under a government-
controlled system and being educated in a command culture, community members have 
acknowledged that NGOs have created room for expression, allowing for all community 
members to articulate their voice; increased equality among community members in the villages; 
and, especially, contributed actively to the decision-making process at the village level. This 
reveals how the engagement of NGOs in the community has been strongly developed. In 
contrast, for different reasons ranging from poor resources (knowledge and budget) to 
government distrust of NGOs, the government is not fully involved in the governance network 
regarding DRR at the local level. 
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Chapter 5 - Disaster Risk Reduction Platforms as Advocacy Networks in 
Indonesia and Myanmar 
 
Interactive governance has increasingly become common practice for disaster risk reduction 
(DRR). The idea behind this concept resonates with broader ideas about effective policy making, 
which have shifted from government-centred to also include non-state actors as crucial in the 
process. In many disaster-prone countries, platforms on DRR have developed to institutionalise 
the idea of interactive governance. Although recent academic work has offered interesting 
insights about the policy requisites for successful interactive governance, there is need for a field 
study that goes beyond a normative framework to explore the actual dynamics and interactions of 
multiple actors involved in DRR governance networks. This chapter aims to fill this gap by 
describing and analysing everyday realities of interactive governance through examining two 
different DRR platforms, one in Indonesia and one in Myanmar. The chapter focuses on the 
characteristics of the advocacy of the two DRR platforms: the Indonesian Alliance for the 
Revision of Disaster Management Law № 24/2007 and the Myanmar Consortium for DRR. Data 
were collected during six months of qualitative research in Jakarta, Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon. 
The findings showed that, in both countries, DRR platforms encountered significant internal 
hindrances related to the government’s commitment to interactive governance. The effectiveness 
and success of the platforms were also influenced by the wider advocacy environment in the 
country. This chapter concludes that interactive governance on DRR is only fruitful in settings 
where the government fully plays its role as part of the process of interactive governance. Poor 
political willingness on the part of the government to acknowledge and engage in this process 
makes the practice of collective action less effective and less influential. 
 
Keywords: interactive governance, governance network, agenda setting, advocacy, power relations 
 
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) governance networks were initially introduced almost 30 years 
ago, when the 1990s were designated as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 
(IDNDR). Previously, when DRR became part of the policy agenda in the 1970s, the paradigm 
of DRR was predominantly based on a hazard-oriented approach (Smith, 2013: 2). This type of 
approach heavily stressed the state’s capacity for disaster response through military operations 
(Oliver Smith, 2013: 2). In the 1970s, the United Nations (UN) Disaster Relief Office was 
developed to provide advice to governments in cases of disaster, without considering or 
mentioning the role of non-state actors. The dominance of the hazard paradigm gradually shifted 
towards a so-called ‘vulnerability approach’, which focused more on human capacity (Gaillard 
and Mercer, 2012: 94; Hagelsteen and Per Becker, 2012: 5). Following this shift, the 
involvement of non-state actors in DRR was increasingly acknowledged during the 1980s. UN 
Resolution Number 36/225 in 1981 recognised the role of the ‘International Committee of the 
Red Cross, the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and appropriate voluntary 
organizations’ in international relief systems (UN, 1981). This recognition significantly 
developed over the 1990s, when the IDNDR underlined the role of non-state actors, described as 
‘scientific and technology communities, humanitarian groups and investment institutions’, in 
terms of active involvement in global action for DRR (UNISDR, 2007). The resolution on 
IDNDR called upon UN member states to establish ‘national committees’ as a mechanism to 
gather government and non-state actors to participate in reducing the loss and disruption caused 
by natural disasters (UNISDR, 2007). The discourse on this kind of network was later re-framed 
 Page | 109  
 
in the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World (1994). This framework 
described ‘partnerships’ in which state and non-state stakeholders would work together in the 
spirit of ‘common interest and shared responsibilities’ (UNISDR, 2007). The Hyogo Framework 
for Action (2005) strengthened this idea by introducing a specific mechanism called ‘multi-
stakeholder platforms’ to frame collaboration between state and non-state actors on DRR. Most 
recently, the Sendai Framework for DRR 2015–2030 incorporated the collaboration of various 
stakeholders within the framework of ‘disaster risk governance’. 
Throughout these historical milestones, the institutionalisation of governance networks on 
DRR has not merely been a response towards the growing involvement of non-state actors in 
DRR. Instead, the commitment to institutionalising this collaborative work was inspired by the 
need to elevate the effectiveness of DRR by including both state and non-state actors. The UN 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) defined ‘multi-stakeholder platforms’ 
as an advocacy mechanism for DRR geared towards coordination, analysis and advice on areas 
of priority needing concerted action (Djalante, 2012: 2924). This platform, which this chapter 
refers to as a ‘governance network’, was expected to contribute to more effective management 
(UNISDR, 2013; Warner et al 2002: 2). Specifically, the report of the Hyogo Framework for 
Action claimed that multi-stakeholder platforms would contribute significantly to ‘integrating 
DRR into sustainable development policies and supporting less developed countries in 
implementing the HFA [Hyogo Framework for Action]’ (Djalante, 2012: 2924). It was also 
believed that this and other governance networks could stimulate learning and innovation 
(Djalante 2012: 2932; Warner 2007: 4). 
 UNISDR data indicate that around 93 national platforms on DRR had been developed 
worldwide as of in 2016 (PreventionWeb, 2017). This number does not include the many DRR 
networks that have taken different forms outside national platforms, such as the Multi-
stakeholder Forum for DRR, the National Committee for DRR and the DRR Working Group 
(DRR WG). 
Alongside the importance that policymakers and practitioners have placed on governance 
networks on DRR, academic interest in this concept has also grown. Several scholars have 
explored the principle of governance networks to gain an overarching understanding of disaster 
management networks in Asia. For instance, Djalante (2012) studied adaptive governance and 
multi-stakeholder platforms in Indonesia using a multi-stakeholder approach; Raju and Niekerk 
(2013) discussed multi-organisational coordination for disaster recovery in India; and Chui, Feng 
and Jordan (2014) used the same lens to explore advocacy coalition frameworks in the context of 
Taiwan’s policy changes. These authors have all related the principle of governance network to a 
disaster-related context in Asia. Djalante (2012: 2923) advocated the concept of adaptive 
governance as an ‘alternative’ in governing disaster management and placed multi-stakeholder 
platforms at the heart of this approach, arguing that multi-stakeholder platforms offer a way to 
manage problems with flexible and adjustable governance systems. Djalante (2012: 2932) 
elaborated on the complex setting of the governance network on DRR from global to local level 
and argued that networks could stimulate learning and innovation within DRR policy—an 
argument that was also made earlier by Warner (2007). Raju referred to ‘coordination structures’ 
to describe the network arena of disaster recovery. He argued that effective DRR politics 
requires clarity on rules, a willingness to coordinate, strong leadership and deliberative 
command. Finally, Chui, Feng and Jordan (2014) addressed pluricentric advocacy within the 
groundwork of ‘advocacy coalition framework[s].’ Throughout their study, Chui et al. argued 
 Page | 110  
 
that the success of advocacy through coalitions and alliances is mainly determined by the social 
engagement and common commitment among stakeholders to work on collective action. 
This existing work has offered scholars of governance some interesting insight on the 
requirements for successful interactive governance. However, the academic literature on 
governance networks on DRR still lacks a specific study on the internal dynamics among actors 
in DRR governance networks. Rather than merely knowing which prerequisites would offer an 
ideal, normative situation for effective DRR governance, we need to understand more about how 
DRR platforms actually work in practice. DRR governance networks are characterised by the 
interplay among various actors who have different backgrounds but have agreed to work together 
within the same platform. As such, DRR governance networks have often been accused of being 
too competitive, complex and uncoordinated (Djalante 2012: 2925; Raju and Niekerk 2013: 92). 
However, previous work has levied these criticisms based on normative frameworks of effective 
interactive governance, without sufficiently explaining the interplay between the macro level of 
system dynamics and the characteristics of advocacy movements. Djalante (2012: 2938) offered 
a rich explanation of the interplay between various multi-stakeholder platforms, highlighting 
‘participation, collaboration and learning/sharing space’ as key elements in disaster resilience. 
Meanwhile Raju and Niekerk (2013: 98) focused on the issue of coordinating inter-sectorial 
department functions to achieve ‘sustainable disaster recovery’. Later, Chui, Feng and Jordan 
(2014: 36) concluded that the success of an alliance’s advocacy framework is determined by 
‘social capital on participatory engagement’. Moving beyond the institutional setting of 
collective action on DRR and including the challenges encountered in this initiative, this chapter 
seeks to elaborate the internal dynamics within the governance network, including the different 
interests and opinions among actors within the wider political system. The chapter contributes to 
the literature by offering insight into the daily practices, problems and events that take place in 
two DRR platforms. The chapter is based on research conducted over several periods of 
fieldwork in two governance networks in Indonesia and Myanmar. Throughout the fieldwork, the 
interactions and advocacy processes of these platforms were traced, and both state and non-state 
actors were interviewed about their perceptions and experiences. 
Platforms in Indonesia and Myanmar were selected as the cases for this study for three main 
reasons. First, both countries are among the most at-risk for disaster, worldwide. The 2016 
World Risk Index, which ranked 171 countries according to their vulnerability to natural disaster 
(Africa News, 2016), placed Indonesia and Myanmar among the top five Southeast Asian 
countries most prone to natural hazards. 
Second, Indonesia and Myanmar offer clear examples of how natural disasters can serve as 
catalysts for policy transformation on disaster management. In both countries, the national 
governments became committed to introducing new policies, legal settings and institutional 
mechanisms following mega-disasters (the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia and cyclone Nargis in 
2008 in Myanmar). Third, in both countries, these transformations have generated the 
development of a DRR governance network. 
Beyond these commonalities, the two countries have distinct characteristics that complement 
each other. In Indonesia, the work of civil society on DRR has developed for over 13 years, 
beginning after the tsunami in Aceh offered momentum in 2004. In contrast, in Myanmar, the 
network of national nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) on DRR was only initiated in 2012. 
In the context of the wider political system, although Indonesia and Myanmar have both 
experienced political transitions from military-type regimes to more democratic governments, 
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the transition in Indonesia has brought significant changes in terms of freedom of expression and 
the distribution of power between central and local authorities. 
Taking Indonesia and Myanmar as case studies, this chapter attempts to answer the following 
questions: How has the idea of interactive governance, structured by the DRR governance 
network, played out in Indonesia and Myanmar? What explains the internal dynamics of the 
networks in terms of the advocacy agenda and modes? What crosscutting findings resonate for 
both cases? To what extent do the ideas and expectations about the positive impacts of 
interactive governance ring true? 
This chapter is structured into five sections. This first section has introduced the context of 
the cases. The second section briefly elaborates the concepts of interactive governance, power 
and advocacy, and explains how these concepts helped to trace the practice of DRR advocacy in 
this study. The concept of ‘interactive governance’ helps to explain the complex setting of DRR 
interaction, and the concepts of ‘power’ and ‘advocacy’ are useful for exploring the interaction 
dynamics occurring in the examined platforms. Finally, the concept of ‘system dynamics’ helps 
with picturing the advocacy process from the macro level. Next, the methodology used for data 
collection, analysis and processing is described in the third section. The fourth section presents 
the findings about how DRR advocacy in Indonesia and Myanmar developed after disasters and 
how this has resulted in specific DRR practices. Finally, the conclusion of the chapter connects 
the findings for the two cases with the literature on interactive governance. 
5.1. Theoretical frameworks 
5.1.1. Interactive governance 
The concept of governance has been used extensively in academic and policy work. 
Governance is a new way of governing by embracing non-state actors in policy processes (Ewalt 
et al., 2001: 1; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010: 590; Peters and Pierre, 1998: 224; 
Rhodes, 1996: 657; Stoker, 1998: 17). Governance challenges the traditional rules of political 
processes, which position the state as the core entity. In governance, the state is no longer 
acknowledged as the core power force; instead, a range of societal actors and their networks are 
considered to have power as well. A governance approach is pluricentric (Rhodes 1996: 657). 
Studying governance processes allows scholars to change the focus from state-led initiatives 
towards multi-actor involvement. This changes the locus and focus of governing by embracing 
new actors and new levels in the decision-making process (locus) and changing the rules of the 
game and steering mechanisms (focus) (van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010: 591). 
This research used the concept of interactive governance to operationalise the principle of 
inclusive DRR. Gaillard and Mercer (2012) clarified the concept of ‘inclusive DRR’, defining 
‘inclusiveness’ as a ‘a large array of stakeholders operating across different scales to collaborate’ 
(Gaillard and Mercer, 2012: 95). Adopting this definition, this chapter understands 
‘inclusiveness’ as the process of working through pluricentric mechanisms to reduce disaster 
risk. This chapter discusses the complex process, common objectives and decentred nature of 
interaction in networks through the lens of interactive governance (Torfing et al., 2012: 14–15). 
This chapter uses the lens of ‘governance network’ to analyse the practice of interactive 
governance. Governance network is one of the typical forms of arrangement for interactive 
governance (Torfing et al., 2012: 16). It emphasises the work of multiple actors who act 
autonomously but relate interdependently in the ‘institutionalised framework’ of the policy-
making process (Torfing et al., 2012: 16). 
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5.1.2. Advocacy 
The notion of advocacy politics revolves around the idea of providing policy input by 
‘advocating alternative programs, procedures, and political systems’ (Kerkvliet, 2009: 232). It is 
‘a game of persuasion and bargaining of interests’ (Constantinou, 2013: 148) to influence 
‘actors, systems, structures and ideas’ (Edwards, 1993: 164). In the literature on advocacy, the 
concept of ‘influence’ is seen as a key aspect of the advocacy process, and this concept has been 
presented in various academic work (Almog-Bar and Schmid, 2014; Anderson, 2010; Barrett, 
van Wessel and Hilhorst, 2016; Ospina and Saz-Carranza, 2010; Stone, 2004; Teles and Schmitt, 
2011). ‘Influence’ has been described as ‘affecting the decision through some form of external 
pressure’ (Heywood, 2004: 52). This process is regarded as deeply crucial for advocacy because 
it is expected to lead to the creation of change and transformation of ‘the legal, political and 
social conditions’ (Barrett, Wessel and Hilhorst, 2016: 9).  
The practice of advocacy is often framed as an ‘open, direct and concerted’ approach 
(Kerkvliet, 2009: 232). Barrett, van Wessel and Hilhorst (2016) defined advocacy for 
development as aiming to create ‘sustainable changes in public and political contexts’ (Barrett, 
van Wessel and Hilhorst, 2016: 15). A theoretical review of advocacy highlights three effective 
advocacy modes: campaigns, high-level lobby and public strategies. Advocacy work is also 
performed in other various ways, such as ‘awareness raising, legal actions and public education, 
as well as building networks, relationships and capacity’ (Barrett, van Wessel and Hilhorst, 
2016: 15). 
In attempting to trace and analyse the advocacy process in two governance networks of DRR 
in Indonesia and Myanmar, the present study adopted the typology of advocacy activities 
developed by Barrett, van Wessel and Hilhorst (2016). This model includes 10 types of advocacy 
activities: (1) strategy development and planning; (2) relationship building and maintaining; (3) 
capacity building; (4) content development; (5) information-centred activities; (6) insider 
advocacy communication; (7) outsider advocacy communication; (8) participation in multi-
stakeholder processes; (9) monitoring mechanisms; and (10) using legal and grievances 
mechanisms (Barrett, van Wessel and Hilhorst, 2016: 20–21). This chapter classifies the 
advocacy processes performed by both networks according to this typology. 
In addition, the chapter also incorporates an analysis of the macro level of the political 
environment in the two examined countries. Advocacy outcomes are shaped by the internal 
aspects of the network and by the broader setting in which the network operates. In this context, 
whether a political system is democratic or authoritarian will tend to influence the dynamics of 
the advocacy movement—what advocates can and cannot do, how far their influence reaches, 
and the methods they can use to set their agenda and reach their goals. In the academic literature, 
the environment surrounding the advocacy process is known as ‘system dynamics’, referring to 
‘dynamics in the government, the economy and international institutions’ as well as 
‘developments like conflicts and natural disasters’ (Barrett, van Wessel and Hilhorst, 2016: 9). 
System dynamics can create room for manoeuvre or generate hurdles for advocacy, resulting in 
an uncertain process (Barrett, van Wessel and Hilhorst, 2016: 9). Taking this into account, it 
becomes clear that an analysis of advocacy processes in DRR governance networks would not be 
complete without a discussion of the system dynamics operating in the country. 
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5.2. Methodology 
This research used qualitative methods for data collection, processing and analysis. 
Qualitative research aims to describe complex interactions between different stakeholders. The 
underpinning philosophy of qualitative research relies on the essence of experiences, meanings 
and perceptions to acquire knowledge (Kumar, 2005: 38). Case studies, in particular, are used as 
a method to gain holistic and in-depth knowledge (Tellis, 1997: 3). Indonesia and Myanmar were 
selected for this study to bring together two cases on the same theoretical grounds. Considering 
both of these cases enabled the present study to generate comparative explanations, explore 
causal relations and contextualise distinctions (Lancaster and Montinola, 1997: 186). 
Data on Indonesia were collected during four months of fieldwork in Jakarta (November–
December 2015). Interviews were organised with nine government officials, one Indonesian 
national platform (Platform Nasional, PLANAS) and eight NGO staff members on the task force 
of the Alliance for Strengthening Disaster Management Law in Indonesia. 
In Myanmar, field research was conducted in Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon over a four-month 
period, including a preliminary research trip in December 2013, three months of fieldwork from 
September to November 2014 and a short follow-up trip in February 2015. The research was 
designed to study the dynamics of the Myanmar Consortium for DRR (MCDRR). I interviewed 
17 individuals working for nine national NGOs. I also engaged in an internship programme at a 
UN agency that was a member of the DRR WG, an active DRR multi-stakeholder platform 
working to develop and deliver policy recommendations to the agency. These recommendations 
were used to propose a plan of action to improve disaster risk governance in Myanmar. 
The fieldwork was combined with analyses of policy documents, academic literature and 
political reports relevant for the themes of civil society, advocacy and DRR in Indonesia and 
Myanmar. The section below begins with a brief analysis of the history and development of civil 
society and advocacy networks in Indonesia and Myanmar, before presenting the findings from 
the fieldwork regarding the workings of networks. 
5.3. Results and analysis 
5.3.1. Civil society in Indonesia and Myanmar 
5.3.1.1. Indonesia 
The initial development of Indonesian civil society can be traced back to the 1920s (Cleary, 
1997: 14). Large organisations associated with religious affiliations were established to serve the 
community in need, especially in the sectors of education and healthcare. Public social welfare 
organisations aimed to fill the gap between the objective of the government programme and the 
needs of the vulnerable population (Carey, 1997: 14). However, civil society in Indonesia 
entered a dark period when the country’s second president, Soeharto, came to power in the mid-
1960s. Significant limitations to advocacy access and severe suspicion from the government 
restricted the movement of civil society. Under the Soeharto administration, civil society had a 
challenging relationship with the government. Civil society was framed as ‘potentially 
destabilising political forces and might mask political agitation’ (Cleary, 1997: 14–15). The 
government later developed laws and regulations to limit civil society’s room for manoeuvre, 
including Law № 8 about mass organisation in 1985, which established the role of the 
government as the advisor for the work of mass organisations (Hanapiah, 2001: 13). 
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The advocacy environment drastically changed with the momentum of political reform in 
1998. In Indonesian history, 1998 is a stepping stone for Indonesian democracy. The year 
marked the start of Indonesian political reform (Reformasi), when massive student 
demonstrations pushed Soeharto to step down from his 32-year presidency. This was the 
beginning of the reform process in Indonesian politics, including a drive for freedom of 
expression. The Reformasi inspired the amendment of Indonesia’s constitution, especially 
regarding Article № 28 on the freedom to unite and gather and express one’s voice through both 
oral and written communication (Hanapiah, 2001: 13). The government also positioned itself as a 
‘partner’ in achieving development goals, acknowledging the role of civil society to keep the 
government in check (Hanapiah, 2001: 14) 
This new era has inspired the growth of civil society in almost all sectors, including law 
enforcement, healthcare, the environment and disaster management. In the specific context of 
DRR, the 2004 tsunami spurred major developments in the disaster management agenda, 
including the development of a specific body to address disaster management, the Indonesian 
National Agency for Disaster Management (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, BNPB), 
and the emergence of civil society engagement on disaster management. Indonesia currently 
enjoys the active engagement of civil society in disaster management advocacy, where various 
multi-stakeholder platforms were established independently in the years following the tsunami 
(i.e. PLANAS, Indonesian Civil Society for Disaster Management [Masyarakat Peduli Bencana 
Indonesia, MPBI], Indonesian Expertise on Disaster Management [Ikatan Ahli Bencana 
Indonesia, IABI], the University Forum [Forum Universitas], the Regional DRR Forum [Forum 
Peduli Bencana Daerah], and the Village DRR Forum [Forum Peduli Bencana Desa]). 
Given the above developments, it can be concluded that the advocacy environment in 
Indonesia tends to work to the advantage of the civil society movement. First, a clear legal 
framework in Indonesia’s constitution guarantees the legality of activities related to freedom of 
expression or freedom to unite and gather. Second, the government has politically acknowledged 
both the existence of civil society and the role of this movement to keep the government in 
check. Third, civil society in Indonesia has developed rapidly since 1998 in multiple sectors, 
such as the environment, law enforcement and DRR. As a new force in Indonesian democracy, 
civil society, often working as alliances of NGOs, aims to influence the decision-making process, 
including acting as a pressure group to have an impact on law making. To shed light on this 
process, below, this chapter examines as a case the work of an alliance to push for revision to 
Indonesian Disaster Management Law № 24 in 2007. 
5.3.1.2. Myanmar 
The civil society movement in Myanmar has a long tradition and history. Prior to the 
country’s independence in 1948, civil society in Myanmar began with religious organisations 
aiming to provide social services to the community (ADB, 2015; Petrie and South, 2014: 87). 
The emergence of these organisations, often called ‘Sangha’, marked the beginning of the civil 
society sector in the country. Sangha and other forms of civil society organisations developed on 
a large scale until 1962 (ADB, 2015). In 1962, a ‘dark era’ for civil society in Myanmar began, 
as the government rigidly controlled the activities of the movement. This situation lasted until 
2010, when the breakthrough of political changes included the roadmap to democracy, the 
adoption of a new constitution and the semi-authoritarian regime’s creation of more space for 
civil society. Since then, civil society, which ‘does not exist in Burmese terminology’ (Steinberg, 
2001: 101), has developed its role in advocacy. In a publication brief, the Asian Development 
Bank classified civil society in Myanmar into three categories: community-based organisations, 
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local NGOs and international NGOs. The community-based organisations developed at the 
village level and work extensively on social activities with a non-profit orientation. Local and 
international NGOs have formal and systematic organisational set-ups and are registered with the 
government (ADB, 2015).  
In the DRR context, the government now works closely with an active multi-stakeholder 
platform, the DRR WG. In contrast to the Indonesian case, the DRR WG in Myanmar is 
predominantly driven by international organisations/NGOs. The DRR WG is a multi-stakeholder 
network consisting of 49 members, including UN agencies, international and local NGOs and 
independent consultants. This network plays an active role in DRR advocacy in the country. In 
addition to the DRR WG, MCDRR was established as a platform of national NGOs working on 
DRR in 2012. MCDRR is a local consortium that focuses on DRR and climate change, with the 
purpose of supporting local organisations in ‘coordinating, networking and information sharing 
related to DRR at all levels’ (MCDRR, 2015). 
Myanmar’s political transition towards being a more substantially democratic country seems 
to have opened ‘Pandora’s Box’, as Myanmar must face serious issues resulting from spending 
three decades under a controlling, centralistic and isolated regime. Issues related to economic 
development, fiscal priorities, the absence of the rule of law, human rights abuses, media control, 
environmental degradation and the high-risk of disaster (Gravers and Ytzen, 2014: 1; Myint-U, 
2012: 26; Skidmore and Wilson, 2012: 13) have to be confronted alongside the transition 
process. In fact, despite the ongoing reform, the country still has many characteristics of ‘an 
authoritarian, “top-down” society’, including a ‘lack of transparency’ (Skidmore and Wilson, 
2012: 10–11). 
The political changes in Myanmar were expected to lift the restriction on freedom of 
expression. In line with this expectation, the administration of Than Shein (2011–2015) 
gradually released political prisoners and created space for expression for civil society. Aung San 
Su Kyi, the leader of the National League for Democracy, the winning party, stated that the era 
of ‘punishment for speaking out’ had ended (The Guardian, 2017). In a great deal of academic 
literature, civil society in Myanmar was projected to play a significant role by creating a bottom-
up approach to the political transition and building an arena where people’s voices could be 
heard (Petrie and South, 2014: 87; Steinberg, 2001: 101).  
However, despite these high expectations, the reality on the ground showed a very different 
outcome. Human Rights Watch addressed the architecture of the law in Myanmar, reporting on 
continued threats to freedom of expression (Reuters, 2016). One of the controversial laws 
banning freedom of speech is the Peaceful Assembly Law, which is often used to justify taking 
action against protesters and demonstrators (Reuters, 2016). Although this law was amended by 
parliament in 2014, it maintained the article on the ‘sentence of demonstrators and protesters’ 
(ADB, 2015). This also includes an article on the government’s right to deny permission to 
demonstrations potentially affecting ‘the country, race or religious relations, human dignity, or 
moral principles’ (ADB, 2015). The position of Aung San Suu Kyi on this subject was later 
questioned when, under her administration, the government imprisoned 38 people, including 
Myo Yan Naung Thein, the secretary of the ruling party’s central research committee, for 
criticising the Chief of Military for the intervention made in Rakhine (Asian Correspondent, 
2016). 
Clearly, the political changes in Myanmar have not completely removed the limitations on 
the civil society movement. The disincentives regulation—including the arrest of high-ranking 
government officials for criticising military action—is a negative precedent for the freedom of 
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expression. This has further confirmed the strong power of the military in today’s transitional 
Myanmar. 
This raises questions regarding how civil society plays their role on DRR in this changing 
political environment. To what extent does DRR civil society define their movement in the midst 
of the pro-active roles of the UN and international NGOs in Myanmar? How do these dynamics 
compare with the Indonesian situation? After elaborating on the Indonesian case in the next 
section, this chapter presents the analysis of the role of MCDRR as the manifestation of 
emerging civil society in Myanmar. 
5.3.2. Indonesia: Alliance for the Revision of the Disaster Management Law 
For the Indonesian case, the analysis of DRR civil society focuses on the advocacy efforts of 
the Alliance for the Revision of Disaster Management Law № 24/2007 (hereafter referred to as 
the alliance). Law № 24/2007 was enacted by the Indonesian House of Representatives (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat) to protect the lives and livelihoods of Indonesian people from severe disaster 
outbreaks. This law created the architecture of the disaster management system in Indonesia by 
regulating the authority, responsibilities, institutions and partnerships within the system. The 
initiative to pursue legislative advocacy was driven by the alliance’s severe criticism of the 
weakness of the law. An interview with a staff member of one of the NGO alliance members 
revealed this weakness: 
 
Law Number 24/2007 was not communicated well to the local level. The component of capacity was 
not included in the definition of disaster […] and if we look closer, there is a perception that the law 
belongs to BNPB; it made others feel that they do not own the law. Since the start, we already knew 
that there are problems. The fundamental problem was that the development of this law was 
undertaken by the technocrat. (interview with a male NGO staff member, 1 November 2015) 
 
MPBI, as the initiator of the alliance, began the advocacy campaign by raising the issue to 
parliament in 2012. PLANAS, the national multi-stakeholder platform, decided to join this 
initiative as a way to engage with a wider element of stakeholders in their advocacy work. In 
practice, the alliance organised themselves into several task forces aiming to deeply improve the 
substance of the law. From interviews and an analysis of policy documents, it became clear that, 
in the initial stages of this advocacy, the alliance formed five working groups with the aim of 
gaining in-depth understanding of the developing problems, solutions and recommendations for 
the proposed legal revision. These five working groups covered issues of the institutional setting, 
partnerships, public participation, financing and accountability. Each of the working groups 
formulated input for a report that served as the foundation for lobbying parliament. 
To gain an understanding of the main reasons behind the advocacy process of the alliance, 
seven interviews were conducted with individuals working in seven different organisations that 
were members of the alliance. These organisations were the main players in the movement 
across many contexts: the organisations in charge of the task forces (the Indonesian Red Cross 
[Palang Merah Indonesia], PLANAS, and Dompet Dhuafa), the initiator of the revision (MPBI), 
a representative of the NGOs Consortium (Humanitarian Forum Indonesia), a mass organisation 
representative (Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center) and an academic organisation 
representative (IABI). Four of these seven respondents worked for multi-stakeholder 
organisations: 
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 PLANAS      Government–public–private platform  
 MPBI      Professional-based  
 IABI      Academic 
 Humanitarian Forum Indonesia   NGO consortium  
 
This section summarises these respondents’ concerns with the law, as well as their attempts 
to have the law revised. From the interviews with staff members, it appeared that there were at 
least four key issues related to the demanded changes. The first involved the institutional setting 
of disaster management. Second was the definition and context of disaster. The third issue was 
emergency response status, and the fourth issue identified was public participation. The 
following paragraphs elaborate the rationale behind the desired revision of the law. 
First, the agenda of ‘institutional strengthening’ was strongly expressed by the alliance as one 
of the problems with the law. The law only governed the institution setting and authority 
mandate within the disaster management system. In Article 5, the law mandated the central and 
regional governments to share responsibility and authority for disaster management. At the 
national level, BNPB was established to perform several duties such as providing guidance, 
direction, standards and requirements for disaster management (Article 12). BNPB was to be 
supervised directly by the president, as an organisation equal in level to the ministries. At the 
provincial and regional/municipality levels, the law tasked the Regional Disaster Management 
Authority (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah, BPBD) with taking responsibility for 
disaster management at the local level (Article 18). Almost all of the respondents expressed the 
agenda of ‘institutional strengthening’ as crucial for revising the law. The organisational 
structure established by the law meant that BNPB and BPBD were connected only by a 
‘coordination line’ instead of a ‘command line’. Contradictory to the initial aim of achieving 
effective DRR through decentralisation, in practice, tensions between BNPB and BPBD were 
often a challenge. The issues of BNPB’s roles, the lacking authority line between BNPB and 
BPBD and a ‘super body’ council of disaster management seemed to be the critical concerns for 
the alliance. 
BPBD representatives spoke of ‘decentralised disaster risk governance’ in a negative tone, 
citing the lack of budget, human resources and capacity as factors hampering their work in the 
region. However, the government had different interests in terms of the revision initiative. 
Interviews with high-level officers from two government bodies (BNPB and the Coordinating 
Ministry on Human Development and Culture) revealed that neither of these bodies strongly 
expressed the ‘institutional setting’ agenda as major problems to be addressed. Law № 24/2007 
only established BNPB and BPBD as government bodies to work specifically for disaster 
management; the roles of other ministries involved was not clarified. As such, the law created 
misinterpretation among the ministries regarding DRR-related issues. 
 
Civil society proposes the establishment of a Disaster Management Council under the coordination of 
the president or vice president. That would mean that BNPB is dismissed of its organisational 
function, which is coordination. Coordination should lie with other parties with more political power. 
(interview with a male NGO staff member, 1 November 2015) 
 
An interview with a high-level officer representing BNPB in the discussion of the revision to 
this law revealed a common position coming from the government, although this was mostly 
expressed in indirect and subtle ways: 
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Ideally, the Disaster Management Council is chaired by the vice president or president so it can be 
powerful; it would move the ministries. It’s impossible for us [BNPB], who have the same level [as 
the ministries], to coordinate other ministries. Ministers are responsible to the president, and not to us, 
so the assignment supposedly comes from the president and not from us. These difficulties [with 
coordination] are becoming a psychological burden for us. (interview with a male high-level BNPB 
officer, 2 November 2015) 
 
Second, the alliance criticised the definition of ‘disaster’ conveyed in Law № 24/2007. In the 
Indonesian Law on Disaster Management, the concept of ‘disaster’ is understood much more 
through a hazard lens than as vulnerability-caused. This definition focuses narrowly on the 
aspect of ‘events’ and ‘impacts’, with limited discussion of the causes of disaster (hazard-based 
only). The alliance aimed to expand this definition by incorporating the components of ‘capacity’ 
and ‘community’ into the frame. The alliance often referred to the UNISDR definition of disaster 
as the benchmark for developing an understanding of the comprehensive meaning and context of 
disaster. UNISDR promotes three elements in their definition: (1) Disaster events are specifically 
framed as ‘serious disruptions’; (2) the causes of disaster are driven by hazards, exposure, 
vulnerability and capacity; and (3) the impacts of disaster include human, material and 
environmental effects (UNISDR, 2007). The alliance projected a strong and resilient village as 
the baseline for empowering community capacity: 
 
Like the construction of a house, the foundation of the house should be stronger than the other 
elements above it. We would like to build a resilient nation through resilient villages. (interview with 
a male representative of an organisational alliance member, 3 November 2015) 
 
A third criticism of the law related to issues of the incoherency of DRR-related legal 
frameworks in Indonesia. At one of the observed panels held at the national event on DRR Day 
2015, a member of the alliance claimed that Indonesia is a ‘country with one of the most 
comprehensive DRR-related laws in the world’25 but that each law was developed as a 
standalone legal framework, with insufficient coherence with the other laws. This alliance 
member was referring to the fact that there are four major DRR-related laws in Indonesia (see 
Table 4): 
 
(1) Disaster Management Law № 24/2007; 
(2) Environment Law № 32/2009; 
(3) Spatial Planning Law № 26/2007; and 
(4) Local Government Law № 23/2014 
 
As this alliance member suggested, these four laws lack coherence; in fact, they often go 
against each other. For instance, Environment Law № 32/2009 scarcely mentions DRR as a 
modality for the development of the National Plan on Environmental Protection and 
Management (Rencana Perlindungan dan Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup). Disaster mitigation 
was incorporated in Spatial Planning Law № 26/2007, but priority action on management for 
disaster-prone areas was missing from the law. This meant that it was still difficult to implement. 
As a final example, Local Government Law № 23/2014 expresses no commitment to address 
DRR mainstreaming in local administration. This goes against the mandate of the Law № 
                                               
25 Interview with a male representative of an organisational alliance member, 4 November 2016 
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24/2007, which states that, during periods without disaster, disaster management should include 
disaster management planning, DRR, prevention, integration into development planning, disaster 
risk analysis, spatial structure planning, education and training, and technical standard 
requirements (Article 35). 
 
Table 4. DRR-related legal frameworks 
Environment Law № 32/2009 
 
Missing DRR agenda on Environment 
Law 
 
Spatial Planning Law № 26/2007 
 
Poor synergy on the issue of disaster 
management for disaster-prone areas 
 
Local Government Law № 23/2014 
 
Insufficient attention to DRR 
mainstreaming for local government 
 
 
The fourth commonly heard criticism of the law expressed by the informants is related to the 
declaration of emergency status. In many cases of major disaster events in Indonesia, the debate 
on the declaration of emergency status arises, with policymakers arguing both against and for 
making this declaration. There are various reasons why this issue was mentioned as a serious 
problem requiring revision of the law. First, declaring emergency status determines the structural 
command in terms of the ‘organisation in charge’ of disaster response. In a situation when a 
major disaster occurs and the scale of casualties is high, the government tends to declare the 
situation a ‘national disaster.’ As a consequence, BNPB is put in charge as the central command 
on the emergency response and rehabilitation. This status enables the government to access the 
so-called ‘on-call budget’ with the minimum procedures in the process of making the request, 
conducting procurement without open tender, and mobilising human resources and equipment to 
support local governments. An alliance member reflected on the debate on emergency status in a 
jokingly manner: ‘In a normal situation, we want decentralisation [on disaster management], but 
during an emergency, we want centralisation’.26 This opinion was widely shared by other civil 
society representatives. For these respondents, disaster management should place local 
government at the frontline. 
 
We have to be grateful that we have the strong BNPB, but with the power of BNPB, which tends to 
be centralised, the capacity of the provincial and regency levels is reducing, so when disaster strikes, 
they ask to declare a national emergency […] Ideally, [we] have to be strong at the bottom level […] 
That would be an asset […] Volunteers have to be in the bottom, not at the top level […] We want to 
have a strong foundation […] and with the metaphor of a house, the foundation of a house is always 
placed at the bottom. (interview with a male representative of an organisational alliance member, 3 
November 2015) 
  
During the inception period of this initiative to revise the Law on Disaster Management, the 
government decided to remain outside the discussion and leave the alliance to lead the process. A 
high-level BNPB officer used the word ‘guarding’ to describe the government’s role in the 
                                               
26 Statement made by a male alliance member on Indonesian DRR Day, 26 October 2015 
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process. The government would only become engaged when the House of Representatives 
invited them for a hearing upon the approval of the initiative by the National Legislation 
Programme (Program Legislatif Nasional, PROLEGNAS). PROLEGNAS is the parliamentary 
instrument to determine the priority of drafting legislation. However, interviews with high-level 
BNPB and Coordinating Ministry on Human Development and Culture staff revealed the 
position of the government towards the law. The government’s priorities were slightly different 
from the agenda of the alliance. The government acknowledged that the law needed to be 
enhanced because it was developed hastily.
27
 As key concerns for the revision of the law, the 
government underscored the issues of the definition of disaster, financing DRR and 
decentralisation. On the point of the definition of disaster, the government sought to integrate the 
component of ‘community capacity’: 
 
The definition of disaster in the existing law is hard to understand. The component of ‘community’ is 
gone [from the clausal definition]. Our vision is a resilient community. From the existing law, it 
seems the potential to empower the community is gone, and all the responsibility rests on the central 
government. This existing clausal [definition] does not teach the community and local government to 
be responsible when disaster happens […] In this decentralised era, they [the local government] have 
to take responsibility, not ask us [the central government]; we would not be able to do it. (interview 
with a male high-level BNPB officer, 2 November 2015) 
 
This interview supports the idea that the central government articulates decentralisation 
relatively strongly, compared with the local government. This idea was also supported by the 
government’s concerns about financing DRR and emergency status. Specifically, BNPB 
demanded that local government take responsibility and will seriously consider their request to 
declare national emergency status. Consequently, after this status is declared, the command and 
resource mobilisation will be taken over by the central government. As for the financing of DRR, 
the government sought further partnerships with non-state actors so that the main source for 
DRR funding would not be the National Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Nasional) 
alone. 
From the interviews with representatives of the alliance and different government bodies, it 
appeared that the two sets of actors have different frameworks. Although both types of actors 
commonly agreed to embrace community capacity and local actors as the frontline on DRR, the 
perceptions driving this agenda were distinct. The alliance was highly concerned with the issues 
of institutional strengthening, community capacity and resource mobilisation as a way to build 
resilient villages from below, whereas the government framed this agenda within the context of 
responsibility sharing among central government, local government and community. The alliance 
saw disaster in terms of ‘capacity’, whereas the government used the word ‘responsibility’. This 
difference in ‘seeing’ would determine the subsequent action taken by each actor (Bankoff and 
Hilhorst, 2009: 2). For instance, in their strategic plan for 2015–2019, BNPB positioned 
improving local capacity (in this context, the local government) (point 1.1) above the goal of 
enhancing community capacity (point 1.2) (BNPB, 2015). Four of BNPB’s six strategy priorities 
for achieving their vision of resilient communities were related to governance issues on disaster 
management, such as surge capacity (point 2), logistic governance (point 4), capacity of service 
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November 2015 
 Page | 121  
 
and work performance (point 5) and accountability (point 6). Meanwhile, the improvement of 
community capacity and local institutions resonated highly with the work of the alliance. 
For the purpose of achieving the optimum goal of advocacy and thus solving, or at least 
lessening the five concerns mentioned above, the alliance identified three different channels of 
advocacy: media exposure, public campaigning and lobby. By using these three advocacy 
strategies, the alliance members hoped to reach diverse audiences. Regarding media exposure, 
the alliance used different media platforms, such as mass media, online platforms and the 
‘disaster channel’ (the Indonesian news portal for DRR initiated by PLANAS, TEMPO [a well-
known Indonesian newspaper] and the Indonesian Agency for the Assessment and Application of 
Technology [Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi]). Through these platforms, the 
alliance shared press releases and published their agenda for public discussion to raise public 
awareness on this topic. 
In terms of public campaigning, the alliance organised a public forum to share and discuss 
their list of problems, as well as their recommendations for the legislative revision. In 2015, the 
alliance even organised a special panel on ‘Strengthening Disaster Management Law № 
24/2007’ at the 2015 DRR Day event held by BNPB in Solo, Central Java. On the panel were 
members of MPBI, Palang Merah Indonesia, the International Federation of the Red Cross and 
representatives from the private sector. 
The third advocacy strategy used by different members of the alliance was lobby to ensure a 
profound connection to parliament. The process of lobbying parliament and the senate was 
crucially important to target Law № 24/2007 as part of the PROLEGNAS. The integration of the 
revision of this law into the PROLEGNAS was crucial for this advocacy process because the 
House of Representatives would only discuss legislation listed on the PROLEGNAS. A staff 
member of the Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center—one of the largest Muslim mass 
organisations in Indonesia—expressed in an interview how a personal approach is enormously 
beneficial to the lobby of parliament: 
 
One of the positive sides of being a mass organisation is we have strong political power. The Chair of 
Commission VIII [BNPB’s partner in the parliament] comes from Muhammadiyah. He used to be the 
head of Youth Muhammadiyah [Pemuda Muhammadiyah], and we also have contact with a member 
of the Indonesian House of Regional Representatives [Dewan Pertimbangan Daerah, DPD]. He is a 
member of the legal drafting commission in the DPD. I have arranged an appointment with him to 
decide when we [the alliance] can have a meeting with DPD. (interview with a male representative of 
an organisational alliance member, 4 November 2015) 
5.3.3. The Myanmar Consortium for DRR: Emerging national NGOs  
The development of MCDRR began in 2012 as an initiative to organise local NGOs for 
DRR. On their website, MCDRR defined themselves as ‘a consortium for local people on DRR 
distinct to other DRR networks’ (MCDRR, 2015). The consortium further framed themselves as 
‘a local consortium focused on DRR and Climate Change with the purpose to support local 
organisations in coordinating, networking and information sharing related to DRR at all levels’ 
(MCDRR, 2015). The word ‘local’ seemingly became a modality for MCDRR to position 
themselves among the various actors on DRR in Myanmar. It was strongly implied in many 
MCDRR documents, for instance, the ‘Strategic Plan of MCDRR 2015–2030’, where they 
framed themselves as the ‘copious voice of local people, a consortium distinct from other DRR 
efforts in the country’ (MCDRR, 2015). 
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Slightly different from the approach taken in Indonesia, for the case of Myanmar, this study 
did not follow any specific advocacy activities conducted by MCDRR because there was no 
particular ongoing advocacy process being implemented by this organisation during the research 
period. Therefore, this section emphasises the general characteristics of MCDRR as a DRR 
platform in Myanmar. 
The field research showed that MCDRR’s advocacy work had six characteristics. First and 
most interestingly, the consortium membership was dominated by NGOs with fewer than 10 
years of experience. In 2015, there were 25 local NGOs registered as members of MCDRR 
(MCDRR, 2015). Of these organisations, it appeared that approximately 68% were established 
after cyclone Nargis. This shows how MCDRR became a vehicle for emerging NGOs’ work on 
DRR. 
 
Civil society organisations here are just at the initial stage—the infant stage, like a toddler stage. We 
didn’t have any chance to form a group. It was forbidden. You could not gather more than five 
persons in town. This happened for many years. Then the civil society organisation started, so they 
are not that mature; they don’t know their role. (interview with a male MCDRR member, 16 
December 2015) 
 
Second, the interplay between different DRR national platforms in Myanmar has taken shape 
the dynamics of interactive governance in the country. As an emerging national platform with 
relatively inexperienced organisational members, MCDRR worked collaboratively with the DRR 
WG, a long-standing and active DRR platform. Developed in 2008 as a response to Nargis, the 
group consists of multiple actors including international organisations (UN agencies), 
international NGOs, professionals and academics. Almost all of the members of MCDRR are 
also associated with the DRR WG. The lead organisation of MCDRR is also in charge of the 
DRR WG’s Task Force for Local NGO Strengthening. The DRR WG is more connected with the 
government than is MCDRR, as the DRR WG has worked as a strategic partner of the 
government since its establishment. On many occasions, the government has requested the DRR 
WG to jointly develop a policy paper (i.e. a monitoring report for the Hyogo Framework for 
Action, preparation for the Sendai Framework for Action). The DRR WG has also organised joint 
campaigns and activities (i.e. the International Day for DRR, training, workshops) and provided 
financial support for government programmes (i.e. the International Day for DRR). The DRR 
WG is influential at many levels mainly because of the role of its members—reputable 
organisations with strong funding resources, highly trained and skilled staff members, and 
extensive international networks. These characteristics give the DRR WG positional power vis-à-
vis the government. Because of its strong power, the DRR WG’s work has influenced the 
discourse and agenda-setting on DRR in Myanmar. This can be seen in sharp contrast to 
MCDRR, which has to struggle with constant challenges such as insufficient capacity to 
communicate in English, a lack of confidence, a different communication culture (trained by 
command-structure to be passive) and poor resource capacity (Srikandini, forthcoming). 
Third, the government and MCDRR shared the common goal of creating resilient 
communities. They agreed to invest in the improvement of community capacity through 
community-based DRR. However, the two actors had different points of emphasis for achieving 
this goal. An interview with a high-ranking officer in the Department of Relief and Resettlement 
(RRD) revealed that the government highlighted the importance of training to build community 
capacity: 
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We conduct the training for CBDRR. We choose the area. The elders of the village and the 
community leader will join the CBDRM programme. We use simulation [and] group work. We use 
the simulation exercise for flood and cyclone. We contact the union ministries, development agencies, 
UN agencies [and] international NGOs. (interview with a male high-ranking RRD officer, 11 
December 2013) 
 
MCDRR’s vision to achieve the outcome that ‘all communities and cities in Myanmar are 
resilient to and overcome climate and other hazards’ (MCDRR, 2015) was broken down into 
their organisational objectives, which were mostly policy-oriented. MCDRR’s five-year plan 
included four objectives: One of these objectives promoted disaster management and climate 
change policy (objective 3), and another advanced mainstreaming DRR in development policies 
and practices (objective 4) (MCDRR, 2015). The other two objectives concerned organisation 
building (objective 1) and partnership outreach (objective 2) (MCDRR, 2015).  
Fourth, the interviews made it clear that 2015 was a stepping stone for MCDRR to increase 
their role in the advocacy process. MCDRR members framed 2012–2015 as a ‘low-profile’ stage 
for the organisation.
28
 During this period, MCDRR’s activities mostly involved organising and 
participating in a series of meeting, workshops and survey assessments on DRR. This has 
gradually moved into engaging in active advocacy to the government. 
 
For about three years, MCDRR was not well known, but in 2015, we [MCDRR] became known by 
other networks. (interview with a male MCDRR member, 17 December 2015) 
 
The breaking point in 2015 began with the formulation of MCDRR’s strategic plan document. 
The workshop process to develop this document was supported by two international 
organisations: the European Union and World Vision International (MCDRR, 2015). The 
document describes the vision, mission, principles and key areas of the work of consortium. In 
navigating their actions, MCDRR stands on three key themes of vision and mission: (1) resilient 
communities and cities; (2) capacity building, coordination, collaboration, sharing and learning; 
and (3) overcoming climate change and other hazards (MCDRR, 2015). MCDRR’s advocacy 
agenda was not mentioned specifically in the document. Advocacy is new for MCDRR. The 
consortium even noted this issue as part of the ‘threats’ in their analysis: ‘There is no 
representation for advocacy for new comers’ (MCDRR, 2015). However, in interviews, members 
of the consortium asserted that MCDRR is valuable as a vehicle for advocacy: 
 
If you really want to have successful advocacy, the better approach is through the network. Advocacy 
by a single organisation to the government is not strong, but by the network it becomes approachable. 
Because today, the agenda is political; we influence parliament. (interview with a male NGO staff 
member, 19 November 2015) 
 
Fifth, MCDRR’s advocacy predominantly aims to influence the policy process rather than 
legislation. In March 2015, MCDRR participated in the development of the ‘National 
Framework for Community Disaster Resilience’ along with other DRR multi-stakeholder 
platform, such as the DRR WG. This national framework aimed to provide a ‘coherent approach 
and recommendations for action’ to achieve ‘people-centred, inclusive, and sustainable 
socioeconomic development’ in Myanmar (PreventionWeb, 2017). MCDRR also participated 
consistently in the International Day for DRR, held annually by the government and the DRR 
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WG. In an interview, a member of the consortium described the DRR advocacy process in 
Myanmar as follows: 
  
Raising awareness and advocacy become important because there are unclear procedures in the law 
making: Are they going to publish the draft and seek consultation? Even before publishing the draft, 
the government asks for public consultation. They give us a few days to ask for this [input]. Civil 
society has to ask the government first about the draft; then they would share. Civil society 
organisations have to go to Nay Pyi Taw to improve the draft. The procedures are not that clear. If 
there is some public attention [to the bill], they ask for civil society organisations’ advice, but some 
bills are not yet transparent. (interview with a male MCDRR member, 16 December 2015) 
 
Sixth, as the above interview extract already shows, a good relationship with the government 
is crucial for opening access to the policy-making process. MCDRR acknowledged the need to 
make an initial move to start the discussion on policy steering. In transitional settings like 
Myanmar, governments that were trained to control and monitor NGOs and civil society 
organisations (CSOs) for decades often remain suspicious of the work of these groups. This 
problem is reflected in the following extract from an interview with a high-level official of the 
RRD, a government body for disaster management, illustrating the degree of mistrust of non-
state actors: 
 
The NGOs have to submit a report to us. Some of them send incomplete reports to us. We would like 
to check how they spend their budget. 85% of the budget should go to the community. We have to 
check this commitment—whether they reach this percentage. We also monitor their programme by 
coordinating with the region and township levels. (interview with a male high-level RRD official, 11 
December 2013) 
 
In addition, CSOs were often accused of being too political or even politicised. In an 
interview with an activist from the National Democratic Institute Myanmar (a non-profit 
organisation supporting democratic institutions), he stated that, in a politically fast-changing 
environment like Myanmar, CSOs have to conduct ‘good analysis with solid evidence’ on their 
movement to avoid accusations of politicisation: 
 
There is a tendency for politicisation because CSOs were born from a social movement, and this 
[development of CSOs] is an uprising now. So, for CSOs doing advocacy work, they should have 
more and better information and good analysis. If they want to do advocacy, they have to come up 
with solid evidence for why they like or dislike [something] about the government policy. Only then 
the advocacy will be efficient. Otherwise, CSOs can be blamed: ‘You have been politicised; you are 
too political’. (interview with a male activist from the National Democratic Institute Myanmar, 18 
November 2015) 
 
To achieve effective advocacy, almost all of the interviewed NGO employees were 
convinced that advocacy should be carried out with a more indirect, subtle and polite approach, 
because they believed this would ease the relationships and trust building (see also Srikandini, 
forthcoming). The following interview extract, for example, indicates that, in meetings with 
government officials, MCDRR members tried to be polite:  
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To approach to the government is not that challenging. The only thing is, how do you look at your face 
in the mirror? If you smile, you get a smile. If you make an ugly face, then you get an ugly face. I 
think it’s the same philosophy. (interview with a male MCDRR member, 16 December 2015) 
 
In other words, only by acting politely and articulating their views in subtle way, could MCDRR 
members expect to get a positive and effective response from the government. After being 
dominant and central under military rule, the government is in the process of changing to one 
that listens and embraces external input. This change will take some time, as the relations 
between the government and the people have been absent for many decades.
29
 The strategy of 
not being direct could also mean providing input without ‘blaming and shaming’ the 
government.
30
 Interviews with staff members working for UN agencies and international NGOs 
revealed some of the challenges involved in working with the government. Five key challenges 
are summarised as follows: 
 
(1) Lack of human resource capacity: The willingness of top-level government staff 
members to embrace policy input from external actors was often hampered at the 
execution/implementation level by middle–low bureaucratic staff members because of 
their lack of knowledge on disaster management. 
(2) High demand from the government for UN agencies and international NGOs to provide 
additional resources (i.e. financial support to assist with government programmes)  
(3) Lack of understanding of union-level government regarding the reality on the ground  
(4) Coordination problems in inter-ministerial work on DRR crosscutting issues 
(5) Geographical distance between Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon is a challenge for the 
coordination between government and NGOs (in terms of time and cost; one hour by 
flight or six hour by car) 
5.3.4. Indonesia and Myanmar: A comparison 
The previous sections have traced the advocacy activities carried out by two DRR 
governance networks in Indonesia and Myanmar. This section will identify the crosscutting 
findings for the advocacy work of the Indonesian alliance and the Myanmar consortium. 
The first overlapping theme that emerged from the analysis of the data from the two cases 
concerns the fact that, although the actors had different positions and interests, they were able to 
cooperate because they had a common goal within the network. For the Indonesian alliance, the 
goal of revising the Disaster Management Law was strongly articulated by the different members 
of the network. Their advocacy goal was clearly developed and rationalised through their 
criticisms of the law. The alliance assigned working groups to discuss specific topics such as 
public participation, institutional strengthening and partnership. Each working group studied 
critical points and gaps surrounding these issues. Meanwhile, for the Myanmar consortium, 
‘locality’ became the modality for their advocacy work. This was articulated in their 
organisational purpose to ‘support local organisations in coordinating, networking and 
information sharing related to DRR at all levels’. Their involvement in the development of the 
‘National Framework for Community Disaster Resilience’ along with the DRR WG also aimed 
to bring the voice of national NGOs into the advocacy arena. In the complex setting of 
governance networks, a well-defined collective goal is crucial to achieve sustainability of this 
                                               
29 Interview with a female UN agency staff member, 17 October 2014 
30 Interview with a male international NGO staff member, 30 September 2014 
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multifaceted work. This finding supports the premise that a ‘goal-directed’ network (Ospina and 
Saz-Carranza, 2010: 417) with ‘a unifying vision’ is better able to articulate their work (Provan 
and Kenis, 2008: 231). 
Second, in both Indonesia and Myanmar, the members of the alliance and consortium highly 
valued the importance of the ‘governance network’ as a strategic way to achieve the advocacy 
goal. One respondent from the consortium in Myanmar even stated that conducting advocacy 
through a governance network determined the success of the advocacy effort with the 
government. Third, as a way of articulating their interests, both networks used various advocacy 
modes to gain media exposure, organise public campaigns, lobby and meet with government 
representatives. 
The cases of Indonesia and Myanmar also presented distinctive characteristics. In Indonesia, 
the members of the network were already active and had more than 10 years of experience 
working on DRR in Indonesia. In contrast, in Myanmar, the active involvement of the non-state 
actor platform was more recent. 
Although they shared concerns regarding government legislation and policy practice, the 
Indonesian alliance’s advocacy work was mainly legislative advocacy. Almog-Bar and Schmid 
(2014) define legislative advocacy as the process of influencing legislation and law making 
(Almog-Bar and Schmid, 2014: 22). In Myanmar, the work of the consortium predominantly 
revolved around policy advocacy through influencing discourse and agenda-setting on policy 
development. In terms of the typology of advocacy activities cited earlier in the chapter, both 
networks commonly used content development, insider communication and participation in 
multi-stakeholder processes. The advocacy was carried out through delivering legislative and 
policy input in their dialogue with their governments. However, the cases differed in that the 
Myanmar consortium had no specific strategy development or planning. The Indonesian Alliance 
for the Revision of the Disaster Management Law formulated a document explaining the 
rationale behind revising the law and listing problems with the existing law. The alliance also 
developed a research paper to support the argument for advocacy, including the practicalities of 
the advocacy trajectory. During the data collection for this study at the end of 2015, the 
consortium in Myanmar was in the process of developing a strategic plan of action.  
In terms of arena, the work of the DRR platform in Indonesia was predominantly governed 
by national NGOs with minimum involvement from international staff and consultants. In 
contrast, interactions among DRR actors in Myanmar were characterised by high levels of 
engagement of international organisations/NGOs. In practice, the monthly meetings of the DRR 
WG were conducted in English because most attendants were foreigners.  
In terms of advocacy channels, the strategies used by the two platforms led to different 
characteristics in their work. Adopting the argument of Almog-Bar and Schmid (2014) on 
‘advocacy tactics’, the advocacy by the Indonesian alliance can be considered ‘aggressive’ 
because of its use of the tactics of ‘lobbying for a bill or policy, testifying in hearings, releasing 
research reports, and encouraging members to write or call policy-makers’ (Almog-Bar and 
Schmid, 2014: 21). As for Myanmar, the advocacy was ‘less aggressive’ because they 
emphasised ‘meetings and socializing with government’ as their tactics (Almog-Bar and Schmid, 
2014: 21). 
In theory, the process of interactive governance reflects the interaction among plural actors 
who stand independently but act interdependently on a complex decision making. To gain the 
benefit from this process, each actors should engaged and aware on their role within the network. 
From the aspect of institutional-setting (polity), the governments positioning themselves as part 
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of the DRR network. In Indonesia, the government is the main actor on PLANAS while in 
Myanmar, the government is the Honorary Chair on DRR Working Group. However, their 
involvement on DRR specific network simply has no direct correlation with their degree of 
engagement. From the series of data collection, it proven that both government plays limited role 
on the process of interactive governance. In Indonesia, the government engaged in the discussion 
of the revision of the Law but left the initiative to the alliance, meanwhile in Myanmar, the 
consortium mostly had to make requests to the government to provide input on policy-making 
processes. Such paradox raise important question about the political willingness of the 
government to engaged on interactive governance. This research examined that the government 
wanted to keep their positional power as independent actor on the process of interactive 
governance. The government holds the power to determine the access for non-state actors to 
engage on policy process. This created asymmetrical relations between government and non-
state actors within the process of interactive governance. The norm that interactive governance 
would only benefit when the government actively engaged on the process, in practice, they want 
to maintain their controlling position.  
 
Table 5. Advocacy work of the DRR governance networks in Indonesia and Myanmar 
 Indonesia 
Indonesian Alliance for the Revision of the 
Disaster Management Law  
Myanmar 
Myanmar Consortium for DRR 
Network 
membership 
Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) 
and the Red Cross; more than 10 years of 
experience 
National NGOs with less than 10 
years of experience 
 
Advocacy 
activities 
Legislative advocacy Policy advocacy 
Type of 
advocacy 
 Strategy development and planning 
 Content development 
 Insider advocacy communication 
 Participation in multi-stakeholder 
processes 
 Content development 
 Insider advocacy communication 
 Participation in multi-
stakeholder processes 
 
Advocacy 
channels 
 Media exposure 
 Public Campaigning 
 Lobby 
(Aggressive advocacy) 
 Meetings 
 Public Campaigning 
(Less aggressive advocacy) 
Government 
relations 
Government engaged in the discussion of 
the revision but left the initiative to the 
alliance 
Poor initiative from the 
government—The consortium 
mostly had to make requests to 
provide input on policy-making 
processes 
System dynamics Supported regulation: Freedom of 
expression guaranteed by the constitution 
 
Constructive position from the government 
Weak regulation to support freedom 
of expression 
 
A level of distrust of civil society 
5.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed important advocacy practices in two DRR advocacy platforms in 
Indonesia and Myanmar. As was stated at the beginning of the chapter, although there have been 
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normative studies of ‘interactive’ governance on DRR, not much is yet known about the actual 
dynamics and practices within participating platforms and organisations. This chapter has 
attempted to contribute to the academic understanding of interactive governance by sharing 
analyses of observations and interviews with state and non-state actors involved in this process. 
Looking at both case studies, this paper draws three conclusions about DRR advocacy 
platforms. First, in terms of the arena (the institutional setting), the present study found that the 
members of the alliance and consortium generally claimed that a ‘governance network’, such as 
the ones they were involved in, is indeed an effective and efficient vehicle for advocacy. 
However, my analysis also showed that advocacy through an alliance or consortium is 
continuously developing, leaving much room for improvement in areas such as developing 
capacity and expertise to improve the process of insider advocacy communication with the 
government. In other words, the capacity, resources and strategy to build the advocacy profile 
are crucial for developing credibility and building a bargaining position vis-à-vis the 
government. Empirical evidence from both cases has demonstrated the value of a credible 
advocacy profile for creating a balanced position with the government. In the Indonesian case, 
the alliance used documents such as academic papers to justify their collective action to revise 
the law. In Myanmar, a clear advocacy strategy along with strong analysis of public issues were 
important to overcome government suspicion of the politicisation of civil society. 
Second, in the case of Indonesia, the advocacy process influenced the legislation process 
when civil society aimed to change the game through revising a law. Meanwhile, in Myanmar, 
MCDRR mostly worked on policy advocacy, where the baseline of the work is to provide policy 
recommendations to the government. 
Third, the success of advocacy is not determined only by the network but also very much 
depends on the positional power of the network vis-à-vis the government. Both Indonesia and 
Myanmar have experienced political changes from authoritarian regimes to relatively democratic 
settings. The system dynamics in both countries determined the advocacy work of the alliance 
and consortium. In Indonesia, freedom of expression is guaranteed by the constitution. The 
government has also acknowledged the role of civil society in policy steering. Here, BNPB left 
the alliance to take the initiative in the revision of the law. This situation created ‘political 
space’, a metaphorical arena for articulating interests and opinions to decision makers. 
Meanwhile, in Myanmar, the issue of distrust from the government toward civil society 
overshadowed freedom of expression. Regulations remained discriminative, and freedoms to 
express oneself and to make demands of the political system were restricted. Here, the 
government also controlled access to policy steering by determining whether there was a need 
for public hearings on the process of policy formulation. This made the involvement of civil 
society in policy steering relatively passive and less influential. 
This study’s analysis of the everyday practices of advocacy revealed that governments are 
not always fully engaged in the process of interactive governance. This suggests that advocacy 
through governance networks requires a strong common agenda because, without this, the work 
of collective action will be constantly hindered. Interactive governance on DRR is only fruitful 
in specific settings where the government fully plays its role as part of the process of interactive 
governance. In these dynamics, how governments position themselves towards external policy 
input, including granting non-state actors access to policy-making processes, determines to a 
great extent the outcomes and shape of the advocacy work. This exogenous factor of the political 
environment is crucial in developing the advocacy setting for DRR governance networks. 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
 
Disaster risk governance (DRG) has become a prominent focal point of the disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) agenda. DRG has a strong influence in determining the direction of the DRR 
movement at the global, national and local levels. The growing interest in this subject has 
manifested both in a number of academic discussions and in policy documents. Many scholars 
have developed work around the subject of DRG and related issues (see Chapters 1 and 2). 
Existing academic work on this topic can be categorised into three areas: (1) the structural 
arrangement of disaster governance (Enia, 2013; Gerber, 2007; Lassa, 2010; Lindsay, 2014; 
Seng, 2010); (2) the intertwined nature of mismanagement and vulnerability risk (Ahrens and 
Rudolph, 2006; Moe, 2010); and (3) the combination of DRR with topics such as globalisation, 
international constellations, social disparities, population issues (Tierney, 2012), political 
systems (Cho, 2014) and DRR global frameworks (Niekerk, 2015). In policy practice, DRG has 
received strong political support, and global frameworks on DRR have consistently stressed the 
need to strengthen DRG in order to achieve effective and efficient DRR (see Chapters 1 and 2). 
Advocacy on strengthening DRG is seen in many forms, including promoting inclusive 
mechanisms on DRR by involving both public and private actors in policy steering. This thesis 
uses the work of Gaillard and Mercer (2012: 95) to frame ‘inclusiveness’. Inclusiveness on DRR 
has three dimensions: (1) recognising that different forms of knowledge are valuable in 
addressing disaster risk; (2) acknowledging that actions at different scales (from the top down 
and from the bottom up) are necessary to reduce the risk of disaster in a sustainable manner; and 
(3) understanding that the two previous points require the collaboration of a large array of 
stakeholders operating across different scales (Gaillard and Mercer, 2012: 95). Inspired by this 
third dimension of inclusiveness (Gaillard and Mercer, 2012: 95), this thesis understood 
‘inclusiveness’ as the process of applying a pluricentric mechanism to reducing disaster risk. The 
pluricentric approach has recently become one of the most common paradigms used to explain 
alternative policy steering beyond the traditional state actor. This new paradigm has challenged 
the predominant role of the state in the policy realm by bringing the wide involvement of non-
state actors into the arena. 
The increasing focus on DRG has cast a great deal of attention on the practice of open and 
engaging coordination among all relevant stakeholders. However, crucially, the actual practice of 
DRG faces challenges. The study found that many decision makers and scholars shared the same 
concerns about the complexity and competitive nature of the arena of DRG (see Chapters 2 and 
3). It appears that, in practice, inclusiveness has ultimately remained unrealised, calling the idea 
and advocacy on this principle into question. Decision makers and scholars who participated in 
the present study agreed that the implementation of inclusiveness is complex because of 
problems associated with coordination, heavy bureaucracy, tension, trust and resources. 
The chief objective of this study was to revisit the concept of ‘inclusive DRR’ using insights 
from the field. This thesis selected two countries, Indonesia and Myanmar, as case studies for 
examining inclusive DRR. The experience from both countries enabled learning about the actual 
practice of governance networks on DRR and about the everyday realities in the field. For this 
purpose, an analysis of the ‘DRR governance network’ was the point of departure for the study. 
‘Governance network’ describes the interaction between actors who act autonomously but 
connect interdependently within a network. This is translated into different forms of 
organisational structure, including national committees, partnerships, multi-stakeholder 
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mechanisms, national platforms and working groups. This arena of interaction was at the heart of 
the present study, which was governed by three main research questions: 
 
 
(1) How has inclusive DRR been developed at the global level? 
(2) How does the principle of inclusiveness on DRG work in practice in Indonesia and 
Myanmar? 
2.1. What are the characteristics of the polity, policy and politics of DRG in Indonesia 
and Myanmar?  
2.2. To what extent has the actual practice of inclusiveness been affected by the 
domestic political environment? 
 To what extent has decentralisation in Indonesia contributed to DRG? 
 To what extent has political transition in Myanmar influenced the dynamics of 
DRG? 
(3) How has the idea of an interactive structure for DRR governance networks played out in 
Indonesia and Myanmar? 
3.1.  What explains the different perceptions of risk among multiple actors involved in 
the process of interactive governance?  
3.2.  What are the actual challenges to the practice of inclusive DRR in DRG? 
(4) What are the lessons learned on interactive governance from the two case studies? 
 
Indonesia and Myanmar are good cases to capture the interplay between DRG and the 
influence of the wider political environment on the dynamics of DRG, considering the extreme 
risks, policy transformations in disaster management and common political history found in the 
two countries. 
This chapter highlights the findings presented throughout the thesis and discusses the course 
of future challenges in this field. The next section summarises the answers to the three research 
questions. In the third section, analytical insights from the research are presented along with 
recommendations for how to move forward. Finally, the thesis closes with an assessment of the 
latest developments in the field of DRG and suggestions for a successful research agenda, 
moving forward. 
6.1. Answering the research questions 
To study the practice of inclusiveness, this thesis focused especially upon the political 
aspects of DRR governance networks. The thesis introduced the political dimension of inclusive 
DRR on DRG to address the metaphoric space of influence within policy steering in DRG. This 
concept was motivated by the intertwined elements of the triangle of governance: polity, politics 
and policy. The ‘politics of DRG’ was used with the aim of understanding different dimensions 
of the governance arena through exploring the context of the institutional setting (polity) in terms 
of both horizontal coordination (among government structures) and vertical coordination 
(between state and non-state actors); power relations (politics); and policy advocacy (policy). 
This approach helped in the overarching analysis of the structural arena of governance by 
facilitating the investigation of the negotiation of influence on policy steering. The questions 
listed in the previous section, which are related to this aspect of the governance networks in 
Indonesia and Myanmar in the global setting, oriented the development of the research. This 
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section summarises the meanings and interpretations drawn from the empirical findings 
presented in this thesis to answer each of the research questions. 
6.1.1. How has inclusive DRR been developed at the global level? 
At the global level, DRR practice has transformed from a top-down, state-centric and largely 
non-political issue into a more pluricentric governance network. DRR has become a global 
paradigm characterised by robust political commitment, a high level of participation of multiple 
actors and advocacy at a wide range of levels. This process began when the first global 
framework on disaster management was introduced 30 years ago in 1987. Following this initial 
framework for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, the international 
community has consistently gathered to renew the strategy and priorities for action on DRR. To 
date, five DRR global frameworks have been adopted by the international community. 
The process of formulating these DRR global frameworks has largely embraced the principle 
of inclusive DRR. Through the conferences organised to establish these frameworks, DRR-
related actors have participated in the discussion, debate and negotiation (see Chapter 1). 
Although these frameworks were agreed and signed by the United Nations member states, the 
policy input structure was inclusive and engaging. At the World Conference on DRR (WCDRR) 
in 2015 and the Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR (AMCDRR) in 2014, the United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, as the main organiser of both conferences, 
attempted to consolidate voices from all DRR actors through the mechanism of multi-stakeholder 
panels. On these panels, representatives from all stakeholder groups including governments, 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), youth, the private sector, disability groups, 
academicians and the media came together to discuss relevant topics and generate policy 
recommendations. Specifically, the 2014 AMCDRR plenary session on multi-stakeholder 
dialogue attempted to gather and formulate input for the development of the Hyogo Framework 
for Action 2, later called the Sendai Framework for Action (SFA) 2015–2030. Following 
previous DRR global frameworks, SFA consistently governs the behaviour of actors in the 
pluricentric DRR global governance network. DRR-relevant actors mostly see their work to 
reduce risk as a way to contribute to the achievement of the priorities for action in the global 
frameworks for DRR. The frameworks elaborated the common goals and strategies used as 
guidelines for reducing disaster risk. These frameworks thus encompass the complex set of 
norms, rules, values and guidelines for governing DRR global action. 
In addition, the power relations (politics) surrounding policy formulation in the global arena 
reflect the use of power among DRR actors. To investigate this topic, the present study observed 
the negotiation process in high-level panels at the WCDRR and the AMCDRR. Observation of 
the high-level panel meetings at the 2014 AMCDRR revealed that states have diverse motives 
for collaborating on the DRR movement. At this meeting, each country composed their political 
statement in a normative way, explicitly stating their commitment to accelerating cooperation. 
The message moved into a more specific agenda when each country highlighted their focus in 
the cooperation on DRR. The present findings showed that the member states communicated 
their DRR agendas in different fashions, concluding that at least three motives drove the process 
of negotiation at the AMCDRR: interest-based, knowledge-based and power-based motives. 
Interest-based motives were mainly driven by the need to gain additional value from the 
cooperation. Governments sought to influence other member states by investing further in the 
resources (financing DRR) and by inviting other states to engage in information sharing. Both 
developing and developed countries were clearly positioned in the interest-based category. For 
developing countries, regional/global collaboration on DRR was important for gaining further 
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external assistance from developed countries and international organisations through DRR 
mainstreaming. For developed countries, the agenda on capacity development and information 
and knowledge sharing was important for sustaining their influence on DRR in developing 
countries. For knowledge-based motives, the key point of the policy statement involved the idea 
of disseminating and strengthening capacity. Here, collaboration was perceived as the arena for 
knowledge exchange. Finally, power-based motives revolved around the capacity of member 
states to drive the global agenda on DRR. Countries with a high level of financial and capacity 
resources had more influence in the negotiation process. In the WCDRR negotiation process, 
most of the countries that dominated the agenda setting and direction at the negotiation table 
were major donors to DRR financing. For instance, near the end of the conference, Japan, the 
host of the WCDRR, pushed other member countries to work in the spirit of compromise to 
move away from the negotiation stalemate. Japan even prepared a specific proposal in case the 
negotiation on the next DRR global framework was deadlocked. This move from Japan reflects 
the country’s positional power in terms of DRR: Japan is the biggest donor for DRR in the 
world, and the country has gained wide international support to host almost all of the world 
conferences on DRR, with its cities’ names commemorated in the global frameworks: the 
Yokohama Strategy, the Hyogo Framework for Action and the Sendai Framework. 
Finally, the advocacy process on DRR in the global setting takes place through a wide range 
of channels. During the WCDRR process, non-state actors aimed to influence governments in 
various ways, using formal, informal, direct and subtle channels. In terms of the formal 
approach, NGO and civil society representatives engaged in multi-stakeholder panel meetings to 
state their ideas and agendas, and the Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for DRR 
and Tearfund acted as ‘observers’, sitting behind the negotiation table to monitor the process of 
formal negotiation among countries. Meanwhile, outside the negotiation room, the informal 
approach was used in the convention hall, in the cafe and even in the restrooms (see Chapter 2). 
6.1.2. How does the principle of inclusiveness on DRG work in practice in 
Indonesia and Myanmar? 
Indonesia and Myanmar share a common background, in terms of both their political context 
and their high level of vulnerability. First, both countries experienced shifts in their political 
systems from military-type authoritarian regimes to systems of more democratic rule. Second, in 
Indonesia, the 1998 political reform (Reformasi) inspired political changes from centralistic to 
decentralist government, and Myanmar has taken sequential steps towards democratisation (i.e. 
political commitment to the Road Map to Democracy, elections and the release of political 
prisoners). Third, major disasters in both countries provide windows on policy change on 
disaster management. Fourth, these political changes and the momentum of major disasters have 
influenced the dynamics of DRG alongside the promotion of the new value of inclusiveness in 
the arena. Drawing on the presentation of findings and analysis regarding the dynamics of DRG 
in Indonesia and Myanmar (Chapters 3, 4 and 5), this sub-section highlights the major 
characteristics of DRG in both countries to answer three sub-questions listed under the second 
main research question. 
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6.1.3. What are the characteristics of the polity, policy and politics of DRG in 
Indonesia and Myanmar? 
6.1.3.1. A heavily bureaucratic set-up on DRR (polity) 
 
Vertical coordination 
 DRG in Indonesia and Myanmar has several common characteristics in terms of the vertical 
coordination of DRR. In both cases, the bureaucratic governmental structure is highly organised 
and procedural. In Indonesia, the structure consists of 22 related ministries and bodies. In 
Myanmar, the bureaucratic layers are massive, consisting of many levels of political bodies and 
bureaucratic officers. Second, inter-ministerial coordination has become the most pronounced 
problem for inter-governmental bodies. In Indonesia, although some related ministries have 
integrated DRR into their organisational programmes and activities, the perception that DRR is 
the responsibility of the Indonesian National Agency for Disaster Management (Badan Nasional 
Penanggulangan Bencana, BNPB) was often voiced by the interviewees. As a newly developed 
ministerial-level agency, BNPB attempted to position itself as a ‘collaborator’ instead of a 
‘coordinator’.  
In Myanmar, at the inter-ministerial level, information exchange and coordination were 
considered weak, leading to misinformation on policy implementation in inter-ministerial work. 
Third, both countries are characterised by tension between the central/national government and 
the local government. In the case of Indonesia, decentralisation was framed strongly by the 
central government, whereas local government representatives discussed this topic in a negative 
tone. The Regional Disaster Management Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana 
Daerah, BPBD) tended to support direct authority, considering access to increased resources 
from the national budget. In Myanmar, there is an indirect line of authority between the 
government structures at the union (national) level and at the state, district and township levels. 
The Relief and Resettlement Department (RRD) at the union level has no direct authority in 
terms of the coordination or structure of RRD at the local level. Meanwhile, RRD at the local 
level has direct authority over the General Administration Department of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. Furthermore, there is weak support on programme and budget from the union level to 
the state, district, township and village levels. The budget from the union level only reaches the 
district level. 
 
Horizontal coordination: Governance network platforms (polity) 
In both cases, DRR governance networks were found to exist in different institutional forms. 
In Indonesia, the institutionalisation of DRR followed a pluricentric approach through the work 
of the National Platform (Platform Nasional, PLANAS). This platform is a multi-stakeholder 
forum for DRR in Indonesia in which the government is one of the members. The role and 
mandate of PLANAS are governed through the ‘Government Regulations on Disaster 
Management’ (№ 21/2008), which mentions that the ‘national action plans for DRR […], 
thoroughly organised and integrated into a forum that includes elements of the government, 
nongovernment organisations, the general public and the private sector, were coordinated by 
BNPB’. In Myanmar, the government works closely with an active multi-stakeholder platform 
called the DRR Working Group (DRR WG). This working group consists of 49 member 
organisations including the United Nations, international and local NGOs and independent 
consultants. The DRR WG has played an active role in DRR advocacy, including contributing to 
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the development and capacity building of local NGOs. At the time of this research, 
approximately 18 local NGOs were involved in the working group, marking its commitment to 
the development of non-state actors in the country. 
6.1.3.2. Asymmetrical relations between state and non-state actors (politics) 
In both Indonesia and Myanmar, the advocacy arenas for NGOs and other non-state actors 
are simultaneously widening and shrinking. In the interviews conducted for this study, 
government and non-state actors in both countries acknowledged the important role of each party 
by affirming the ‘good stage’ of their partnership. However, beyond this statement, in both cases, 
the findings indicate that the relationship is headed in an asymmetrical direction. Representatives 
of PLANAS revealed that, in partnerships, both parties work together to ‘a limited level’. The 
government engages PLANAS only at the final stage of policy evaluations, and the members of 
the network demand a more comprehensive engagement. In other words, the government 
determines and controls access to policy steering. In Myanmar, the government upholds its 
influence over the working group by driving the agenda of the governance network. In their 
organisational profile, the DRR WG positions itself as a ‘government-led model of DRR 
coordination’. However, in practice, the partnership initiative is often driven by the need to fulfil 
the government’s needs (demand-driven). This practice contradicts the basic idea of a 
governance network, where the complex process of interactive governance should achieve 
common goals within the network. 
The empirical findings from Indonesia and Myanmar lead to the conclusion that the state has 
a pivotal role in the DRR governance network. The government exercises its power by 
positioning itself as the ‘manager of policy interaction, the governance of governance’ (Torfing 
et al., 2012: 122). In academic literature, this dynamic can be framed within the concept of 
‘meta-governance’, which describes ‘deliberate attempts to facilitate, manage and direct more or 
less self-regulating process of interactive governance without reverting to traditional statist styles 
of government in terms of bureaucratic rule making and imperative command’ (Torfing et al., 
2012: 122). In Indonesia and Myanmar, the governments were found to give direction to the 
governance network by (1) determining network members’ access to policy steering and (2) 
influencing the agenda of the network. 
6.1.3.3. Policy advocacy (policy) 
Governance networks have been acknowledged as strategic vehicles for DRR advocacy in 
Indonesia and Myanmar, consistently helping to accelerate non-state actors’ policy input to the 
government by facilitating information and knowledge exchange. Governance networks were 
also found to accelerate the process of agenda setting on advocacy, create various channels to 
influence the government, and strengthen advocacy alliances. In Indonesia, DRR advocacy has 
gone beyond policy-based advocacy. The initiative through the Indonesian Alliance on the 
Revision of Disaster Management Law № 24 in 2007 demonstrates the development of the 
advocacy movement towards legislative change. In contrast, in the context of Myanmar, the 
advocacy process strongly revolves around policy consultation and technical support. 
Despite these distinct advocacy types, both cases show the richness of advocacy activities. 
First, the use of multiple channels of advocacy has extended the viability of reaching diverse 
audiences. The DRR advocacy networks in both Indonesia and Myanmar have engaged in direct 
and formal advocacy processes, which mostly revolve around bilateral, trilateral and multilateral 
meetings, hearings and consultations. Second, for the purpose of reaching the public, different 
activities are undertaken, including media exposure, public campaigns and lobby. Finally, 
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particularly in a context with a strong history of authoritarianism such as that seen in Myanmar, 
actors tend to use a backdoor, non-confrontational approach in executing their advocacy 
strategies (Ware, 2012). It is crucial and strategic for non-state actors to frame the agenda in such 
a way that the government feels they are not being ‘blamed and shamed’. 
Table 6 gives an overview of the dynamics of DRG in Indonesia and Myanmar. As the table 
shows, there are many similarities in DRG within the local parameters. However, a major 
difference is found in the role of the international community. Whereas key players are almost 
entirely Indonesian experts in the Indonesian case, in Myanmar, the international community 
plays a major role in DRG. 
  
Table 6. Dynamics of Disaster Risk Governance in Indonesia and Myanmar: A Comparison 
Subject Indonesia Myanmar 
Commitment to 
DRR mainstreaming 
Policy transformation on 
disaster management after the 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 
 
Disaster management 
adopted into law (Disaster 
Management Law № 24) in 
2007 
Policy transformation on 
disaster management after 
cyclone Nargis in 2008. 
 
Myanmar Action Plan on 
DRR 2009–2015 
 
Experience  Exposed to disaster 
management since the response 
and rehabilitation phases in the 
aftermath of the 2004 tsunami 
in Aceh. An estimated 300 
international NGOs worked 
during these phases 
(ReliefWeb, 2005), with more 
than USD 1 billion in 
humanitarian aid (The 
Guardian, 2014) 
Exposed to disaster 
management since the 
response and rehabilitation 
phases in the aftermath of 
Cyclone Nargis in 2008. An 
estimated 170 organisations 
worked during these phases 
(Srikandini, 2010), with more 
than USD 607 million in 
humanitarian aid (UN 
OCHA, 2009) 
 
Legal document Enacted by Disaster 
Management Law № 24/2007 
Myanmar Action Plan on 
DRR 2009–2015 
 
Bureaucratic set-
up 
22 related ministries work on 
the issue of disaster 
management 
 
10 ministries comprise a 
sub-committee of the 
National Disaster 
Preparedness Committee, and 
a total of 36 ministries work 
on DRR-related issues 
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Line of authority 
from central to local 
government 
regarding work on 
DRR 
 
Line of authority from the 
RRD (Ministry of Social 
Welfare) regarding work on 
DRR reaches only the district 
level 
 
The work on DRR at local 
(both provincial and regional) 
levels is the responsibility of 
BPBD, reaching down to the 
community level 
 
Budget for disaster 
management 
For 2015–2019, BNPB 
receives IDR 8.7 trillion (equal 
to USD 653 million for five 
years, or USD 116 million/year) 
 
Estimated annual budget 
for disaster management of 
USD 100 million 
National capacity DRR mainstreaming driven 
by national capacity 
 
Assistance from UN and 
International NGOs on DRR 
mainstreaming 
Engagement with 
international 
organisations/NGOs 
Meetings and workshops are 
dominated by national DRR 
specialists 
31 of 49 members of the 
DRR WG are international 
organisations or NGOs. DRR 
WG meetings are dominated 
by international DRR 
specialists 
 
 
Multi-stakeholder 
platforms 
Various active multi-
stakeholder platforms: National 
Platform (Platform Nasional), 
the Indonesian Society for 
Disaster Management 
(Masyarakat Penanggulangan 
Bencana Indonesia), Indonesia 
Experts for Disaster 
Management (Ikatan Ahli 
Bencana Indonesia) 
 
The DRR WG and the 
Myanmar Consortium for 
DRR are the active multi-
stakeholder platforms on 
DRR 
Funding for multi-
stakeholder platforms 
Funding relies heavily on 
collaboration with the 
government 
 
Minimal funding support 
from internal member 
organisations 
Strong funding support 
from internal member 
organisations 
Note: BNPB: Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (National Agency for Disaster Management); BPBD: 
Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah (Regional Agency for Disaster Management); DRR: disaster risk 
reduction; DRR WG: Disaster Risk Reduction Working Group; NGOs: nongovernmental organisations; RRD: 
Relief and Resettlement Department; UN: United Nations; UN OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs 
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6.1.4. To what extent has the actual practice of inclusiveness been affected by the 
domestic political environment? 
Political changes in Indonesia and Myanmar have significantly influenced the process of 
strengthening DRG in both countries. This change has stimulated the transformation of DRG 
towards a pluricentric approach and inspired the practice of inclusiveness by using multi-
stakeholder initiatives in policy advocacy.  
6.1.4.1. To what extent has decentralisation in Indonesia contributed to DRG?  
Decentralisation is a key agenda point for political reform in Indonesia. In the new system, 
decentralisation has created a political emphasis at the local level and justified the development 
of local institutions, including in the context of disaster management. DRR negotiations have 
shifted from Jakarta to the regency level. Additionally, the democratisation that began with 
political reforms in 1998 has facilitated the growing development of initiatives from non-state 
actors and from the community. The engagement of civil society in advocacy politics in 
Indonesia has taken shape through various multi-stakeholder platforms. Theses platforms were 
established independently from government. Specifically, decentralisation has justified the 
power sharing between two disaster management bodies: BNPB at the national level and BPBD 
at the provincial and regency levels. In other words, as a consequence of the decentralisation of 
DRG, the lines of authority between BNPB and BPBD are more about ‘coordination’ than 
‘authority’. BPBD reports to the governor of the province, and the operational budget for the 
institution comes from the provincial/regency budget. 
6.1.4.2. To what extent has political transition in Myanmar influenced the dynamics 
of DRG? 
The commitment to initiating democratisation began with the process of the Road Map to 
Democracy (2003), when the country agreed to undertake a seven-step programme for 
Myanmar’s transition to a democratic state. This political milestone reflects the direction of 
Myanmar’s democratic trajectory, and this transitional process has helped Myanmar to be open 
to various aspects of international engagement, including humanitarian assistance. The political 
transition has stimulated a conducive environment for non-state actors to play a role in DRR 
across the country. The government’s behaviour has shifted from that of a closed-minded regime 
to be more inclusive in terms of engaging United Nations agencies, the Red Cross and NGOs. 
Involving multiple actors in disaster management has caused a slight shift from a monocentric 
approach towards a more pluricentric governance network. This has facilitated the growth of 
metaphoric space for non-state actors to articulate their agendas on policy setting. The active 
presence of the DRR WG and the participatory approach taken by NGOs at the community level 
provide clear evidence supporting this conclusion. 
6.1.5. How has the idea of an interactive governance structure for DRR governance 
networks played out in Indonesia and Myanmar? 
The interface between government and civil society is seen in activities such as the 
formulation of the National Progress Report on the Hyogo Framework for Action, preparation 
meetings for international DRR negotiations (i.e. at the WCDRR) and public hearings on the 
Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (the National Mid-Term Development 
Plan). Within these interactions, civil society provides policy input and feedback to the 
government. For instance, in preparation for the WCDRR, representatives from the government, 
NGOs and civil society worked together to discuss Indonesia’s national interests and to 
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formulate the standing position for this conference. Meanwhile, turning to the larger picture, the 
DRR WG engaged in four areas of advocacy: strengthening DRR institutions, community-based 
disaster preparedness and mitigation, building DRR knowledge and institutions, and 
mainstreaming DRR in development sectors. This working group has been involved in a series of 
policy consultations, providing technical support to the government for policy development, as 
well as reports including a concept note on Myanmar’s Action Plan for DRR (2015), 
recommendations for Myanmar’s standing position at the WCDRR (2015) and a concept note on 
the Standing Order on Disaster Management (2015). 
6.1.5.1. What explains the different perceptions of risk among multiple actors 
involved in the process of interactive governance?  
Previous studies have shown that the different interpretations actors use to give meaning to 
disaster and risk affect the subsequent actions they take (Bankoff, Cannon, Kruger, Schipper, 
2015: 7; Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2009: 2). Starting from this argument, this thesis investigated the 
multiple perceptions of actors on risk in the complex interactions involved in interactive 
governance. 
First, in Indonesia, the present study revealed different points of emphasis on DRR for 
government officials (at national and local levels) and the community. Within the national 
government, perceptions about DRR were diverse. Four ministries at the national level and one 
local government body: Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional  (the Indonesian Ministry 
of National Development Planning), Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (the Indonesian 
Regional Body for Development Planning); BNPB (the National Agency for Disaster 
Management); the Ministry of Villages, Underdeveloped Regions and Transmigration; and the 
Ministry of Environment) perceived DRR as an approach to be adopted throughout the disaster 
management cycle, including preparedness, relief/emergency and rehabilitation. Differing 
perceptions translated into different agendas on DRR concerning issues such as land use and 
spatial planning, institutional strengthening, community-based approaches to resilience in 
villages and the integration of the development plan. Two government bodies stressed the 
component of infrastructure, including safe schools (the Ministry of Education) and watershed 
planning (the Ministry of Forestry). The Ministry of Social Affairs focused on building 
community capacity through establishing ‘disaster preparedness villages’ and ‘village emergency 
response units’ as a way to reduce the level of vulnerability within the community. In contrast, 
the community perception of risk revolved around vulnerability and human-caused disasters. 
Community members perceived disaster as a consequence of the climate (e.g. drought in a long dry 
season or flooding after heavy rainfall), but they also highlighted issues such as illegal logging 
causing landslides and land clearing driving wildfires. For NGOs, disasters had complex 
entanglements with issues such as illegal logging, poverty, poor awareness of environmental 
conservation, and weak village regulations and law enforcement, and they believed that DRR should 
be able to take on these underlying causes. This was later translated into livelihood programmes, 
agricultural training and advocacy on village regulations. Although the comprehensive approach to 
DRR enabled inclusion, it also meant that each actor could aim to make his or her own concerns 
central, and this risked leading to a fragmentation of DRR. 
In Myanmar, the government and Myanmar Consortium for DRR (MCDRR) shared a 
common goal: a resilient community. They agreed to prioritise the improvement of community 
capacity through community-based DRR. However, these two actors had different points of 
emphasis for how to achieve this goal. An interview with a high-ranking officer in the RRD 
demonstrated the government’s concern with the importance of training to build community 
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capacity. Meanwhile, MCDRR’s vision of ‘all communities and cities in Myanmar [being] 
resilient to and [overcoming] climate and other hazards’ (MCDRR, 2015) is broken down into 
their organisational objectives, which are mostly policy-oriented. To achieve this vision, the 
consortium has four objectives in their five-year plan. One of these objectives promotes disaster 
management and climate change policy, and another stresses mainstreaming DRR in 
development policies and practices (MCDRR, 2015). The other two objectives are more 
concerned with organisation building and partnership outreach (MCDRR, 2015). 
6.1.5.2. What are the actual challenges to the practice of inclusive DRR in DRG? 
Decentralised DRG in Indonesia has encountered implementation challenges. An 
organisational structure that is heavy on bureaucracy has added complexity to the DRR 
governance system in Indonesia. Resulting problems include poorly integrated work, 
coordination issues and an organisational ego. The advocacy arena for NGOs and other non-state 
actors is widening, but this space is also shrinking because the decision-making process has 
failed to develop a comprehensive plan for building a partnership. The present study concludes 
that the decentralisation process in Indonesia relies heavily on the development of local 
institutions, with moderate development in terms of institutional strengthening. 
In Myanmar, political transition has been less significant in influencing government bureaucracy 
in the institutional setting. In the context of DRG, government regulation operates through a 
multi-layered, organisational and heavily top-down approach that extends to the local level. This 
structure has created poor inter-ministerial coordination, as well as a power gap between 
government at national and local levels. In addition, the power relations among actors involved 
in DRG are asymmetrical: The government remains dominant in terms of influence over agenda 
setting. Horizontal and vertical coordination are major issues in Indonesia and Myanmar. 
Vertical coordination was more complex because the ambitions of decentralisation were not 
matched with institutional capacity at lower levels of governance. In Myanmar, the most striking 
aspect came when the government sought to continue to impose itself while seemingly adopting 
the language of inclusive DRR that was favoured by the international community. 
6.1.6. What are the lessons learned on interactive governance from the two case 
studies? 
In Indonesia and Myanmar, the actors involved in DRG generally claim that the governance 
network is an effective and efficient channel for advocacy. However, the present study found that 
advocacy through alliances or consortiums is continuously developing. First, improvements in 
capacity, resources and strategy to build a robust advocacy profile significantly strengthen 
credibility and bargaining position vis-à-vis the government. Data from this study indicate that a 
credible advocacy profile can create balance in relation to the government. In the Indonesian 
case, the alliance used documents such as academic papers to justify their collective action for 
legislative revision, and a clear advocacy strategy and strong research on public issues were 
suggested to overcome government suspicion regarding the politicisation of civil society in 
Myanmar. 
Second, the effectiveness of advocacy is determined by both the network and the positional 
power of the network vis-à-vis the government. Both Indonesia and Myanmar have experienced 
political changes from authoritarian regimes to relatively democratic settings. That being said, 
the nature of these changes has influenced the nuance of the advocacy work of alliances and 
consortiums in these countries. In Indonesia, the basic constitution guarantees space for civil 
society to express and articulate their views. The government has also acknowledged the role of 
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civil society in policy steering, most clearly by explicitly stating the role of PLANAS in a 
government regulation. In contrast, in Myanmar, there is no law protecting civil society’s 
freedom of expression, leaving space for the government to suppress any critique or protest. 
Third, as a complex interaction of state and non-state actors, the process of interactive 
governance requires actors on both sides to play an active role. In Indonesia and Myanmar, the 
governments often fail to engage fully in interactive governance. This can be seen in the 
asymmetrical power structure in the relationships between state and non-state actors. The 
government has a strong influence on agenda setting and is dominant in determining non-state 
actors’ access to policy formulation. These findings suggest that a robust collective goal is 
required to achieve an interactive governance of DRR that is constructive and productive. 
6.2. Overall assessment of DRG 
This thesis aimed to shed light on the actual practice of governance networks involved in 
DRR politics and to draw a critical note from the everyday reality in the field. The study found 
that DRR has undergone a transformation through two waves of change. First, DRR has 
transformed from a policy agenda into well-structured global governance, with strong political 
support and well-established norms, principles and guidelines. Second, the governance of DRR 
has shifted away from a monocentric approach that positioned the state as the single player, 
becoming a more pluricentric governance network (see Chapter 2). 
Learning from the insights generated by the field research, perhaps the most important 
question about the future of DRG is how to tackle the classical challenges to the governance 
network on DRR. This includes heavily bureaucratic procedures, resource issues and government 
dominance of policy steering (see Chapters 3, 4 and 5). These pitfalls in the practice of 
governance networks on DRR were also raised in the SFA as part of a section on a ‘lesson 
learned, a gap identified and future challenges’. 
Several challenges will need to be confronted as part of the future development of DRG. 
First, the growing frustration caused by heavily bureaucratic procedures has multiple significant 
effects on the work of the governance network on DRR (Chapters 4 and 5). This has contributed 
to the delay of the decision-making process, limitations to non-state actors’ advocacy access to 
the government and problems with coordination, especially in the inter-ministerial process 
(Chapters 3, 4 and 5). The SFA hardly addresses issues of government structure in its strategic 
priority for action on strengthening DRG. The global framework only mentions ‘the need for 
clear vision, plans, competence, guidance and coordination within and across sectors’. To some 
degree, this means that any action to improve the issue of the heavily bureaucratic nature of these 
processes will rely on the political willingness of governments. In this context, a key 
ministerial/agency body for disaster management should develop a specific mechanism for 
coordination to facilitate the process of information and knowledge exchange within the 
government structure. This mechanism should entail periodic and regular reports by DRR-
relevant government bodies to help the work across all sectors. In parallel, this mechanism would 
also impact the dynamics of the governance network by offering more coordinated efforts to 
govern policy steering. Advocacy access, which is often hindered by heavily bureaucratic 
procedures, might also increase through an open coordination mechanism in the inter-ministerial 
arrangement. 
Second, in terms of resource issues (see Chapters 3 and 4), the SFA specifically highlights 
the agenda of regulatory and financial means as a way to empower local authorities. In 
attempting to achieve this goal, strong political willingness from member states is critical to 
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improve the resource distribution from national to local governments. The agenda of resource 
distribution might require a clear and measurable plan and budget developed by the local 
government. Aside from financial resources, consistent planning to strengthen the capacity of 
human resources in the local government is also an imperative agenda item. 
Third, the dominant role of governments in governance networks on DRR (see Chapters 3, 4 
and 5) is driven by the need to direct and guide the work of these networks. This pivotal position 
in interactive governance also reflects the SFA’s framing of the initiative on DRR governance 
networks. One of the SFA’s priorities for action underlines the need to strengthen ‘government 
coordination forums’ made up of DRR-relevant stakeholders. From this perceptive, governments 
are seemingly positioned at the heart of these governance networks, playing the role of 
coordinator, but the spirit of interactive governance entails mutual dependency and parallel 
positions among its members. It is crucial to improve the positional power of non-state actors 
without undermining the preference of the government to govern the network. As such, a clear 
strategic advocacy agenda by non-state actors, as well as strong capacity in terms of resources 
and knowledge, would enable measurable action to empower these actors in negotiations with 
the government in the DRR governance network. 
Finally, it is important to note that inclusive DRR through governance networks is not likely 
to prevail solely through the establishment of specific multi-stakeholder mechanisms. Rather, the 
commitment to moving towards the ideal of interactive governance is far more important. 
Interactive governance requires solid collective action to navigate the complex process of 
interaction in order to achieve common objectives. Attempting to achieve this demands that 
governance network members have a strong political willingness, a concrete strategic plan and 
robust resources. Considering the growing interest and political support, it can be expected that 
interactive governance through governance networks will continue to become the future practice 
for institutionalising multi-stakeholder initiatives on DRR. 
6.3. Future development of DRG 
Over the next decade, presumably, we will witness consistent endorsement and advocacy on 
strengthening DRG, in which governance networks on DRR will increasingly be the ideal in 
terms of policy steering. At least until 2030, the commitment to uphold this approach has the 
political consensus of the United Nations member states. The SFA establishes seven global 
targets, one of which strongly calls for the strengthening of DRG. Specifically, the desired 
outcome is to ‘substantially increase the number of countries with national and local DRR 
strategies by 2020’. In attempting to achieve this target, the priority for action on strengthening 
DRG is a dominant feature of the current and future DRR movement. This includes promoting 
the coherency of laws and regulations, strengthening government coordination forums, and 
empowering local authorities through regulatory and financial means. To understand this 
important development, robust research on the endogenous dynamics of DRR governance 
networks is crucial. Research of this type will contribute not only to the empowerment of DRG, 
but also to supporting the achievement of the SFA overall. However, despite the findings of this 
thesis, a great deal of work remains to done to advance the current understanding of governance 
networks on DRR. 
First, this thesis had limited opportunities to investigate the power relations between the state 
and DRR global agencies. As mentioned in Chapter 2, DRR has transformed into a global 
structure of governance, and the question of how states position themselves in terms of the global 
strategic guidelines seeking to govern their behaviour is intriguing and of critical concern. Do 
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states continue to exercise their power to keep their dominance in the global arena, as was 
observed in practice in the cases of Indonesia and Myanmar? 
Second, further research to develop robust policy recommendations for strengthening the 
work of DRR governance networks is also important to bridge academic work and policy 
practice. Among the urgent topics that have not been covered in this thesis is the political 
mapping of DRR global governance networks. This would describe the trends and practices of 
DRR interactive governance from the perspective of member states and non-state actors. 
Third, there are theoretical challenges to advancing the research on DRR interactive 
governance, and research on this topic remains under-theorised. Despite the extensive work by 
scholars on the governance-related topic of DRR, there is a lack of work specifically on the 
dynamics of DRR governance networks. In future academic work on DRR governance, the in-
depth study of interaction within governance networks should be given more attention. 
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